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ABSTRACT'
This thesis examines information-processing in chronic pain. "Schematic"
processing is investigated selective memory for pain-related information is explored
in depressed and non-depressed chronic pain patients, depressed non pain-patients and
controls. A memory bias for sensory adjectives is found in the non depressed chronic
pain group, while a tendency to over-recall both sensory and affective compared to
neutral information is found in the depressed chronic pain group. No memory bias
is observed in an acute pain group, and the implications of this are discussed. A
possible cognitive avoidance mechanism is identified in depression.
A questionnaire assessing beliefs about pain ("conceptual" processing) is
developed and validated, and shown to differentiate between chronic pain patients
and controls. The impact of two interventions for chronic pain (surgery and
cognitive-behavioural management) on schematic and conceptual processing is
investigated prospectively. In general the endorsement of organic beliefs decreases
while the emphasis on psychological beliefs increases post-intervention. Evidence is
found to suggest that surgery, but not cognitive-behavioural treatment, reverses pain-
related memory biases. This is discussed in relation to changes in pain intensity.
Evidence is provided to suggest that beliefs are causally related to several pain-
related measures including anxiety, depression, health locus of control, cognitive
coping strategies and activity levels.
A word completion paradigm is employed to explore further the role of schematic
processing in chronic pain, and finally, a lexical decision task is used to assess the
role of word frequency effects in information-processing in chronic pain. These
results suggest that memory biases in chronic pain cannot be explained by frequency
effects, hence addressing the validity of the memory biases described earlier in the
thesis.
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Chapter 1 IntrnIuctio,t
This introductory chapter aims first to provide an overview of the psychological
factors identified as being involved in the experience of pain. Differences between
acute and chronic pain, and the issue of organic versus psychogenic pain are outlined.
This is followed by a brief description of the neurological foundations of pain, the
Specificity and Gate Control theories of pain, and the extent to which each can
account for clinical observations. A parallel processing model of pain-distress is then
presented. The distinction between sensory and affective components of pain is
discussed, with particular reference to their assessment Next, the problem of
depression in chronic pain patients is addressed, in relation to demographic,
cognitive, coping and other psychological variables. Following this general
introduction is a review of the literature concerning the role of affect in cognitive
processes, including mood-related attentional biases, mood congruency and state
dependent memory effects. The specific issue of the association between pain, affect
and memory, with which much of this thesis is concerned is then presented, along
with the empirical evidence. Associative network models, schemata theory and an
integrated model for these findings are compared within an information-processing
framework Finally, the goals of the thesis are outlined.
The Puzzle of Pain
In his seminal work uThe Puzzle of Pain" (1973), Ronald Melzack eloquently
describes one of the major problems facing all health care professionals working with
12
pain sufferers; namely, that there is no single consistent link between injury and pain.
The commonly held belief that the greater the damage to the body, the more intense
the pain, is not invariably the case. Frequently observed are instances where serious
is sustained but no pain is felt, as in congenital analgesia, soldiers wounded in battle
(Beecher, 1959), and more recently in a population of hospital accident and
emergency department attenders (Melzack et al, 1982). Conversely, pain is sometimes
present when no injury has occurred, no tissue-damaging disease process is present,
or long after healing is completed, as in the case of tension headaches (Olesen,
1986), and low back pain where in 70% of cases no damage can be found
responsible (Loeser, 1980). Clearly these examples provide the extremes of a
continuum depicting the relationship between pain intensity and injury severity. Thus
although pain has obvious survival value in certain circumstances, preventing further
damage and promoting healing through enforced inactivity, it also serves no obvious
useful purpose at many other times.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN PAIN
The observation that there is no simple relationship between injury and pain
implies that other factors are significantly influencing the experience of pain. Many
factors, labelled "psychological" (as distinct from biological, physical or genetic etc.)
have been identified as making an important contribution. Studies can broadly be
grouped under the following headings, and will briefly be discussed in turn: culture,
personality, learning, social modelling, control, cognition and attribution, placebos
and hypnosis. Clearly, they are highly inter-related, with considerable overlap. The
aim is not to be exhaustive, but to give a flavour of these areas of work.
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Cultural determinants of pain
The way in which people respond to pain is known to valy enormously between
cultures. Many instances have been documented where an individual is subjected to
apparently appalling procedures, for example ritual insertion of hooks into the
muscles of the back, then swinging from a cart for extended periods of time in parts
of India (Kosarnbi, 1967), and trepanation (scraping of the scull) in East Africa.
These individuals appear to experience no pain, and exhibit no signs of distress,
indeed in the first example the procedure is associated with great honour and
"exaltation"
Several studies have examined the influence of ethnicity on thresholds. Although
evidence suggests that the majority of people share a common sensation threshold,
pain perception and pain tolerance thresholds are culture-related. Sternbach and
Tursky (1965) found that the level of electric shock needed for the stimulus to be
detected did not differ between Italian, Jewish, Irish or Old American subjects. In
contrast, Clark and Clark (1980) found that Nepalese climbing expedition porters
require significantly higher levels of electric shock than their Occidental climbing
visitors before they label them as painful. This is despile the fact that both groups
were equally sensitive to changes in shock intensity.
Zborowski (1952) suggests that such findings reflect differences in attitudes
towards pain and pain expression (ie. groaning, crying out), rather than intrinsic
differences in the sensory experience between groups. These results highlight the
importance of distinguishing between peoples' overt reaction to pain - their
behaviour, which is readily observed - and their actual perception of pain, which can
never truly be measured. Essentially, pain is a subjective experience which is
14
communicated to others solely through language and behaviour (issues related to the
measurement of pain are discussed later).
Personalüy Variables
A strong link exists between an individual's personality and their past experience
and culture, to the extent that they are probably inextricable. However, other
personality variables have been shown to be associated with certain pain conditions.
Hanvik (1951) explored the relationship between low back pain and scales on the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Thirty sufferers with clear
pathology were compared with 30 with no clear pathology. The first group were
observed to show increased scores on the depression scale, but lower hypochondriasis
and hysteria scores. A second specific profile on the MMPI was demonstrated by
Gentry et a! (1974) in chronic low back pain patients. They found that this group had
a strong need to appear socially acceptable, and they exhibited emotional conflicts
somatically. They were characteristically extrovert and sociable, yet also self-centred,
dependent and demanding of others. In a comparison of acute and chronic pain
patients, Philips (1964) found that female low back pain patients had elevated
hysteria, depression and hypochondriasis scores in relation to female fracture patients,
whose scores in turn were only slightly raised compared to normal controls. Such
personality variables have also been correlated with treatment outcome. Spinal
fusions appear to be more successful in individuals scoring lower on the hysteria,
hypochondriasis and depression scales of the MMPI compared to high scorers who
fare less well (Wilfing et al, 1973). Although these studies provide a clue to the
relationship between pain and personality, it is not clear whether such findings reflect
15
premorbid personality differences, or changes in personality attributes as a
consequence of the pain, or, indeed a mixture of the two.
Learning
The role of learning in pain is at one level plainly evident. From birth onwards
we learn through experience to avoid hot or sharp objects, and that certain behaviours
result in pain reduction. When dogs are raised in complete isolation, deprived of all
environmental sthnull, they fail to develop normal behavioural and emotional arousal
responses to noxious stimuli (Melzack and Scott, 1957). However, learning through
experience is most effective in dealing with acute pain episodes. Fordyce provides
a behavioural analysis of chronic pain based on Skinner's princip4 of operants" -
actions of the organism which can be either increased (reinforced) or decreased in
frequency of occurrence by their consequences. Under this analysis pain behaviours
(such as wincing, asking for help from others, taking medication, limping etc.), may,
to a large extent, be under the control of contingent reinforcements. Such
reinforcement may include attention and sympathy, pm medication, avoidance of
household chores and other unpleasant responsibilities. Fonlyce observes that if the
relationship between pain behaviour and contingent reinforcers can be severed,
marked improvements in the pain problem may occur, to the extent that the problem
may be resolved (Fordyce, 1978).
Social Modelling
The impact of witnessing the pain and distress of others is frequently great and
long-lasting. Typically, watching others exposed to pain or injury provokes patterns
16
of physiological arousal suggesting empathic emotional arousal (Berger, 1962; Craig,
1968). A wealth of diverse evidence supports the claim that modelling processes
influence cognitive and behavioural responses to noxious stimuli, the interpretation
of painful events, and the degree of emotional arousal. Observational learning plays
an important role in the acquisition of new and appropriate pain-related behaviours
with the advantage that injuiy and pain can be avoided by the individual, but it also
incurs the possibility that maladaptive responses, including sick-role behaviour, may
be learned (Craig, 1978).
Social modelling also provides an effective means of controlling pain and distress
in a clinical setting, especially in children (Melamed et a!, 1975; Melamed and
Siegel, 1975). However, the model needs to provide a realistic, credible message,
which must not differ too widely from the individual's expectations, for the process
to be effective. Several laboratoiy experiments have shown that tolerant and
intolerant models (people who are not subjected to pain, but behave either stoically
or demonstratively in front of the subject) have a significant impact on the intensity
of electric shock accepted by subjects (eg. Craig and Weiss, 1971; Craig and Best,
1977). Indeed, where models describe as painful a level of electrical stimulation
usually described as tingling, subjects also described the stimulation as painful on
77% of trials. This is compared to 3% of trials when no model was present (Craig,
Best and Ward 1975; Craig and Weiss, 1972). Psychophysical measures suggest that
exposure to a tolerant model is associated with reductions in autonomic reactivity
below that observed in a control (no model) group (Craig and Prkachin, 1978). All
these results point to the importance of social context in the experience of pain.
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Control, and the meaning of the situation
Thompson (1981) provides a definition of control which recognises that control
does not need 4xercised, or even real, for it to be effective - simply the perception
of control is sufficient control is "the belief that one has at one's disposal a response
that can influence the aversiveness of an event". Thompson categorizes control into
behavioural, cognitive, information and retrospective, and emphasizes the importance
of the meaning of the situation for the individual, in terms of the endurability,
desirability and predictability of the aversive evenUn a clinical setting it has been
demonstrated that patients who are pre-operatively given accurate information about
the type, intensity and duration of pain to expect, and provided with relaxation
coping strategies, report less pain and require less medication than patients who
receive no instructions (Egbert et a!, 1964). However, information alone may magnify
pain and anxiety (Langer et a!, 1975), and inadequate control may be worse than no
control at all (Weisenberg er a!, 1985).
In a study relating locus of control to pain coping strategies and psychological
distress, Crisson and Keefe (1988) found that chronic pain patients who viewed
health outcomes as controlled by chance tended to rely on maladaptive pain coping
strategies and showed greater psychological distress, including depression, anxiety
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and feelings of helplessness, compared to
patients with other locus of control orientations.
The belief that pain and its effects on life are under personal control has also
recently been examined in chronic pain patients by Jensen and Karoly (1991). They
demonstrated that the belief that it is within one's ability and resources to manage
pain, is positively related to well-being and activity levels.
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Cognitive factors in pain
Ross, Gil and Keefe (1988) have pointed out that the cognitions commonly
associated with the onset of acute pain, such as the idea that pain is a warning signal,
and that some form of remedial action is indicated, can be seen to be adaptive.
however, as the pain persists, and patients pass into the sub-chronic and chronic
phases, cognitions frequently become irrational and maladaptive, including anxiety,
depression, guilt, anger and fear, and are typically resistant to change.
Cognitive distortions in chronic low back pain (CLBP) patients have been shown
to be correlated with general distress but not somatizations, and this correlation is not
due to the association of these factors with pain severity (Smith er a!, 1986).
Cognitive distortions have additionally been shown to be closely related to levels of
disability (Smith eta! 1986). Also, Lefebvre (1981) demonstrated that depressed LBP
patients make cognitive errors in interpreting experiences related to low back pain
compared to depressed non-pain subjects. Negative pain-related cognitions,
particularly those relating to feelings of helplessness and hopelessness have been
significantly associated with measures of pain intensity (during the past week), pain
distress, behavioural disruption and anxiety, and in addition cognitions concerning
feelings of hopelessness have, not altogether surprisingly, been found to be related
to depression (Boston et a!, 1990). These results were, however, complicated by the
confounding of measures of pain and anxiety; anxiety was found to correlate
significantly with the cognitive coping strategies and measures of pain. This could
be interpreted as suggesting that these coping strategies are more closely associated
with affective distress than pain intensity.
Further evidence that cogrntions can have significant impact on the experience of
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pain and distress is through the use of cognitive coping strategies, in the management
of pain. Cognitive methods aimed at altering the subjective component of pain
include imaginative inattention, transformation of context, imaginative transformation,
attention diversion and somatisation. Although not successful in increasing pain
tolerance in every individual, on every occasion, all these methods have therapeutic
value for some people, on some occasions (Turk, Meichenbaum and Genest, 1983).
Suggestion, placebos and attributions
The power of suggestion over the experience of pain is undisputed. Placebos,
which can be defined as chemically inert substances or procedures administered with
the suggestion that they will relieve pain, can exert considerable influence on pain,
to the extent that around 35% of patients gain relief from placebo compared to only
70% of patients treated with even high doses of morphine (Beecher, 1972). Many
curious properties of the placebo effect have been documented, including the finding
that their efficacy is always around 50% of the drug with which they are being
compared (in double blind trials) (Evans, 1985); they are more effective for severe
than mild pain (Evans, 1985); a dose-response relationship exists, injections are more
effective than oral preparations, and even the colour of the tablet appears to be of
iql2.
importance (Blackwell et a2. All these observations imply that both the implicit and
explicit suggestions made by the person supplying the drug are influential. However,
as Richardson (1989) points out, qualities such as the size and appearance of the
medication can have no influence on pain independently of the recipient's perception
of them, and as such, conclusion s about the efficacy of placebos may be
meaningless. Although researchers have attempted to identify the "placebo
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responder", no personality, inteffigence or suggestibility variables have consistently
been associated with response to placebo (see Shapiro and Moths, 1978). Several
theories have been advanced to account for the placebo effect, including reporting
error, cognitive dissonance, conditioning processes and anxiety reduction; each is
likely to play a role in the effect, and as yet the exact mechanisms axe poorly
understood.
Considerable evidence exists to suggest that under hypnosis, where attention is
focused intensely on the hypnotist, and away from other stimuli, and with appropriate
suggestion, subjects can be subjected to severe pain, even undergoing major surgery,
and yet report that they felt no pain, only sensations (Hilgard and Hilgard, 1986).
McGlashan et al (1969) provide evidence that such findings are more than merely
special examples of the placebo effect, by demonstrating that pain perception and
pain tolerance levels are markedly increased during hypnosis, but only the pain
perception threshold is increased after administration of a placebo.
ACUTE vs CHRONIC PAIN
The distinction between acute and chronic pain is made primarily on the basis of
duration. Acute pain, which is of recent onset or short duration is typically associated
with autonomic changes, anxiety and behavioural responses directed at seeking relief
from the pain. On the other hand, chronic pain, which is traditionally defined as pain
which has persisted for 6 months or longer (France, Krishnan and Houpt, 1988). is
often associated with a pattern of vegetative signs, helplessness, hopelessness and
depression. The pain is no longer biologically functional and frequently no adequate
explanation can be provided by doctors for its existence. Psychological factors play
21
an increasingly important role as the duration of pain increases, often with severe
impact on family and lifestyle, and the emergence of "abnormal illness behaviour"
(Pilowsky, 1969). Zarkowska and Philips (1986) found that although measures of
pain behaviour (complaint, avoidance and help-seeking), and subjective indices of
pain (sensory and affective) did not distinguish between acute and chronic pain
sufferers, the relationship between the subjective and behavioural components of pain
was different in these two groups, and became suonger with increased duration.. An
understanding of the process of change between acute and chronic pain states is of
obvious relevance to health professionals, in both aiding prevention of chronicity and
in the prediction of which patients with acute pain conditions are likely to become
chronic.
ORGANIC vs PSYCHOGENIC PAIN
Where no clear physical cause for pain can be identified, the pain is often labelled
"psychogenic" in origin. The patient is assumed to have some emotional,
motivational or personality problem as the primary cause of their pain behaviours
(Fordyce, 1978). For example, Engel (1959) identified a subgroup of patients without
detectable lesions who were characterized by excessive guilt feelings, intolerance of
personal success, and family histories where pain and aggression were prominent.
However, there is compeffing evidence to suggest that psychological disturbance is
the result, rather than the precipitant of chronic pain. For example, although chronic
pain patients show elevated scores on the hysteria, depression and hypochondriasis
scales of the MMPI, these scores decrease significantly after successful treatment of
the pain (Sternbach, 1974; Sternbach and Timmermans, 1975).
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The distinction between organic and psychogenic pain is therefore of little value,
since psychological factors play a major role in all cases of chronic pain, and as yet
medical science is unable to confidently claim that where organic causes exist they
are able to invariably detect or identify them.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PAIN
The preceding sections clearly highlight the need for any neurophysiological
model of pain to be able to account for the many and diverse psychological
influences on pain. In the following two sections, 2 major models of pain will be
presented. The first, the traditional Specificity Theory will only be briefly outlined,
since it has been superseded as a result of a scientific revolution, by the second, the
Gate Control Theory.
The Specflcizy Theory
The traditional theory of pain, in its simplest form, was first described by
Descartes in 1664. It proposes that messages from pain receptors in the skin are
carried to a pain centre in the brain. Numerous experiments (reviewed by Rose and
Mountcastle 1959; Sinclair, 1982) have shown that there exists a one-to-one
relationship between receptor type, fibre size and quality of sensory experience -
cold, warmth, touch and pain. Thus proponents of the specificity theory talk of each
type of fibre as having a distinct pathway to a specific centre in the brain. In 1957
Keele identified a "pain pathway" in the spinal cord - the spinothalamic tract - which
is essential for pain sensation.
The physiological assumption inherent in this theory, that receptors are
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specialized, remains undisputed. However, the assumption that there exists a direct,
invariant relationship between the physical stimulus and the psychological sensory
dimension has been vociferously challenged. The implication that there is a direct
connection from a receptor to a brain centre where pain is "felt", which when
stimulated always produces pain, and only pain, is clearly untrue.
The Gate Control Theory
Detailed descriptions of this theory, first published in 1965, are readily found in
for example Meizack and Wall (1988) and therefore many of the complexities and
neurological details will be omitted here. The basic tenet of the theory is that the
flow of nerve impulses from peripheral fibres to the spinal cells which project to the
brain can be increaseor decreased by the action of a neural mechanism - the "gate" -
located in the dorsal horns of the spinal cord. Thus the modulating influence of the
gate is able to act before pain is perceived or responded to. Modulation is proposed
to occur at any of the synapses between the spinal cord and brain. Large fibre inputs
tend to close the gate, inhibiting transmission, while small A-delta and C fibre inputs
typically open it, thereby facilitating transmission. Extensive work by Wall and his
colleagues has revealed that the cells comprising the substantia gelatinosa in
particular seem to be responsible for modulating the input (Wall 1964) from
peripheral fibres to spinal cord transmission (1') cells. It is proposed that the gating
mechanism is influenced by the Central Control Trigger, a system of large diameter,
fast-conducting fibres which activate selective cognitive processes. The theory also
proposes a central Action System, comprising the neural areas underlying the
behaviours and experience that makes pain what it is. This system is activated when
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the output of the T cells exceeds a critical leveL Powerful control over the sensory
input can also be exerted via efferent fibre conduction relating to memories of past
pain experiences, attention, emotions and other cognitive influences.
A Parallel Processing Model of Pain Distress
In 1979 Howard Leventhal and Deborah Everhart published a model of the
relationship between pain and emotion. They proposed two sepaiated but interacting
parallel pathways for the processing of pain, from the point of sensory input onwards.
The first is a sensory-perceptual or informational pathway which deals with the
location, intensity, duration and other physical attributes of the stimulus. The other,
the emotion pathway generates the distress component of the pain experience.
Elaboration of the input from these pathways is the result of a hierarchical system
of three processing mechanisms, termed perceptual-motor, schematic and conceptual
processing. Perceptual-motor processing is the earliest stage of processing which is
considered automatic and to a large extent innate. It generates outputs that are the
perception of the sensory attributes of the noxious stimulus (Johnson, 1973; Johnson
and Leventhal, 1974), along with a perceptual signal identifiable as an emotional
response. Schematic processing concerns the integration of pain stimuli and responses
in memory systems, providing representations of pain which influence the perception
of, and response to, future episodes of pain. Schemata are also thought to play the
role of "attention selectors", dictating which aspects of the pain-distress experience
enter focal awareness . the material attended to at any given time. Thus, under this
model, the vast bulk of processing occurs preconsciously, with only a small
proportion of what is perceived and processed entering focal awareness. In support
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of schematic processing the authors provide evidence from phantom limb pain
research, hypnosis, and research on the effects of sensation information and attention
on pain-distress experience. Finally, the model proposes a conceptual level of
processing which involves the individual's conceptualization of pain-distress,
including beliefs about the experience of pain-distress. These are of enormous
importance, since they will have impact on factors including adjustment to, and
coping with chronic pain, and compliance with treatment regimens. This level of
processing is assumed to have a modifying effect on both perceptual-motor and
schematic processing.
This model is not incompatible with Meizack and Wall's (1965) gate theory of
pain. Indeed, Leventhal and Everhart (1979) suggest that the interaction between
infonnational and emotional pathways is, in effect, the gate mechanism.
THE ASSESSMENT OF SENSORY AND AFFECTIVE COMPONENTS OF
PAIN
There is considerable evidence to corroborate Levefithal and Everhart's (1979)
claim that the sensory and affective/distress components are distinct aspects of the
pain experience. Hilgard, Morgan and MacDonald (1975) demonstrated that
anaesthesia instructions given while under hypnosis result in a dissociation between
the 'informational' (sensory) and 'emotional' (distress) components of pain.
Similarly, Leventhal et a! (1979) showed that pain intensity and pleasantness are
differentially affected by instructions on how to monitor pain.
These findings indicate the value of not limiting the assessment of pain to the
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sensory component. Indeed, multidimensional pain assessment involves measurement
of the following areas: physiological, sensory, affective, behavioural, cognitive and
lifestyle impact. Physiological changes considered important in the experience of pain
include muscle tension, measured by electrornyographic (EMG) changes, and vascular
changes, thought to cause tension and migraine headaches respectively. Studies
investigating the prediction that tension headache sufferers show elevated EMO
activity have provided mixed results: Haynes a a! (1975) found evidence for a
reduction in EMG levels, while Martin and Mathews (1978) and Pearce and Morley
(1981) found no clear relationship between pain intensity and EMG activity. Pearce
and Richardson (1987) therefore suggest that physiological variables such as EMG
may not be diagnostically helpful, even though traditionally they may be thought to
play a causal role.
The subjective component of pain is commonly assessed using rating scales, in
a variety of forms including numerical or verbal categories (1,2,3,4,5; none, mild,
moderate, severe, unbearable), Visual Anakgue Scales (VAS; 10 cm line anchored
at two extremes of pain intensity) and the 101-point numerical rating scale. The
relative reliability and validity of these scales is a matter of some debate, with some
authors claiming the VAS to be more sensitive to change than the Verbal Rating
Scale (VRS) (eg. Joyce a ci, 1975), but more vulnerable to response bias (Gracely,
1979). A combination of the VAS and VRS has been devised (Heft and Parker,
1984), with verbal anchors spaced at intervals along a 10cm line at distances which
reflect magnitude of differences in intensity ie. 'faint', 'weak' and 'mild' are more
closely spaced than 'moderate', 'strong' and 'intense'. However this measure is not
often reported as being used in the literature. Jensen, Karoly and Braver (1986)
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compared six different methods, concluding that on indices of utility and validity the
methods are comparable, but the 101-point numerical scale may be the most
practicaL
Perhaps the most widely used measure of the qualitative aspects of pain is the
McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ Meizack, 1975) which comprises groups of pain
descriptors increasing in 'intensity', reflecting the sensory (eg. stabbing, sharp),
affective (eg. fearful, cruel) and evaluative (eg. miserable, troublesome) aspects of
pain. Subjects indicate which words accurately describe their pain, providing either
a score of the number of words chosen in each category, or an index of pain
intensity. The latter measure has provoked some criticism, since the assumption that
adjectives in each of the groups (particularly the affective and evaluative) form a
single intensity dimension may be unjustified.
Following this line of argument Morley (1989) found that the affective adjectives
of Tursky's Pain Perception Profile required a 3-dimensional model. Using a task
where patients rated the similarity of all combinations of 12 pairs of affective
descriptors, Morley and Palm (1992) again found evidence for three dimensions,
'tolerability/emotional reaction', 'distraction/distress', and a third, more ambiguous
and as yet, unnamed dimension.
In addition to measures of the affective qualities of pain, several instruments are
typically used in the assessment of general emotional state in chronic pain patients.
These include the Spielberger State-Trait Inventory (Spielberger et a!, 1970) and
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI Beck et a!, 1961). The BDI has been found to be
a useful index of depression (Turner and Romano, 1984), despite the overlap of some
of the symptoms of depression and pain itself (eg. sleep disturbance, inability to
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work).
A wide variety of methods and instruments are available for the assessment of
behavioural and cognitive aspects of pain, along with the impact of chronic pain on
lifestyle and family (details of which can be found in Pearce and Wardle, 1989 and
Pearce and Richardson, 1987).
CHRONIC PAIN AND DEPRESSION
It is generally accepted, then, that pain is not merely a sensory experience, but
incorporates a distinct emotional/distress component which can be separately
evaluated. In addition to this affective component of the pain, which typically
accompanies all pain experience, many patients with a long-term painful condition
also suffer symptoms of depression. The proportion of chronic pain patients reported
to be depressed ranges from around 10% to 100% (Romano and Turner, 1985). This
large amount of variation can be attributed to the lack of consistency in diagnostic
criteria for depression (RDC, DSM-llI, major depression, minor depression etc.), and
method of assessment (clinical interview, self-report measure) used in different
studies. The problem also arises that some symptoms of depression such as fatigue,
insomnia and changes in appetite, are also frequently associated with the physical
aspects of the condition itself, in the absence of depression.
Further controversy exists as to the direction of causality between chronic pain
and depression. Three general models have been proposed to account for the
relationship. The first is a biological model which suggests that common substrates
or neurochemical mechanisms may underlie both disorders (eg Ward et a!, 1982).
The second model, which applies to pain patients where there is no demonstrable
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organic pathology (and hence is not generalizable to all chronic pain patients and
weak in consequence), proposes that chronic pain is a variant of depressive disease,
Ic. a masked depression (Engel, 1959; Blumer and Heilbronn, 1982). The third model
integrates cognitive and behavioural formulations based on ideas of reduced ability
to engage in activities, perception of personal control and social rewards (Fordyce,
1976; Turk and Rudy, 1986). Strong support for the last model has been provided by
Rudy, Kerns and Turk (1988), who provide evidence for a cognitive-behavioural
mediation model in which measures of perceived life interference and self-control
were found to be significant intervening variables between pain and depression.
Interestingly, they found the direct link between pain and depression to be non-
significant. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Brown (1990) was unable to
fmd a strong, consistent causal relationship between the two, using a two latent-
variable, cross-lagged design, although he did find some evidence that pain predicted
depression during the last 12 months of his 3 year study.
Considerable effort has been expended in differentiating depressed and non-
depressed chronic pain patients on a variety of pain-related variables. In chronic pain
patients depression has been significantly associated with greater pain intensity,
interference due to pain and pain behaviours (Haythornthwaite, Sieber and Kerns,
1991), catastrophizing (Sullivan and D'Eon, 1990), passive coping style (Brown,
Nicassio and Wallston, 1989) and reported loss of ability for social and recreational
activities (Doan and Wadden, 1989). Haley, Romano and Turner (1985) found sex
differences in patterns of the relationship between depression activity and pain,
although no demographic or medical history differences were observed. In women
pain intensity was associated with depression, whereas in men impairment in activity
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was a better predictor of depression.
Given the strong association between depression and chronic pain, and the
considerable impact of depression on both cognitive and behavioural aspects of long-
term pain, it is clearly of importance that negative affect is not neglected in the study
of chronic pain.
AFFECT AND COGNITION
The relationship between affect cognition has received an enormous amount of
attention in recent years. Interest has focused almost exclusively on anxiety and
depression, and their effect on the processes involved in attentive mechanisms and
memory. The relevant experimental evidence will now be presented, leaving
theoretical interpretations of the results to subsequent sections, however general
cognitive deficits associated with affective states will not be considered.
Anxiety
Attention processes
In exploring the influence of affect on attention - the capture of processing
resources for a particular task or stimulus - a variety of experimental paradigms have
been used. Attentional biases towards anxiety arousing stimuli (as distinct from
attention to an anxiety response) have been shown to occur using a modified Siroop
(Stroop, 1935) colour naming task. In the classic experiment, subjects are required
to name the colour ink in which words in a list are written, ignoring the word
content If the word is a colour name, written in a different colour ink to the one
named, for example the word "blue" written in green ink, this causes interference,
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significantly decreasing the speed with which words are read.
In an initial study, Mathews and MacLeod (1985) presented generally anxious
patients and controls separate lists of physical threat, social threat and positive
(control) words. They found that, compared to the normal controls, anxious subjects
showed greater interference on threat-related words. They also demonstrated a
specific bias for physical threat words in subjects reporting particular anxiety about
physical matters. In addition, through partial correlation analyses, they showed that
the main predictor of degree of disruption was state anxiety rather than depression
levels, which were also elevated in the anxious patients. In a replication of this study
Mogg, Mathews and Weinman (1989) confirmed the selective interference of threat
words on colour naming in generally anxious patients compared to controls. They
also found clearer evidence for the specificity of the interference effect such that
threat words which were congruent with the individual's predominant worries were
particularly slowed.
Using a sample of spider phobics Watts, McKenna, Sharrock and Trezise (1986)
provided further support for the specificity of disruption, demonstrating that while
the phobics' performance was little affected by general emotional words such as
"death" and "grief', it was greatly disrupted by spider words, such as "hairy" and
"crawl", compared to a control group.
Mogg and Marden (1990) extended this research with the aim of answering 4
questions. The first was to determine whether such processing biases are the sole
province of clinically anxious subjects (as opposed to anxious but non-clinical
subjects). Secondly, they explored the issue of whether the bias operates on all
emotional information, or just threat information. Thirdly, is there a bias for
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information of personal concern, unrelated to emotionalizy? Finally, is the bias an
artefact of the familiarity of the words for the individuals (termed the frequency
effect)? Mogg and Marden tested 4 groups of medical students: high trait anxious,
low trait anxiety scorers, students who were active members of a rowing club, and
non rowers matched for trait anxiety with the Towers. Six sets of word stimuli were
used for the S troop task: social threat, physical threat, positive emotion, neutral, high
frequency neutral (matched for frequency with the social and physical threat words
and positive emotion words), and a set of rowing terms. Results indicated that high
trait anxiety subjects were relatively slower in naming emotional words than non-
emotional words compared to low trait anxious subjects. However, the high trait
anxiety subjects did not distinguish between positive emotional and threat words. The
results also demonstrated that the processing bias is associated with emotional
material and not merely information that is relevant to personal interests, and
interference in colour naming is not associated with word frequency. The authors'
primary conclusion was that all emotional stimuli are involved in selective processing
effects, and not threat stimuli alone.
Martin, Williams and Clark (1991) arrived at a similar conclusion, finding that
generalized anxiety disorder patients and controls did not differ in their colour-
naming times of positive and negative (threat) emotional words. They also found
evidence that the bias is stronger in patients compared to high-anxious conuols.
Thus although the results of such Stroop tasks are generally consistent in
providing evidence that anxious patients have a processing bias for certain
information, they do not agree entirely on the nature or extent of the bias.
Unfortunately, the Stroop task is not able to distinguish between a bias in
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perceptual/attention processes and a response bias explanation. In other words it may
be possible that emotionally disturbed people are Npreset to respond to stimuli of
particular relevance to their psychopathology, rather than there being any inherent
differences in the way in which they process information compared to control groups.
The other problem in interpreting results from the Stroop experiments lies in the
potential confounding of variables such as word frequency, concreteness and
imageability. Although Mogg and Marden (1990) assessed the influence of high
versus low frequency neutral words on the colour naming task, and found that
frequency appeared not to play a mediating role, they did not assess the frequency
of the threat/emotional words for the different groups. It is conceivable that the high
trait anxiety group were more familiar with the threat/emotional words (and by
implication these words were therefore of high frequency for this group) than the low
trait anxiety group. However, this explanation of the S troop results seems implausible
in view of the findings of Watts et a! (1986), who found that emotional Stroop
interference was reduced in a group of spider phobics after systematic desensitization
treatment involving repeated exposure to the threatening stimuli.
Given the processing bias versus response bias problem inherent in the emotional
Stroop paradigm, MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) devised an experiment where
subjects make a neutral response (pressing a button) to a neutral stimulus (dot
probe). In this experiment 16 generally anxious subjects and 16 matched controls
were presented 2 words simultaneously, one 3cm above the other, on a computer
screen. The task was to read out loud the top word of each pair. On some of the
trials one of the words wasreplaced by a small dot ( the "dotprobe"). The dotprobc
replaced the upper and lower words on an equal number of trials. When the probe
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appeared subjects had to press a button as quickly as possible. On some trials one of
the words was a threat stimuli. Results indicated that anxious patients were relatively
quicker in detecting the probe when it replaced a threat word in the top position, than
when it replaced a neutral word at the top with a threat word at the bottom. On the
otherhand, if the probe occurredinthe bottom position with athreatword atthe top,
these subjects were relatively slower in detecting/responding to it. Control subjects
exhibited the opposite pattern. Thus anxious patients tend to orient towards threat
while normal controls tend to orient away from the threat stimuli. In accordance with
Mogg and Marden (1990), and Martin, Williams and Clark (1991), but in contrast
with Mathews and Macleod (1985) and Mogg, Mathews and Weinman (1989), the
results of this experiment also suggested that there is no relationship between the
type of threat word and the predominant concerns of the individual. The results of
this study are extremely important, in so far as they provide strong evidence that
anxious patients do differ form controls in the way in which they allocate attention
to their environment, and that this cannot be accounted for in terms of a simple
response bias.
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) used this visual dot probe task to explore the
relationship between state anxiety, trait anxiety and attention bias. They reasoned that
if an attention bias were to be found in relation to state anxiety alone, the bias could
be seen as a secondaiy consequence of the mood state. Alternatively, if the bias is
found with trait mood alone, it might be viewed as a cognitive mechanism underlying
vulnerability to that particular mood state, ie. a tendency to preferentially attend to
aversive stimuli in the environment. Fifty-eight medical students, divided into two
groups on the basis of STAI trait anxiety scores, underwent the dot probe task on 2
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occasions - the first 12 weeks prior to their exams (low state anxiety), then again one
week before their exams (high state anxiety). Two sets of threat words were
compiled exam-related and general threat The results indicated that only high trait
anxious subjects shifted their attention to general threat words on both test occasions.
However, as the exam drew nearer, while the attention bias towards exam-related
words increased in high trait anxiety students, in the low trait anxiety group attention
tended to be drawn away from the exam-related words (Ic "cognitive avoidance").
This fmding can be seen to parallel the pattern of results of the control group in the
first visual dot probe experiment. The authors concluded that state and trait anxiety
interact in anentional bias to stimuli relating to events currently causing stress. They
also suggest that the differences observed reflect rehearsal or avoidance of exam-
related issues between the first and second times of testing. Alternatively, the threat
value of the words themselves may have increased between the two times and been
responsible for the effect, rather than the emotional state per Se.
In a recent study employing this paradigm, Mogg, Mathews and Eysenck (1992)
replicated the findings of MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) in currently anxious
patients, and provided evidence that the extent to which these patients selectively
attend to social threat is associated with the severity of their social worries.
In a similar paradigm, the "colour perception" task, two wonis, differing in
emotional valence are presented simultaneously, then displaced by 2 bars of colour,
also presented simultaneously. The subject has to decide which bar appeared first, the
rationale being that if attention is switched to a particular word from the pair, the
colour bar replacing that word wifi be perceived as appearing earlier. The failure of
Mogg et al (1991) to find evidence for either an attentional bias for threat stimuli
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associated with both state (stress) or trait anxiety in medical students, or a bias
towards threat in clinically anxious individuals compared with normal controls, runs
contrary to predictions and previous findings. Mogg et a! attempt to account for these
null findings primarily in terms of problems inherent in the nature of the task,
highlighting the differences between this and the visual dot probe task.
Finally, a lexical decision task has been used in an attempt to identify the exact
conditions under which an attentional processing bias exists, in terms of the
accessibility of information or assignment of processing priorities. Using this
approach, MacLead and Mathews (1991) provide evidence in support of the
contention that anxiety is associated with the assignment of high processing priorities
to threat-related information, rather than with facilitated availability of such
information from memory. On each trial subjects were presented with either one or
two letter strings on a computer screen. The comparison between single and double
trials permitted the "competition" for processing resources hypothesis to be tested.
Some of the strings were real words, others were non-words. The task involved
deciding whether any of the letter strings were non words, and the time taken to do
this was measured. Half of the real words were threat-related, the remainder neutral,
matched for frequency and length. Equal proportions of each appeared on single and
double letter string trials. Two groups of subjects were tested, 16 generally anxious
out-patients and 16 non-patient controls. The three way interaction of particular
interest (valence: threat, neutral x anxiety: generally anxious patients, controls x
string number one, two) was significant, and its interpretation entirely consistent
with the prediction that an attention bias in anxiety is only apparent when there is
competition for processing resources between concurrent threat and non-threat
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stimuli.
Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck and May (1991) developed this idea, and established,
using the same task, that when the neutral words form members of a semantic
category (household terms), an anxiety-related bias is only evident when there is
competition for processing resources (as before), but also when information is
presented outside the focus of the subject's attention. This categorization effect places
doubt over the conclusions of the MacLeod and Mathews experiment. Thus the
evidence for the "competition" hypothesis is equivocal.
Overall, the available evidence from all paradigms suggests that under certain
circumstances anxiety states are associated with pre-attentive biases (eg. Mathews
and MacLeod, 1986), post-awareness processing biases (eg. Mathews and MacLeod,
1985; Mogg et a!, 1989; Mogg and Marden, 1990), visual attention biases (operative
outside awareness) (eg. MacLeod, Mathews and Tata, 1986; MacLead and Mathews,
1988), and the assignment of processing priorities to threat-related information
(Maci_cod and Mathews, 1991; Mogg et a!, 1991). Findings conflict regarding the
extent to which these processing biases are specific to threat or emotional words in
general (Martin, Williams and Clark, 1991; Mogg, Mathews and Weinman, 1989).
Memory processes
The effects of mood on memory can be divided into two sorts: state dependency
and mood congruity. The former refers to the finding that information learnt in one
state, for example depression, is remembered better when the person is back in that
state. Mood congruity effects, on the other hand, occur when material which is
congruent with an individual's prevailing mood is recalled better than incongruent
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material. Although there is considerable evidence for mood-state dependent memory
(Ucros, 1989, provides a meta-analysis of published research from 1975 to 1985), it
is mood congruity research which forms the focus of much of this thesis, and will
therefore receive attention here.
In contrast to the plethora of evidence supportive of attention processing biases
in anxiety, empirical support for selective memory processes in anxiety states is
sparse. In an early study, Nunn, Stevenson and Whaian (1984 explored selective
memory effects in agoraphobic patients using a prose recall task. Nine agoraphobic
patients and 9 controls were presented with 5 prose passages, three of which
contained potentially phobic material, the other two containing neutral information.
The number of phobia-related propositions recalled was shown to differ significantly
between the groups, with patients recalling more of the phobic propositions, but an
equal proportion of neutral propositions. However, given the small sample sizes and
bizarre statistical manipulations, these results cannot be assumed to be equivocal. In
a second experiment the authors presented the same subjects with a word list
containing 10 phobia-related and 10 neutral words. Subjects heard the list four times
in random order, and attempted to recall them. Again a significant interaction
between group and wordtype was found, with the patients remembering
comparatively more phobic words and fewer neutral words. However, these results
are also open to question, since it was not possible to account for effect of the first
part of the experiment on the second, and the experimenter reading out the material
was not blind to group membership.
These methodological problems were overcome by Rusted and Dighton (1991),
whose results from a prose recall task also showed a recall bias favouring phobia-
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related material, this time in spider phobics.
In a carefully controlled study using a free recall paradigm, Mogg, Mathews and
Weininan (1987) presented groups of anxious patients and controls with positive,
threat-related and negative words, matched for frequency and length, in self versus
other-reference conditions. In this type of experiment subjects are required to think
about the words either in relation to themselves or another person, in this case a
television personality. This experiment failed to provide evidence for a self-
referenced recall bias in the anxious subjects, and, contrary to prediction, these
patients exhibited relatively poorer recall of threatening material. Interpretation of
these results is complicated, however, by the fact that the anxious patients were also
significantly more depressed than the controls.
Foa, McNally and Murdock (1989) also failed to find evidence for an anxiety-
related mood congruity effect, at either encoding or retrieval stages of processing.
In contrast to these recall studies, Burke and Mathews (1992) found a significant
difference in the number of anxious autobiographical memories produced by
generalized anxiety disorder patients compared to controls. However, there are major
difficulties with the use of autobiographical memory as an indicator of biased
processing: firstly, the anxious patients may have experienced a greater number of
anxiety-provoking events than the controls, and these patients may label equivalent
events as more threatening than controls, either at the time of their occurrence or
when they are retrieved as memories.
Thus studies exploring the relationship between anxiety and memory are raze.
Selective memory effects appear to occur in prose recall but not free recall tasks,
however the number of published studies in this area are too few to draw firm
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conclusions.
Depression
Attention processes
Like studies on anxiety and me,vor, published experimental investigations of
d oWet1io
depressionare relatively uncommon. They too have produced mixed results. Gotlib
and McCann (1984) used an emotional Stroop task to compare the performance of
15 depressed and 15 non-depressed students (assigned to these groups on the basis
of Beck Depression Inventory scores). The words used were depressive, neutral or
manic self-descriptive adjectives. The mean colour naming latencies for non-
depressed subjects did not differ between wordtypes, however, the depressed subjects
showed significant interference on the depressive compared to both manic and neutral
words. This effect was not found in subjects in whom depressed mood was induced,
suggesting that the bias was more strongly associated with stable patterns of
processing than transient mood. Williams and Nulty (1986) arrived at a similar
conclusion after investigating S troop disruption in subjects who were tested one year
apart, forming stable depressed, stable non-depressed and 'unstable' depressed
groups. These studies suggest that an attention bias is associated with negative mood,
however there are several problems associated with this work. Firstly, where non-
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cimcal populations are sampled, it cannot be assumed that the results are genezable
to their equivalent patient populations; caution is particularly required where the role
of such biases are implicated in the cause and maintenance of these disorders. More
importantly, anxiety levels of the subjects were not assessed in these experiments,
and depression is commonly associated with elevated levels of anxiety. Consequently
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it is plausible that their findings may have been directly attributable to anxiety, rather
than depression.
Williams and Broadbent (1986) employed the Stroop paradigm, with the aim of
clarifying these issues. They examined a group of patients who had taken an
overdose and compared them with other hospital patients and non-patient controls,
using neutral, general negative words (eg. hopeless) and negative words specific to
the concerns of the attempted suicide patients (eg. fatal). Results showed that the
greatest disruption occurred in the overdose patients on the condition-specific
negative words, and that the extent of interruption was most clearly predicted by self-
rated depression than by any other mood, including tension-anxiety.
In contrast to these positive results, MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) failed
to find evidence for an attention bias related to depression on the visual dot-probe
task. However, the stimuli used were anxiety-related, rendering the results
inconclusive. Gotlib, McLachlan and Katz (1988) employed the colour perception
task (described earlier) and found that depressed subjects attended equally to
depressed, manic and neutral-content words, although their depressed group only
exhibited a mild level of depression as assessed by the BDL Mogg et a! (1991), in
their experiment using the colour perception task were also unable to find a
relationship between depression and attention bias.
Memory processes
Selective memory effects in negative mood using the free recall paradigm aie well
established and documented. They are presented in detail in the next chapter when
introducing the first experiment of the thesis, and are therefore not covered here. In
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addition to this research, the role of negative affect in autobiographical memory and
prose recall has been investigated, and will be briefly reviewed.
In an early study Uoyd and Lishman (1975) employed recall of personal
memories as their task, and found a significant positive association between severity
of depression and time taken to retrieve unpleasant memories. This study is beset by
two major flaws. Firstly, the more severely depressed patients may have experienced.
a greater number of negative events, providing them with a greater choice to retheve
from, and secondly, these subjects may have been more likely to interpret neutral
events as negative, again inflating the number available to chose from. Teasdale and
Fogarty (1979) used a mood induction paradigm and randomization of allocation of
subjects to conditions, and Clark and Teasdale (1982) used clinically depressed
patients who exhibited diurnal variations in mood to overcome these problems. The
former study showed slowed recall of positive material in depressed mood, while the
latter study demonstrated a clear pattern of positive memories being less probable in
the depressed phase of the cycle, with the reverse when the same patients were in
their less depressed state. Memories had been rated for pleasantness/happiness by
independent judges.
Findings of mood-related recall of stories with mixed affective content are also
relatively robust. Breslow, Kocsis and Belkin (1981) examined recall of positive
negative and neutral aspects of a narrative by depressed patients and matched
controls and demonstrated a decrement in the recall of the positive components of
the story by the patient group. Bower, Gilligan and Monteiro (1981) also found a
selective memory effect in subjects who had undergone a hypnotic mood induction
procedure, They found that more sad facts were remembered from the story by the
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subjects who had heard the story while in sad mood, compared to those who bad
hearditwhileinahappymood.Itappearsthatthemoodattimeofencodingthe
information is the important factor in producing biased recall, since Bower (1981)
failed to demonstrate an effect of mood at time of recall, but replicated the encoding
congruity result.
To conclude these sections on affect and cognition, empirical evidence suggests
that biases in attentive processes are more strongly associated with anxiety states,
while selective memory effects are more strongly related to depression, however
there is considerable overlap between the two areas, and a complete distinction is not
supported.
PAIN, AFFECT AND COGNITION
Given the increasing recognition that pain cannot be coiAeived solely as a sensory
experience, the relationship between chronic pain and depression, and the observation
that psychological and cognitive factors play an important role, it is perhaps
surprising that so few studies have explored the impact of pain on information-
processing. As described earlier, Lefebvre (1981) identified cognitive distortions in
the way depressed chronic low back pain patients interpret information, however this
approach is able to tell us little about the attention and memory processes more
usually examined. Three studies have explored information-processing in relation to
chronic pain, using the Stroop, autobiographical memory and free recall paradigms.
Pearce and Morley (1989) provide evidence for a pain-related attention bias in a
group of chronic pain patients. Using the Stroop task with negative, sensory and
affective words, they demonstrated greater interference on both sensory and affective
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stimuli in the chronic pain patients compared to controls. No systematic pattern of
correlations was found between interference scores and ratings of fatigue, tension,
vigour, despondency, confusion and anger. However, standard measures of anxiety
and depression were not obtained, and it remains possible that the observed effect
could be attributed to anxiety (or depression) rather than pain per se. A recent study
by Pincus et a! (submitted) supports this possibility: evidence for interference on
affective adjectives was provided, but disappeared when differences between the
chronic pain and control group's levels of depression (BDI score) were taken into
account
In an investigation of autobiographical memoiy in female students, Eich, Rachman
and Lopatka (1990) compared retrieval of real-life events when the subjects were
experiencing menstrual pain, and again when they were pain-free. The events were
then rated for pleasantness by the subjects. Results revealed that pain promoted recall
of unpleasant events only if the pain was accompanied by increased negative affect,
suggesting that the impact of pain on autobiographical memory is mediated by its
influence on mood. This investigation did not, however, specifically study recall of
pain experiences.
Finally, only one experiment has explored memory for pain-related information
in relation to pain status. Pearce eta! (1990) explored both mood congruity effects
and state-dependent learning in chronic pain patients and non-patient controls. These
are described in the next chapter, and are therefore not presented here.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Research such as that described in the preceding sections can be best
conceptualized within an information-processing framework This framework is
characterized by seven basic concepts (Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews,
1988). Firstly, information-processing systems are conceived of as having a limited
capacity, which places constraints on the amount of information which can processed
at any one time. This limited capacity can either be due to restriction in resources,
or competition for structures or mechanisms within the system. Secondly, as an
inevitable consequence of this competition, information is processed selectively. This
'selective attention' may be seen as either the cause, or the consequence of
differential processing. Thirdly, information-processing models typically construe an
operation as comprising a number of sepamte, serial, component processes. Each
stage of processing requires the output from the previous stage in order to function.
The fourth concept is that of parallel processing, where a number of operations can
take place simultaneously. The fifth concept contrasts bottom-up with top-down
processing. The former operates where basic low-level processes concerned primarily
with the physical stimulus, influence higher order representations, including attitudes,
expectations, beliefs and prototypical situations. The latter occurs when high-order
representations influence low-level processes. Sixth, processing of information is
thought to occur through hierarchical systems (cf Leventhal, 1979), the operation of
lower level hierarchies being controlled by higher levels. Bottom-up and top-down
processing is conceived of as occurring within each hierarchy, with hierarchies
working independently. Finally, some processes are thought to be automatic, not
requiring auentional resources or conscious effort, either innate or learned, and are
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fixed. In contrast, strategic (controlled) processes are flexible, can be modified and
are essential in dealing with novel situations. Automatic processes do not suffer from
limited capacity constraints since they can occur in parallel, whereas controlled
processes are largely serial. Zajonc (1980) has argued that the assessment of the
affective quality of a stimulus is an automatic process, proceeding entirely outside
awareness.
Associative Network Models
Several variations of the basic associative network model proposed by Quillian
(1968) have been devised, including that of Anderson and Bower (1973). Their
Human Associative Memory (HAM) Network has been most commonly used to
account for the effects of mood on memory. Within the network concepts and events
are represented as nodes, with links of varying strength between them - the
associative connections. When a word, (or concept) is presented, the corresponding
node is activated, with activation spreading along the links to other closely related
nodes. The most important aspect of the model as applied to mood and memory
research is the assumption of specific nodes for each emotion, associatively linked
with clusters of nodes representing descriptions of past events, beliefs, the subjective
experience and verbal labels (Bower, 1981). When activation exceeds a threshold
level, either through presentation of a stimulus or the result of a prior thought, the
contents of the network enter awareness.
Mood congruity effects are thought to occur in free recall tests as a result of
increased elaboration (more associative links) between items that are congruent with
the subject's prevailing mood, along with biased search strategies. In reviewing the
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evidence that cognitions affect depressive mood and mood affects cognitions,
Teasdale (1983) concludes that depression may be maintained by a reciprocal
relationship between the two. This can readily be accounted for in terms of activation
of a depression network. Similarly, Ingram (1984) suggests a feedback loop involving
the activation of negative memories which enter consciousness, recycling activation
back through the depression node.
Although the model can be successfully applied to interpret much of the mood
and memory literature, there are several major problems, discussed by Williams,
Watts, McLeod and Mathews (1988). The most important of these is that anxiety and
depression do not appear to have comparable effects on attention and memory, with
an attention bias more readily demonstrated in anxiety states, but selective memory
more strongly evidenced in depression. Associative network theory would not predict
this distinction in the effects of the two moods on information-processing.
Schemata
In contrast to the nodes of the associative network model described above, schema
are mental representations of all the information relevant to a particular stimulus.
Schema interact with new information, influencing the encoding, understanding and
retrieval of that information as a result of beliefs, expectations, rules and
assumptions, and by guiding attention and memory search (Beck, Emery and
Greenberg, 1985). By definition, schema have consistent internal structures, often
considered modular such that activation of any part of the schema will result in
activation of the whole (Mandler, 1984). In addition schema axe commonly
considered to comprise prototypes of stimuli, against which new information is
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evaluated. Both bottom-up and top-down processing are thought to be involved in
schematic processing of a stimulus: identifying the relevant schema and using it to
comprehend the stimulus respectively.
These principals of schematic functioning are able to accommodate mood and
memory phenomenon. For example, the schemata of depressed individuals may be
overactive, and new information which is schema-congruent more likely to be
assimilated, leading to biases in interpretation of new events and in recalling
information. These schemata are also thought to contain faulty information about the
self, world and future (Beck, 1967; Beck et a!, 1979). In particular, knowledge about
the self is thought to exist in "self-schema (Kuiper, MacDonald and Derry, 1983),
resulting in the biased processing of negative information which has been encoded
with specific reference to the individual in self/other-reference recall paradigms (eg.
Derry and Kuiper, 1981).
However, like associative network models, schema theory is unable to account for
the differing effects of anxiety and depression on information-processing.
An Integrated Model
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1988) propose an 'integrated model'
which is able to account for the differential effects of anxiety and depression on
attentive and memorial processes. The model is based on the concepts of integration
(priming) and elaboration (Graf and Mandler, 1984). Priming is the automatic
activation of the mental representation of a stimulus, resulting in strengthening of the
internal organization of the representation and hence increasing accessibility - the
word is more likely to come to mind when only partial cues axe presented.
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Elaboration occurs when activation spreads from the representation of the stimulus
to other associated representations, forming new links and activating old ones. The
consequence of elaboration is heightened retrievability of the word. Graf and Mandler
(1984) explicitly state in summary that integration makes the word more accessible,
whereas elaboration renders the word both more accessib1 and more retrievable. The
implication is that the process of elaboration necessarily involves priming. Williams
et a! (1988) propose that tasks such as the dot-probe assess the level to which words
have been primed, and that anxiety acts to bias the extent io which threat information
is primed. They also suggest depression specifically affects the elaboration stage of
processing, such that negative information is more easily remembered in free recall
tasks. In anxiety states priority is given to threat-related information in the allocation
of processing resources pre-attentively. In depression the allocation of processing
resources is to the elaboration of negative material. litherent in this model is the
assumption that priming and elaboration are entirely distinct, however, this is in
direct conflict with the original Oral and Mandler modell as described above. If the
original model is strictly applied to the data from the mood and information-
processing literature, the following predictions would ensue: 1. anxiety causes bias
in priming, and hence attention bias; 2. depression leads to bias in priming and
elaboration, and thus attention bias and memory bias. As noted in earlier sections,
there is some evidence that negative affect is associated with an attentive bias (Gotlib
and McCann, 1984; Williams and Nulty, 1986; Williams and Broadhent, 1986).
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AIMS OF THE THESIS
The experiments reported in this thesis are an attempt to explore the impact of
chronic pain on a variety of cognitive processes, within an information-processing
framework. Particular emphasis is placed on the investigation of schematic and
conceptual processing. Schematic processing is explored through au investigation of
selective memory for sensory and affective information in depressed and non-
depressed chronic pain patients, and acute pain patients. Schematic processes are
investigated further by comparing responses of chronic pain patients, health
professionals and controls on a word-stem completion task. Conceptual processing
is explored by developing a questionnaire examining pain-related beliefs. Changes
in both schematic and conceptual processing as a result of surgical and cognitive-
behavioural interventions are investigated. Causal relationships between beliefs about
pain and psychological variables including depression, health bcus of control,
cognitive coping strategies and activity levels are examined. The possibility that
information-processing biases in chronic pain may be attributable i differences in
frequency/usage of pain-related word stimuli between chronic pain patients and non-
patient controls is tested. The adequacy of the associative network account of effects
of pain on memory is also examined.
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Chapter 2 Inve.stigcitim of selective menwij for sensonj ansI
affective infornuuion in cfirsmic pain azuliepression
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The importance of cognitive factors in emotional aiihysical disorders has been
emphasized in the previous chapter. An analysis of tthe role of cognitions in
depression has been presented by Teasdale (1983), ii terms of a reciprocal
relationship, such that negative cognitions produce depression, and depression
increases the probability that those cogrntions will be experienced, causing further
depression. Thus a vicious cycle is invoked, perpetuating and intensifying the
depression. Based on several standard information-processing concepts, including
network theories, depth of processing and cognitive capacity, Ingram (1984) provides
a comprehensive analysis of the possible mechanisms of onset and maintenance of
depression, accounting for the emotional, cognitive, motivational and physical
symptoms of the disorder.
One of the processes thought to play an important role ün the relationship between
cognitions and depression is memory, and this will now be considered in some depth.
EFFECT OF DEPRESSION ON RECALL
Much of the research in this area has centred on an attempt to identify the
cognitive processes responsible for the vicious cycle of negative thoughts and
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depression. To this end, the role of memory processes, especially mood congruity
effects, haze been explored with researchers seeking to specify which factors underlie
differences between depressed and non-depressed subjects. The approach which
allows the greatest control over variables such as the affective tone of the material,
is the use of word lists (other approaches have been discussed in chapter 1).
Typically, subjects are presented with lists of words, either with or without the
knowledge that they are going to be asked to remember them at a later stage. Either
each of the individual lists contain words of different emotional valence, or the words
are of mixed valence within each list.
There are two main types of study in this area; firstly those involving the
induction of the desired mood states, usually contrasting depression with elation, in
normal subjects. Secondly, subjects are classified as either depressed or non-
depressed on the basis of clinical diagnosis or self-report measures. As with all
research of this nature, caution should be exercised in generalizing the results of
normal subjects to clinical groups.
One of the first relevant studies in this area, undertaken by Isen, Shalker, Clark
and Karp (1978) employed a success/failure mood induction procedure. Positive and
negative affect was induced prior to, and immediately after, learning a list of 26
words, including positive, negative and neutral personality trait words. Forty-seven
psychology students were divided into 4 groups; those who experienced success at
a computer game both before and after learning the words, those who failed at both
times, a group who succeeded before learning the list but failed at the game
afterwards, and finally a group who failed at the first game but succeeded at the
second. Results showed no evidence for a state-dependency memory effect - there
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was no significant interaction between outcome (success/failure) at the game the first
and second times. However, results did indicate a significant interaction between
wordtype and mood at time of recall, such that students who had experienced success
after learning the list recalled more of the positive trait words. Notably, there was no
evidence for an effect of negative mood on the recall of negative information, nor
differences in the recall of neutral words. Isen et al conclude that selective memoiy
is therefore associated with retrieval rather than encoding processes, and suggest that
the results represent the effect of mood on accessibility of cognitions.
McDowell (1984) was able to demonstrate biased recall of negative words in
depressed patients only when words were presented in mixed lists of pleasant and
unpleasant words, rather than when presented in separate lists. He suggests that the
reason for this is that mixed lists produce competition for processing resources
between wordtypes, whereas separate lists do not. McDowail also found that,
compared to non-depressed controls, depressed patients recalled more unpleasant then
pleasant words, but only when not instructed to rate the stimuli in terms of their
pleasantness. McDowell concludes that these results indicate the importance of
encoding processes in selective recall.
Teasdale and Russell (1983) investigated the effect of induced mood (elation or
depression) at the time of recall on the recall of mixed lists of positive, negative and
neutral personality trait words, presented in normal (presumably neutral) mood. They
clearly demonstrated a recall bias for positive words in the elation condition, and
negative words in the depression condition. However, the experimenters explicitly
told the subjects (n=32) that the study concerned the effect of mood on memory, and
it is therefore not implausible that the subjects guessed the hypotheses, especially in
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view of the induction procedure used - modified Velten (1968) statements.
An important factor in mood-related memory biases appears to be the applicability
of the material to the person learning it. Bradley and Mathews (1983), for example,
found a bias for negative compared to positive self-referent adjectives in depressed
patients compared to non-psychiatric controls, only when asked to think of the words
in relation to themselves. When instructed to focus on the applicability of the words
to others, the patients showed a positive (normal) recall bias.
In a similar study to that of Teasdale and Russell (1983), Clark and Teasdale
(1985) found that women, but not men, recalled more pleasant than unpleasant
personality trait words when in induced happy mood and vice versa. The induction
procedures were equally effective for men and women, and they did not differ on
their ratings of the pleasantness of the words. In a second study they found that
women gave higher usage ratings for the trait words, and that within this group usage
predicted the extent of preferential recall in the congruent mood state. This is of great
importance, since it implies that selective memory may simply be a function of word
frequency for the particular population being sampled, rather than any inherent
differences in the way in which groups process information. (This issue is addressed
in a later chapter, in relation to chronic pain patients.)
The results of these experiments are, clearly, nx entirely consistent. However, it
is apparent that under certain, well defined circumstances, and given the
methodological weaknesses of some of the studies, a memory bias for words of
negative emotional valence can be demonstrated, in both normal subjects in whom
mood states have been induced, and in subjects with naturally occurring clinical
mood states.
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RECOGNiTION MEMORY AND MOOD
In addition to exploring the effect of mood on free recall, some investigators have
assessed the relationship between mood and recognition memory. In this paradigm
the subject is typically presented with a list of words (which he/she may be asked to
remember in a free recall task). These words are then presented again (the "old"
words), interspersed with an equal number of "new" words. The subject is required
to decide whether each word was a member of the original list. The advantage of this
approach is that it enables a distinction to be made between a person's "true"
memory - their ability to recall information, and response bias. A response bias
explanation in its most general sense suggests that selective memory is an artefact
of emotional states, and that for example, depressed subjects axe "preset" to always
respond to negative material in a particular, stereotyped way. In terms of recognition
memory, response bias refers more specifically to the relative laxity or strictness of
the criterion used by subjects in making each recognition judgement.
Several studies have used the recognition paradigm to investigate the effect of
mood on memory, generally with little success (Bower and Cohen, 1982 provide a
review). These experiments typically concentrate on hit rates as their dependent
variable, ie. the number of words correctly recognised. Several reasons for the lack
of significant results have been proposed. Simon (1982) offers an explanation in
terms of the "index" and "encyclopedia" in episodic memory; Bower and Cohen
(1982) suggest that presenting the "old" word provides such a strong cue that it
overrides the relatively weak mood cue, and Williams et al (1988) propose a simple
ceiling effect.
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SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY
The experiments described above do not, however, use the recognition paradigm
to its full potential. Responses on a recognition test fall into four categories - hit
(correct recognition of an old word), false alarm (saying a new word was present
when it wasn't), correct rejection and false rejection. Following the principles
described by Swets et al (1961), this data can be submitted to a Signal Detection
Theory (SDT) analysis, which separates the effects of response bias (3) from "true"
memory (d'). Small values of 3 are indicative of a relatively lax criterion, high
values a more strict criterion. The use of SDT for memory research is not universally
accepted, primarily because the assumptions of normality, homogeneity of variance
and an optimally located criterion are not always met, and receiver operating
characteristics (ROC curves) are rarely calculated to test these assumptions. Despite
this, Healy and Kubovy (1978) conclude that in relation to other methods of dealing
with recognition data, d' is the "preferred index of performance".
Zuroff, Colussy and Wielgus (1983) suggest that "most of the existing evidence
on selective memory and depression is readily interpreted in terms of response
bias...". They therefore tested 3 groups of psychology students, classified as
depressed, formerly depressed and non-depressed using the short form Beck
Depression Inventory (BD1) and a past tense form of the BDI. Subjects were
presented with 10 positive and 10 negative self-relevant adjectives, and tested on free
recall, and after 7 days a recognition test comprising the Original 20 words and 20
new words matched for valence. The authors claim that the results of the recall tests
indicate a recall bias for negative adjectives in the depressed and formerly depressed
groups compared to the non-depressed group. The hit rate and false alarm rate data
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also apparently tended to support a selective processing account; more (although not
significantly) negative adjectives were correctly recognised by the depressed and
formerly depressed groups, and depressed subjects produced the most negative false
alarms, and non-depressed the least. These results are, however, qualified by
significant differences in response bias () between the groups, with depressed
subjects employing a less strict criterion than the other two groups. Zuroff a a!
interpret these results as indicative either of differing guessing strategies between the
groups, or differences in the "willingness"of the groups to report negative adjectives,
but not intrinsic differences in the subjects' ability to recall the materiaL
This study has been heavily criticised by Martin and Clark (1986a,b). They point
out the failure to carry out appropriate analyses of variance, by considering positive
and negative words separately (a 2-way, groups x wordtype was needed), and that
the necessaiy interaction between them was unlikely to have been significant given
the reported means. Depressives appear instead to simply show a tendency to adopt
a less strict criterion for all material irrespective of valence. In addition, the Zuroff
et a! study does not permit the distinction between effect of mood on encoding and
retrieval processes to be made.
In a much better designed study Dunbar and Lishman (1984) presented 30
clinically depressed and 30 non-depressed controls with positive, negative and neutral
words (they were not specifically told to learn them), which were then presented
again with an equal number of matched words for the recognition test. The results
of interest were a highly significant interaction between group and wordtype for the
variable d', such that depressed patients had higher d' values for the negative words
than did controls, with the opposite pattern for positive words. They also report a
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stricter criterion (higher ) in depressed patients for positive and neutral words, but,
importantly, no difference in 3 for the negative words.
A ThEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Despite the lack of consistency in the results of SDT analysis of recognition
memory, the approach remains a useful tool in the attempt to specify the exact nature
of selective memory effects. Also, although the results of both recall and recognition
memory experiments have not been entirely consistent, where selective memory has
been found, it has invariably been accounted for in terms of an associative network
model of mood and memory. Hypothesized emotion "nodes" are cognitive
representations of clusters of memories associated with a particular emotion, and
include the concepts, beliefs, descriptions of past events etc. linked to that emotion
(Bower, 1981). Activation of a node and its associated network above a threshold
level results in memories entering conscious awareness (see previous chapter for
details). It is proposed that there exists a "pain node", which, in addition to the
negative affect node, is activated during the experience of pain. This node, and its
close associates comprise the sensory attributes of pain, memories of past experiences
of pain, and beliefs about the causes of pain etc. It is hypothesized that, over time,
when the experience of pain becomes chronic, the pain node and associated network
will become permanently activated to such an extent that selective memory effects
become apparent If in addition to the long-term activation of the pain node, the
individual becomes depressed, under these ciivumstances the node representing the
affective side of pain would also become chronically activated.
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MEMORY AND PAIN - EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Providing general support for this idea, one study used word lists to explore the
role of memory in pain. In their first experiment Pearce et al (1990) compared 25
chronic pain patients with 25 non-patient controls on a recall test comprising pain-
related (sensory), negative and neutral words. Their results provided evidence for a
mood congruity effect in the chronic pain group, who recalled significantly more
pain-related words than did the controls. In their second experiment non-patient
volunteers undergoing experimentally induced pain (a cold pressor task) provided no
evidence for selective recall of pain-related information compared to volunteers not
subjected to pain. These results suggest that a memory bias in relation to pain may
be more related to the status of being a chronic pain patient that the state of being
in pain.
However, it could be argued that since the chronic pain sufferers in the Pearce et
a! (1990) study were significantly more depressed than their control group, the
selective memory for sensory words demonstrated in their experiment may have been
an artefact of the negative affect in the chronic pain group. The differences in
depression levels could, incidentally, account for the lack of memory bias in the
induced pain group. Also, in terms of a pain node, induced pain would not
necessarily be assumed to activate the same network as that for chronic pain.
Although sensory attributes of the experience would activate similar "sensory"
concepts, the meaning of the pain, its implications etc. arc likely to be very different.
The whole package of activation, over a long time, may be required for selective
processing.
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STUDY AIMS
The aims of this study are twofold. Firstly, to test the prediction thai, in
accordance with network theory, patterns of selective recall in chronic pain and
depression are related to both pain and depression status. A word list recall paradigm
will be used, with sensory and affective pain related adjectives, and neutral
adjectives, in four groups of subjects: chronic pain patients who are also depressed,
chronic pain patients who are not depressed, depressed patients with no pain, and
non-patient controls. Secondly, the relative contributions of true memory and
response bias in selective memory in these groups will be investigated using a
recognition paradigm and Signal Detection Theory analysis.
METHOD
DESIGN
A mixed design was employed with two between groups variables and one within
groups variable - chronic pain status, depression status and wordtype respectively.
The four subject groups comprised patients with either chronic pain, depression, both
pain and depression or neither. The wordtype categories consisted of two classes of
pain-related adjectives, sensory and affective, and neutral adjectives unrelated to pain.
The sensory and affective adjectives were chosen from the McGill Pain Questionnaire
(MPOJ (Melzack, 1975), and were matched for frequency and number of syllables
with the neutral adjectives (Carroll, Davies and Richman, 1971). The affective
category included some words from the "evaluative" scale of the MPQ. This scale
has been shown not to be separable from the MPQ affective scale using factor
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analysis (Brennan et al, 1987). The words used axe presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Sensoiy, affective and neutral words used in the recall tests.
Sensory	 Affective	 Neutral
scalding
stabbing
pressing
boring
pounding
tender
tingling
flashing
throbbing
crushing
tugging
hurting
horrible
unbearable
mild
discomforting
fearful
cruel
miserable
gruelling
distressing
troublesome
vicious
terrifying
flexible
windswept
imprecise
amazing
educated
polished
legal
selective
leaking
promising
nimble
angular
The experiment was divided into two sections, recall and recognition. The design
of each is outlined below.
Recall Tests. Three recall tests each comprised 4 sensory, 4 affective and 4 neutral
words in pseudo-random order, along with 3 neutral "fillers" at the beginning and end
of each list. The fillers were included to minimize primacy and recency effects, and
were excluded from statistical analyses, except to obtain a measure of the proportion
recalled. The main dependent variable was the number of words conectly recalled
from each wordlype.
Recognition Test. The 54 words of the recall lists were matched for wordlype,
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frequency and number of syllables with an equal number of new adjectives,
constiwting the 108 words of the recognition test. The additional words are shown
in Table 2.2. Again the order of presentation was pseudo-random. Here the dependent
variables were the number of words correctly recognized ("hits") and the number of
words "recognized" which were new words ("false alarms"), for each wordtype
category.
Table 2.2 Additional sensory, affective and neutral words for the recognition test.
Sensory	 Affective	 Neutral
beating	 killing	 spreading
shooting	 tiring	 grand
pricking	 suffocating	 reputable
drilling	 wretched	 swaying
cutting	 blinding	 prime
pinching	 sickening	 protruding
gnawing	 frightful	 youthful
wrenching	 excruciating	 transient
searing	 punishing	 resounding
itchy	 exhausting	 knotty
aching	 annoying	 stony
splitting	 intense	 informal
SUBJECTS
The subjects recruited for the study were chronic pain patients from Pain Relief
Clinics at the Whittington and Wanstead Hospitals, clinically depressed patients
attending the Middlesex Hospital and normal, non-patient controls. The control group
comprised mainly adults attending Extra-Mural Studies evening classes, and a small
number who replied to advertisements requesting volunteers for a psychological
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experiment. Patients were not included if, in the opinion of the physician responsible
for their care, they were suffering global memory, attention or concentration
dysfunction as a result of organic brain disease, psychosis, brain damage,
Alzheimer's Disease, alcohol intoxication, Korsakoff Syndrome or other amnestic
syndrome. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), (Beck et al, 1961) was used to
classify the pain patients into two groups: those who were not depressed (score 0 -
8), and those who exhibited significant depressive symptomatology (score 15 or
above) at the time of testing. Similarly, the criterion for inclusion of psychiatric
depressed patients was a minimum score of 15, and for controls a maximum score
of 8 on the BDI.
All the chronic pain patients had a history of at least six months pain, and were
in pain at the time of testing. Ideally the psychiatric depressed patients would have
had no pain, however it proved impossible to fulfil this condition since most of these
patients reported some pain. Patients were therefore excluded from this group if they
reported a current pain intensity rating of 35 or more on a 0 - 100mm Visual
Analogue Scale [VAS]. This group had a mean current pain intensity score of 8.50,
which contrasts with that of the pain patients, whose mean pain intensity rating was
54.9. A total of 121 subjects was recruited; of these 49 were excluded. Reasons for
exclusion were as follows: twenty one chronic pain patients scored in the range 6 to
14 on the BDI; 10 of the depressed patients either failed to score the minimum
required on the BDI or had pain intensity ratings of greater than 35; and 16 controls
were excluded for analogous reasons. The remaining 72 comprise the final groups.
The characteristics of the subjects in these groups are shown in Table 2.3. The
diagnoses classified as "other" in this table include neck/shoulder, limb, intestinal and
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Table 2.3 Characteristics of subjects.
	Pain, Not	 Pain,	 Depressed,	 Control
	
Depressed	 Depressed	 Not Pain
	
n=19	 nzl6	 u18	 n.19
Biographical
Mean age (sd)	 45.79 (14.8)	 52.38 (8.54)	 45.39 (14.6)	 39.42 (9.9)
Sex ratio(M:F)	 1:0.9	 1:2.2	 1:1.25	 1:1.71
Pain Intensity
Mean pain	 54.37 (24.4)	 55.71 (26.4)	 830 (12.4)	 1.79 (4.0)
intensity' (Sd)
Depression Status
Mean BDI" score	 4.47 (2.1)	 23.13 (8.2)	 29.06 (10.5)	 3.26 (2.4)
(Sd)
Chronicity of
Condition
Pain patients
Mean (mths) (sd)	 66.74 (44.1)	 65.07 (70.0)	 -	 -
Psychiatric
patients Mean	 -	 -	 43.31 (48.1)	 -
(mths) (sd)
Diagnostic Status
Pain patients
Low back pain	 31.58	 20.00	 -
(%)
Arthritis (%)	 10.52	 20.00	 -	 -
Neuralgia (%)
	 5.25	 13.33	 -	 -
Other (%)	 52.65	 46.67	 -	 -
Medication
Status
Prescribed	 26.32	 42.86	 00.00	 -
analgesics (%)
"Over-the-counte?	 21.05	 14.29	 5.56	 -
analgesics (%)
Anti-depressants 	 00.00	 7.14	 55.56	 -
(%)
Anxiolytics (%)	 10.53	 21.43	 22.22	 -
'0 .100mm Visual Analogue Scale
b Beck Depression Inventoq
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myofascial pain. With regard to the medication classification, it should be noted that
some patients were taking more than one type of drug at the time of testing. There
was no significant difference in the ratio of males to females in the four groups (x2
=1.971, df=3, p>O.5O).
PROCEDURE
For the recall task subjects were asked to listen to the word lists presented using
a Sony "Walkman"-type recorder. Subjects were instructed to attempt to learn the
words, and were told that they would be asked to repeat out loud all those they could
remember. The inter-stimulus interval (1S1 onset to onset) was 2 seconds. After each
list the subject was allowed 2 minutes for free recall.
Instructions were then given for the recognition task. The words were again
presented using the Sony Walkman. After hearing each word the subject was required
to decide whether the word had previously been in any one of the three recall lists,
responding "yes" if they thought it was, and "no" if they believed it was not. If they
were uncertain, they were instructed to guess. Here the ISI was 3 seconds, to allow
sufficient time for the subject's verbal response. All responses were recorded by the
experimenter. No attempt was made to obtain ratings of how confident subjects were
in the responses they made on each item, which would have allowed ROC curves to
be determined. This was because in a pilot study Dunbar and Lishman (1984) found
this procedure too demanding for their patient population.
The 21 item, full length BDI was then completed, and the VAS rating of current
pain intensity was obtained using a 0 -100mm VAS anchored at 'no pain' and 'the
most intense pain I have ever experienced'. The BDI and pain intensity rating were
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administered after the memory tests to avoid possible priming effects, which would
confound the results of the memory tests.
The duration of the procedure was approximately 30 minutes. Subjects were
unaware of the hypotheses under investigation; they were told merely that the
experiment concerned memory ability.
RESULTS
Recall
The recall score was expressed as a proportion of the total correct recall
accounted for by each wordtype was calculated for each subject. This data was
subjected to a 3-way, split-plot Analysis of Variance using the program BMDP 2V
with pain and depression as the between groups variables and wordtype as the
repeated measure variable. None of the main effects or two-way interactions were
significant. A significant pain by depression by wordxype interaction emerged using
the Greenhouse-Geisser probability adjustment for multiple levels of the repeated
measure, F (2,136)=3.68, p=0.0285. To control for the possibility that age may
influence accuracy of recall, since the groups were initially different in their mean
age, the analysis was repeated with age as a covariate. No change in the patterns of
results occurred and the pain by depression by wordtype interaction was unaltered.
Table 2.4 presents the proportion recall means for each group and wordtype, along
with their standard deviations. Figure 2.1 depicts graphically the nature of the
interaction. It can be seen that the pain patients who were not depressed, and the
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Mean Recall
0.24
0.22
0.2
0.10
0.16
0.14
0.12
Table 2.4 Mean proportion recalled (SD) by group and wordtype
Pain, Not
	 Pain,	 Depressed,	 Control
Depressed	 Depressed	 Not Pain
n=19	 n=16	 n=18	 n=19
Sensory	 0.221 (0.13) 0.194 (0.13) 0.206 (0.10) 0.170 (0.05)
Affective	 0.139 (0.12) 0.205 (0.19) 0.122 (0.10) 0.193 (0.07)
Neutral	 0.154 (0.09) 0.138 (0.08) 0.147 (0.08) 0.181 (0.05)
0.1.1
S...ory	 AtIctuv.	 N.utr&
Wordtype
—*- P.m Not Dsprs;s. 	 Psili Dspru;sd
-9 D.pieu.d Not P.ur	 Coitrol
Fig. 2.1 Mean proportion recalled by group and wordtype.
psychiatric depressed patients, recalled more sensory than affective words, while the
depressed pain patients recalled approximately equal proportions of sensory and
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affective words, and fewer neutral words. The control group recalled similar numbers
of words from the three wordtype categories. A simple effects analysis of wordtype
for each group was performed to identify the location of the significant effect. The
simple effect of wordtype for the four groups, each with 1.96,133.39 df using the
Greenhouse Geisser adjustment, were as follows: pain, not depressed, F=3.07,
p=O.O584; pain, depressed, F=1.69, p=O.l919; depressed, not pain, F=2.74, p=O.0726
and control, F=<l, p=O.8Ol8. In accordance with predicted patterns of recall, a priori
contrasts were carried out on the simple effects for the first three groups. In the pain,
not depressed group, significantly more sensory than affective or neutral words were
recalled, F(1,18)=4.75, p=O.0428. In the depressed pain group the comparison
between the neutral and the sensory and affective words did not reach significance,
F(1,15)=2.27, p=O.l528. Finally, in the depressed, not pain group the contrast
comparing affective versus sensory and neutral was also significant, F(1,17)=5.56,
p=O.O360. Since such a procedure is unable to distinguish between a V-shape and an
inverted V-shape pattern, it is clear from the graph of the results that the significance
lies in the opposite direction to that predicted, ie.. fewer affective words were recalled
than either sensory or neutral words.
Recognition
The variables d' and t (derived from signal detection analysis procedures), were
computed from the "hit rate" and "false alarm rate" variables using tables from
Hochhaus, (1972), for each subject and wordtype. The I distributions for each
wordxype were significantly skewed, and were therefore subjected to log
transformation which returned each distribution to an adequate degree of normality.
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The means and standard deviations of these results axe presented in Table 2.5. These
variables were subjected to separate 3-way split-plot ANOVAs, with pain and
depression as between groups variables and wordtype as the repeated measure
variable. The significant results of these analyses are displayed in Table 2.6.
The main effect of pain in the d' data can be accounted for by higher d' values
in non-pain patients compared to chronic pain patients. Similarly, the main effect of
depression is accounted for by lower d' values in depressed compared to non-
depressed patients. The interaction between pain and wordtype approached
significance (p=O.08). The pattern of this result, which was also apparent but not
significant in the depressed patients, suggests that higher d' values occur for sensoiy
words compared to affective or neutral. Finally, in general, affective words produced
lower d' values then the other two wordtype categories (main effect of wordtype)
The only significant effect found in the j3 data under this analysis was a main
effect of wordtype. A post-hoc contrast analysis using Scheffe's adjustment revealed
that neutral words resulted in significantly higher J3 values than did either sensoly or
affective words (F( 1,7 l)=40.25, p4).00l).
DISCUSSION
The results of the recall section of this study are generally consistent with the initial
predictions. Chronic pain patients who were not depressed showed a pattern of
selective recall directly related to pain and depression status. In ocher words, those
pain paxients who showed minimal or no depressive symptotnatology had a recall
70
Table 2.5 Mean (SD) d' and Log J by group and wordtype.
Pain, Not
	
Pain,	 Depressed,	 Control
Depressed	 Depressed	 Not Pain
n=19	 n=16	 n=18	 n=19
d'
Sensory
Affective
Neutral
Log
Sensory
Affective
Neutral
1.507 (0.70)
1.007 (0.67)
1.221 (0.73)
0.049 (0.49)
0.144 (0.47)
0.363 (0.50)
1.442 (0.78)
0.950 (0.66)
1.186 (0.47)
-0.128 (0.45)
-0.24 1 (0.50)
0.183 (0.50)
1.450 (0.76)
0.996 (0.75)
1.264 (0.73)
0.096 (0.51)
-0.054 (0.38)
0.426 (0.41)
1.469 (0.67)
1.560 (0.81)
2.133 (1.10)
0.142 (0.45)
0.075 (0.57)
0.357 (0.49)
Table 2.6 Significant effects of separate ANOVAs for d' and t3.
Main Effect	 F Value	 p
d'	 Pain	 (1,68) = 4.40	 0.040
Depression (1,68) = 4.69 	 0.034
Wordtype	 (2,136) = 6.04	 0.003
Log (
	
Wordtype	 (2,136) = 21.87 0.000
bias for sensory adjectives alone. Although the expected bias for the depressed
chronic pain patients did not quite reach statistical significance, the pattern found was
as predicted - high recall for both sensory and affective material compared to neutral
material. These effects may have been more significant had the subjects been
instructed to encode the material self-referentially. The non-patient controls showed
no bias for any wordtype. All these findings are in line with predictions that pain and
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depression axe associated with specific selective information-processing biases.
In theoretical terms, the results of this experiment are supportive of the notion that
there are separate nodes for pain and depression, with distinct associated networks.
However, the findings do to some extent conflict with those of Eich et al (1990),
who suggest that pain impedes the retrieval of pleasant material and aids the retrieval
of unpleasant material only when the pain is accompanied by negative affect. In
other words pain per se has no impact on memory. If this were invariably the case
it would be predicted that no recall bias be found for either sensory or affective
adjectives, unless the chronic pain patients were also depressed, ie. pain alone would
not result in any selective processing of pain-related material. This clearly was not
the case in this study, nor that of Pearce et al (1990). This apparent discrepancy may
have been the direct result of differences between autobiographical memory as in
Eich et al, and memory for recently presented words as in these experiments.
Alternatively, pain may aid only the retrieval of pain-related events, rather than any
unpleasant event, as was assessed by Eich et al (1990).
One recall result, however, runs contrary to predictions. This is that patients who
were depressed but not suffering chronic pain showed no recall bias for the affective
pain words, these adjectives being proportionally less well remembered than either
sensory or neutral words. This is surprising and runs contrary to the prediction
derived from previous findings that clinically depressed patients selectively recall
negative materiaL Two possible explanations can be found for these results. Firstly,
the affective adjectives in this study may not have been sufficiently salient to the
depressed patients to increase the actnration of the depressive associative network,
in d absence of a forced encoding strategy. This may have been because these
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words, although negative, were more strongly linked to pain than depression. Mood
congruity effects, when found, appear to be largely dependent on the subject being
required to think of the material with particular reference to themselves (eg. Bradley
and Mathews, 1983). In previous studies subjects have been forced to process
material in greater depth than would result from just hearing the rds: for example
subjects have been asked to rate themselves on each adjective (eg. Roth and Rehm,
1980). Although this explanation is a plausible account of the failure to demonstrate
a bias for the affective words it does not account for the significant V-shaped pattern
of results, nor indeed for the fact that an alternative contrast comparing sensory with
both affective and neutral words was also significant, ie. that the affective and neutral
words are significantly less well remembered than the sensory. There are two
possibilities. Firstly that the depressed non-pain patients have a imemory bias for
sensory pain-related words (the alternative contrast). Secondly, and more plausibly,
that these results represent an alternative information-procesthig mechanism,
"cognitive avoidance". This concept is discussed in relation to anxiety disorders by
Foa and Kozack, (1986), who point out that in this group of patients "concentrating
on the non-fearful elements of a situation is a commOn pattern". Thus cognitive
avoidance is believed to occur when emotional stimuli, after identification as such,
are less well processed than neutral stimuli. This would result in such stimuli being
less well remembered. The phenomenon has been demonstrated by Watts et a!
(1986), who found that spider phobics are increasingly less able identify spiders
in a recognition task, as the size of the spider is increased. In the present study
cognitive avoidance appears to have operated such that the most 'distressing' words,
the "affective" ones, were actively avoided by the clinically depressed patients.
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Processing was therefore diverted to the neutral, and in particular sensory wonis.
Sensory words may have been more salient than the neutral words, probably because
this patient group is likely to have had a significantly higher incidence of pain
problems in the past than normal populations, (who did not show this pattern of
recall). The processes involved in cognitive avoidance are poorly understood, and as
Williams et al (1988) point Out, the boundary conditions under which it occurs are
as yet unknown. However, it appears that depressed mood, as well as anxiety, may
play an important role in the process. This account of the results in terms of
cognitive avoidance clearly requires further investigation, but is consistent with the
debriefmg reports of patients who remarked that many of the words were very
relevant to them, but they couldn't recall them because they were too 'painful' or
'difficult'. The first experiment reported in the next chapter aims to address this issue
in a group of clinically depressed patients.
Two conclusions may be drawn from the results of the recognition data. The d'
results suggest that both people who suffer chronic pain, and people who are
depressed have poorer overall true memory than normal controls, but there is some
evidence that in the patient groups true memory is better for sensory information.
This follows logically from the recall results, and provides insight into the possible
nature of this information-processing bias. However, once again the results of the
psychiairic depressed group are anomalous. The recall data and its intcrpretation
provides a clue as to why this might be so. A cognitive avoidance mechanism
operating in this group could account for these results. Since processing is diverted
away from affective words and onto sensory and neutral ones, the d' scores (true
memory) for affective adjectives were lower than for sensory and, (to a lesser extent)
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neutral adjectives. The precise nature of these differences in true memory can, as yet,
only be intimated. Whether they reflect encoding, storage or retrieval processing
dissimilarities needs to be empirically explored. No conclusions can be drawn at this
point since the subjects were in the same "mood' at both encoding and retrievaL
The second conclusion concerns the contribution of response bias to the selective
memory effect The results indicated a propensity for subjects in all groups to
adopt a stricter criterion for deciding that they have heard a word before if it has a
neutral valence. In this respect the results are analogous to those of Dunbar and
Lishman (1984). The reliability of this finding needs further investigation, but the
results do suggest that memory biases in chronic pain and depression can to some
extent be accounted for by differences in true memory ability, and are not solely the
consequence of response biases.
From a clinical perspective, the findings of this study have implications for the
maintenance of chronic pain problems. Selective memory processes are likely to play
a role in instigating a vicious cycle similar to that proposed by Teasdale (1983) in
depressed patients, although the exact mechanisms, and relationships between sensory
and affective components of pain remain undetermined. A further issue which
requires clarification is the role of duration of pain in selective memory, and
therefore the second experiment to be reported in the next chapter examines the recall
of sensory, affective and neutral adjectives in a group of patients experiencing acute,
clinical pain.
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Chapter 3 'Tests of cognitive avoilance in Lepression aiul
selective memory in acute clTinica( pain
INTRODUCTION
One of the interesting and puzzling findings of the previous chapter was that a
group of clinically depressed patients failed to exhibit the predicted memory bias for
affective adjectives, compared to sensory and neutral adjectives. Indeed, a contrast
analysis of this group's data demonstrated that significantly ftwer affective words
were recalled compared to the other wordtypes. This unexpected result was accounted
for in terms of cognitive avoidance. An empirical example of this phenomenon is
provided by Watts, Trezise and Sharrock (1986). In the first of two experiments they
showed that spider phobics have poorer recognition memory for spiders than do
controls, but only for large spiders (this was a post hoc comparison of small versus
large spiders). They interpreted this as indicative of larger spiders provoking greater
emotional arousal. Their second experiment failed to demonstrate the predicted
remedial effect of elaborative encoding. It was hypothesized that forcing phobic
subjects to look carefully at, and describe 2 distinguishing features of each spider
would result in the amelioration of the poorer recognition memoiy for big spiders,
ie. under this condition phobics would have similar memory to controls. This was not
statistically supported under the a priori analysis.
In a recent study Watts and Dalgleish (1991) provided further evidence for poor
memory for spider-related information in spider phobics. Using a wordlist recall
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memory paradigm, they found that phobics show significantly poorer recall of spider
words (compared to a group of words also from a category - baby-related words) in
relation to non-phobic controls. The results were consistent with a shift in processing
resources towards baby words and away from spider words in the phobics. Watts and
Dalgleish suggest that cognitive avoidance provides a plausible account of these
results.
Although cognitive avoidance effects have, to date, been associated solely with
anxiety disorders, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a similar process operates,
under certain conditions, in depression.
The first experiment reported here aims to test the hypothesis that clinically
depressed patients cognitively avoid certain types of negative information, and that
this avoidance results in poorer memory for this information. Within a simple recall
paradigm, groups of clinically depressed patients and non-depressed controls are
presented with the same words as previously (sensory, affective and neutral), with
an additional category, adjectives associated with depressive feelings. They were
included in addition to the MPQ affective/evaluative words in order to check that
these words were not under-recalled in the previous experiment because they were
not sufficiently connected with depression to activate the depressive associative
network The alternative possibility was that this group had a bias for sensory
information. This will be clarified in this experiment.
The second issue to be explored in this chapter concerns the specificity of
selective memory effects to chronic pain. At this point it seems appropriate to draw
an analogy between pain and anxiety. Anxiety is often divided into state (the current,
largely situation-dependent level of anxiety) and trait (seen as an enduring personality
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characteristic) components. In terms of information-processing, chronic pain may be
analogous to trait anxiety, and acute pain more aldn to state anxiety.
There is evidence to suggest that attentional bias in anxiety is most reliably
related to trait rather than state anxiety. Broadbent and Broadbent (1988), in a series
of experiments using the visual dot-probe paradigm demonstrated that the bias
"characterizes the individual and [is] not solely a change that appears in anybody
who enters a temporary state of anxiety". The authors also point out that this finding
is of theoretical interest, since it lends credence to the assertion that biased
processing is a causal factor in the development of the clinical disorder.
If this analogy holds, it would be anticipated that in acute pain conditions no
selective processing of pain-related information be apparent. In support of this,
Pearce et a! (1990) found no evidence for biased recall of sensory adjectives in a
group of subjects in whom pain had been experimentally induced. However, it would
be invalid to assume that induced pain is equivalent to acute clinical pain. Therefore,
in the second experiment reported here a comparison will be made between a group
of patients suffering acute pain (of less than one months duration), and controls. The
same measures and procedures as those employed in the original experiment will be
used.
EXPERIMENT 1. Test of cognitive avoidance in depression
METHOD
DESIGN
A mixed design was employed, with one between groups variable, depression
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status (clinically depressed or non-depressed), and one repeated measure variable,
wordiype. The wordtype categories comprised sensory, affective, neutral and
depressive adjectives. Four lists of words, with 3 words from each category, were
presented in fixed pseudo-random order, with 3 fillers at the beginning and end of
each list. Thus the independent variables were depression status and wordtype, and
the dependent variable was number of words correctly recalled.
MATERIALS
The same sensory, affective and neutral words as those used in the previous
experiment were employed. A pool of 12 adjectives reflecting feelings associated
with depression were generated. These were as follows: pessimistic, lethargic, lonely,
hopeless, discouraged, worried, pathetic, gloomy, inadequate, bleak, worthless,
despairing. All words were matched as closely as possible for frequency and length.
The depressive adjectives did not come from a recognised source (unlike the words
typically chosen for memory research in depression, they were not members of the
list of personality trait words rated for likeableness by Anderson, 1968, eg. hostile,
impolite, dishonest). Personality trait words were not chosen because they do not
describe the feelings associated with depression, and ale therefore not comparable
with the pain-related adjectives and the experience of pain. An attempt was made to
ensure that these words were appropriate. A group of 15 psychology undergraduates
rated how negative each of the depressive and neutral words were on a 5-point scale
from "not at all negative" to "extremely negative". They were also asked to rate how
depressed they were currently feeling on a scale from 0 (not at all depressed) to 10
(extremely depressed). A matched t-test confimied that the two categories of words
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were completely distinguishable on this basis, t(14)=16.75, p<O.0001. There was no
Si3%4CO
&correlation between levels of depression and ratings of how negative the adjectives
were.
SUBJECTS
Twenty-seven clinically depressed subjects were recruited from out-patient clinics
and the psychiatric day hospital at Watford General Hospital. Patients were required
to score a minimum of 15 on the BDI for inclusion in this group. Patients were not
included if they had any history of chronic pain, or were experiencing any current
pain. Of the 27 patients interviewed, 8 failed to meet these criteria and were therefore
excluded from statistical analyses.
The control group comprised 25 people randomly chosen from a pool of volunteer
members of the general public. Inclusion in this group required a maximum score of
9 on the BDI, and no history of chronic pain. Four of the 25 subjects were excluded
on this basis. The chacteristics of these groups are shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Chacteristics of subjects.
Mean age (sd)
Sex ratio (M:F)
Mean BDI" score (sd)
Depressed Patients
n= 19
41.74 (14.40)
8:11
25.68 (9.12)
Controls
n=21
37.00 (11.68)
5:16
6.14 (2.13)
Duration of depression	 32.38 (58.28)
mean (mths) (sd)
Beck Depression Inventory
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PROCEDURE
Subjects were tested individually. They were informed that they would hear four lists
of words, and that after each list they would be asked to say out loud as many of the
words as possible. Lists were presented aurally using a Sony "Walkman" recorder at
a rate of one word every two seconds (stimulus onset to onset). Subjects were
allowed two minutes for free recall (this length of time was, in fact, never completely
filled). The 21-item, full length BDI was then administered, and it was ascertained
whether the individual had ever experienced a chronic pain condition, or was
currently in any pain. Subjects were given no indication of the true nature of the
experiment prior to participating, but were fully debriefed afterwards.
RESULTS
Mean recall scores, expressed as proportions of the total recall including fillers, were
calculated. This data was subjected to a 2-way, split plot ANOVA using the program
BMDP 2V, with depression status(depressed versus control) as the between groups
variable, and wordtype (sensory, affective, neutral or depressive) as the repeated
measure variable. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of wordtype,
F(3,114)=4.49, p=O.005l, accounted for by better overall recall of neutral adjectives.
There was no evidence for either a main effect of depression status, F(1,38)<1,
p=O.7674, nor a wordtype by group interaction, F(3,1 14)=1.30, p=O.2783. However,
an a priori contrast analysis in accordance with the cognitive avoidance hypothesis
in the depressed patients (ie. comparing recall for sensory and neutral adjectives with
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Table 3.2 Mean proportion recalled (SD) by group and wordtype.
Depressed Patients	 Controls
n=19	 n=21
Sensory	 0.132 (0.09)	 0.094 (0.06)
Affective	 0.093 (0.06)	 0.097 (0.04)
Neutral	 0.143 (0.06)	 0.154 (0.06)
Depressive	 0.112 (0.07)	 0.124 ((107)
Figure 3.1 Mean proportion recalled by depressed patients in each wordtype
category.
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Figure 3.2 Mean proportion recalled by control subjects in each wordtype
category.
that for the affective and depressive adjectives) was significant, F(1,18)5.74,
p=O.O276. Also, a post hoc contrast on the control group's results, comparing recall
of neutral words with the other 3 categories was significant, F(l,20)=1O.45,
p=O.0042. The mean proportions recalled, along with standard deviations are
presented in Table 3.2, and graphically for each group separately (since there was no
interaction) in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
U.05
S.nsory
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EXPERIMENT 2. Test of selective memory in acute clinical pain.
METHOD
DESIGN, MATERIALS and PROCEDURE
In this experiment acute pain patients and controls were compared on recall and
recognition memory tests. Again a mixed design was used, with one between groups
variable, pain status (acute pain versus control) and one repeated measure variable,
wordtype (sensory, affective and neutral). The wordlists were identical to those
described in Chapter 1 and the procedures for both recall and recognition tests were
replicated.
SUBJECTS
Sixteen patients from the gynaecology ward at Whipps Cross Hospital were
recruited for this experiment. Patients were invited to participate in the research if
they had recently (within the last 4 days) undergone planned surgery for previously
non-painful conditions, or had surgery for ectopic pregnancy. This condition typically
causes intense pain which rapidly necessitates treatment. Patients whose condition
had caused pain for longer than 4 weeks were excluded.
Patients were tested between one and four days after surgery, mean=2.75 days,
(sd=O.75). At pain assessment, after the memory test, it became apparent that 3
patients were no longer in pain, and were therefore excluded from the statistical
analysis. The mean age of the acute pain group was 30.31 years (sd=5.63). Their
mean current pain intensity rating on a 0-100mm VAS was 40.54 (sd=25.11), and
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their mean BDI score was 7.00 (sd=5.54). 53.85% of the group were taking
analgesics.
The control group comprised the female members of the non-patient control group
of the experiment reported in Chapter 1. Their mean age was 39.50 years (sd= 10.30),
current VAS pain intensity rating was 1.83 (sd=4.32), and mean BDI score was 3.17
(sd=2.52).
RESULTS
Recall
The proportion recall data was subjected to a split-plot ANOVA with pain status
(acute pain versus control) as the between groups variable, and wordtype (sensory,
affective and neutral) as the repeated measure variable. There was no evidence for
main effects of pain status (F(1,23)=1.23, p=O.2783) or wordtype (F(2,46)=2.28,
p=0.l 162), nor an interaction between the two variables (F(2,46)=1.66, p=0.2O15).
Although the two groups differed significantly in their levels of depressive
symptomatology (as assessed by the BDI, t(23)=2.195, p<0.O25), the use of BDI
scores as a covariate in the above analysis did not alter the results. The mean
proportion recalled for each group and wordtype, with corresponding standard
deviations, can be found in Table 3.3. The results are presented graphically in Figure
3.3. Although further statistical analysis is inappropriate given the lack of significant
effects, it can be seen that in the acute pain group a trend is emerging for sensory
words to be remembered best, and neutral words least well.
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Table 3.3. Mean proportion recalled (SD) for each group and wordtype.
Acute Pain Patients
	
Controls
n=13	 n=12
Sensory	 0.244 (0.09)	 0.176 (0.05)
Affective	 0.198 (0.12)	 0.187 (0.07)
Neutral	 0.153 (0.08)	 0.168 (0.06)
Recognition
The variables d' (true memory) and 13 (response bias) were derived from the hit
rate and false alarm rate results, using tables from Hochhaus (1972). Mean d' and f3
scores and their standard deviations are presented in Table 3.4. D' and f3 scores were
subjected to separate two-way ANOVAs with pain status as the between groups
variable and wordtype as the repeated measure variable. Under the first analysis (d'),
a significant main effect of wordtype was found using Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted
probabilities, F(2,46)=6.55, p=0.0033. A significant interaction between pain status
and wordtype also emerged, F(2,46)=3.60, p=O.O36O (again with Greenhouse-Geisser
probabilities). The main effect can be accounted for by superior true memory for
neutral adjectives. A simple effects analysis of wordtype for each group was
performed to identify the location of the significant effect(s) within the interaction.
The simple effect of wordtype for the acute pain patients and controls, with
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted probabilities were F(1.97,45.25)=5.08, p=O.O1O6 and
F(1.97,45.25)=5.07, p=0.Ol06 respectively. It can be seen from the graph of these
results (Figure 3.4) that acute pain patients have significantly poorer true memory for
affective compared to sensory and neutral adjectives, whereas control subjects have
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Mean Recall
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
significantly higher d' scores for neutral adjectives alone.
£.nory	 Mfsctiv.	 Nsutral
Wordtype
+-Acut.. Pain Patients	 Controls
Figure 3.3. Mean proportion recalled by group and wordtype.
Under an equivalent analysis of log f3, significant main effects of pain status and
wordtype were found, F(l,23)=9.61, p=O.005O and F(2,46)=3.76, p=O.O308
respectively, but no significant interaction emerged. The main effect of pain status
reflects a stricter criterion (higher values of log ) in the acute pain patients across
all wordtypes. The main effect of wordtype can be accounted for by higher 13 values
for neutral adjectives. For clarity, the pattern of these results is presented graphically
in Figure 3.5.
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Table 3.4 Mean (SD) scores for the variables d' and log .
Acute Pain Patients	 Controls
n=13	 n=12
d'
Sensory	 2.605 (0.75)	 2.423 (0.53)
Affective	 1.843 (0.83)	 2.598 (0.93)
Neutral	 2.577 (0.82)	 3.274 (1.17)
Log 13
Sensory	 -0.184 (0.47)	 0.252 (0.34)
Affective	 -0.179 (0.29)	 0.249 (0.55)
Neutral	 0.139 (0.22)	 0.403 (0.22)
Mean d
3.5,
• S.niory	 Aft.ctM	 Neutral
Word ty p.
	
Pu p P.S p.ntl	 *C,ntr.ls
Figure 3.4 Mean d' scores by group and wordtype.
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Figure 3.5 Mean Log by group and wordtype.
DISCUSSION
COGNITIVE AVOIDANCE IN DEPRESSION
The results of the clinically depressed patients in the first experiment can be seen
to provide evidence for cognitive avoidance of information which is related to the
emotional components of depression. These results support this interpretation of the
findings in the clinically depressed group in the previous chapter, and render the
alternative possibility (a bias for sensory words) less likely. Indeed, in the present
experiment sensxy adjectives were marginally less well remembered than neutral
adjectives. However, before considering the possible mechanisms and implications
of the cognitive avoidance interpretation, it is worthwhile to appraise, and eliminate
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alternative explanations.
Firstly, rather than placing emphasis on the relative under-recall of the affective
and depressive adjectives, it may be that sensory and neutral were relatively over-
recalled, ie. that this group of patients have a memory bias for sensory and neutral
adjectives. This is unlikely and makes little sense. Care was taken to ensure that none
of the patients had any previous or current pain complaints, and even if the group
were in some way unusual with regard to pain, this would not account for the equally
high recall of neutral adjectives.
Secondly, the concreteness and imageability of the words may have differed
significantly between categories, and therefore played an important role in recall. It
is well established that words which are more concrete and hence more imageable
are more easily remembered (Paivio, 1969). It could be argued that the neutral words
were slightly more concrete than the other three categories, resulting in superior
recall of this category. However, this explanation could not account for the relatively
better recall of the sensory adjectives.
Thirdly, following the equally well established finding that presenting words
belonging to a common semantic category increases recall (eg. Deese, 1959; Jenkins
and Russell, 1952; Bousfield, 1953 and Cohen, 1966), it would be predicted that
affective, depressive and (not just) sensory words would have been recalled more
than the neutral words. This was clearly not the case. In support of the improbability
of this as an explanation, Watts and Dalgleish (1991) showed less free recall of
spider words in spider phobics hi comparison to another set of words which also
belonged to a category - baby related words.
Fourthly, and lastly, it may be that the words chosen, despite the additional
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category, still did not adequately represent the emotional component of depression.
Again this seems unlikely, since if these words were simply undifferentiated from the
sensory and neutral words, no difference in the number of words recalled from each
category would be predicted.
Thus, the most plausible explanation for the results of the clinically depressed
patients in this experiment is that information associated with feeling depressed is
cognitively avoided.
There axe several possible mechanisms potentially involved in a cognitive
avoidance process. Depressed patients may attend less to depression-relevant material,
leading to poor encoding and subsequently poor recaiL If this were the case, on a
theoretical level in terms of the associative netrk model, the depressive network
would not become activated, and hence the words would not readily be recalled (and
they certainly would not be selectively remembered). Alternatively, the depressed
patients may attend equally to all information, but only elaborate non-personally
relevant material, perhaps as a safety mechanism. This is not consistent, of course,
with the clinical observation that depressed individuals tend to ruminate, and fail to
prevent negative thoughts from leaving conscious awareness. Hypotheses concerning
the roles of attention and elaboration in cognitive avoidance clearly need empirical
investigation.
The last issue to be considered in relation to these results, is why was cognitive
avoidance found to be operating in this group, when research in this area typically
points to a recall bias towards remembering negative information? There axe two
mpin differences between this study and those in which selective memory for
negative information was demonstrated. In the present study subjects were not
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required to perform a self-referential encoding procedure. In addition, the words
chosen were very different to those used in previous experiments. The words used
were chosen very specifically to reflect the emotions associated with depression,
rather than personality trait words which are more closely related to self-image. The
emotion words may have caused greater arousal in the depressed subjects resulting
in cognitive avoidance and poorer processing. This explanation is in accord with that
provided by Watts, Trezise and Sharrock (1986), who suggested that the large spiders
in their study caused greater arousal in the phobics than the small spiders, leading
to poorer recognition of the large spiders.
Finally, with regard to this experiment, the controls subjects' results require some
comment. There was evidence to suggest that in this group neutral words were
recalled better than any of the other three categories. It is possible that this is simply
an expression of the tendency of non-patient subjects to remember words which have
either a positive valence, or non-emotional content.
SELECFWE MEMORY IN ACUTE CUNICAL PAIN
The results of the second experiment provide some evidence to support the
hypothesis that patients suffering acute clinical pain will not show a memory bias.
Although the interaction between pain status and wordtype did not approach
significance, the data do suggest that a higher proportion of sensory adjectives are
recalled compared to neutral adjectives. The proportion of affective adjectives
recalled took an intermediate position. This is not surprising since some of the
patients scored in the moderately depressed range on the BDI, but there were too few
subjects in the group to justify a comparison between depressed and non-depressed
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patients. Given the slightly ambiguous nature of the results, it would be premature
to draw firm conclusions on this issue. Larger groups of subjects may have revealed
a significant interaction, and this clearly requires further investigation.
If the statistical findings are considered conclusive, and the trend ignored, the
analogy between acute and chronic pain, and state and trait anxiety suggested in the
introduction, seems applicable. Like the role of selective attention in anxiety, which
has been shown to be more closely associated with state anxiety, or at least an
interaction between state and trait anxiety (Broadbent and Broadbent 1988; MacLeod
and Mathews, 1988), selective memory seems to be associated more closely with
chronic than acute pain.
The results of the signal detection analysis of recognition data do little to
illuminate the situation. Neither the true memory nor response bias measures are able
to account for the free recall results, and hence some doubt must be cast over their
utility in investigating information-processing in pain.
Although the results of the recall test, when taken at face value, do point to the
importancechronicity in the development of information-processing biases in pain,
other factors such as beliefs, and attitudes, exerting a "top-down" processing
influence are also likely to be of great significance. In the terms of Leventhal (1979),
conceptual processes influence lower level schematic processes. The conceptual
processing of an individual experiencing an acute pain episode, with the expectation
of full recovery, is likely to differ markedly from that of patients for whom pain is
a permanent problem. One of these factors, beliefs, forms the focus of the next
chapter, in which differences in beliefs about pain are explored in chronic pain
patients and non-patient controls.
93
Cfiapter 4 'The dve&pment and valilation of a
que.stionnaire assessing e(iefs a6out pain
INTRODUCTION
In recent years research has increasingly focused on beliefs about pain in chronic
pain patients as important factors in pain report, psychological functioning and
treatment compliance (eg. Williams and Thorn, 1989). In a comprehensive review of
the literature Jensen, Turner, Romano and Karoly (1991) identified 62 articles which
examined the relationship between beliefs, coping efforts and adjustment to chronic
pain. At a general level, an internal locus of control has been associated with positive
adaptation to chronic pain - greater use of active coping strategies and less depression
(Crisson and Keefe, 1988; Skevington, 1983). More specifically, there is evidence
for a relationship between beliefs about the ability to control pain and
coping/adjustment (eg Strong et al, 1990; Jensen et a!, 1987; Crisson and Keefe,
1988; Keefe and Williams, 1990 Jensen and Karoly,1991). Beliefs concerning
helplessness in relation to chronic pain have been associated with passive coping
style, and greater levels of psychological and physical disability, pain intensity and
interference with activity (Nicassio et a4 1985; Smith et a!, 1988; for and Turk,
1988). Although there is a fair degree of consistency in findings between studies, the
majority employed correlational designs and therefore the causal role of the beliefs
investigated cannot be assumed.
The concept of auributional style, which is closely linked to that of locus of
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control, has received some attention in relation to chronic pain. Three primary
atiributional styles have been identified as playing a role ia chronic pain and
psychological functioning: internal attributions - the belief th outcomes are the
result of something about the individual; stable attributions - beliefs that outcomes
are a result of non-transient factors and are therefore long-lasting, and finally global
attributions - beliefs that many situations will have the same outcome (Abrarnson,
1978). The Auributional Style Questionnaire, developed by Peterson et al (1982) as
a measure of internal, stable and global attributions has been applied to chronic pain
patients with mixed results. In the first study Love (1988) found that depressed
chronic pain patients, in comparison to non-depressed chronic pain patients, are more
likely to exhibit all three attributional styles for negative, but not positive outcomes.
In a second study, a composite score of the three styles for negative outcomes was
found to be related to depression in a group of chronic pain pataents (Cheatle a at,
1990). However, no significant association between depression and atiributional style
was found by Ingram a a! (1990).
Taken as a whole, despite a few inconsistencies, these results clearly demonstrate
the importance of beliefs and attributions in the adjustment to cihronic pain.
Thus, to date, great emphasis has rested on the impact of beliefs about the ability
to control pain on measures of psychological and physical functioning. In contrast,
there is a relative paucity of research investigating beliefs and attributions about the
causes of pain, its consequences, and factors affecting the experience of pain. It is
thought that if symptoms are attributed to a neutral "external" cause, they will be less
disabling and cause less distress than if attributed to personal "internaF' causes.
(Storms and McCaul, 1976). For example, Storms and Nisbett (1970) investigated
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this phenomenon in a group of insomniac patients, who typically experience
heightened arousal symptoms on retiring to bed. Two groups of subjects were given
a placebo pill, the first with the information that it would cause increased heart rate,
alertness and body temperature, the other group being informed that the pill was a
sedative. The second group took longer to get to sleep, apparently because they were
unable to attribute their symptoms to an external cause - the pilL Similar results were
found by Liebhart, (1974), who provided cardiac neurosis patients (who worry
excessively about relatively minor cardiac problems) with a pill to which they could
attribute their symptoms. Compared with waiting list and irrelevant placebo control
groups, these patients showed significantly less somatic, affective and behavioural
deterioration. Although not without criticism (Watts, 1983, pg 139), these studies
provide evidence that if patients are given the opportunity to reatiribute their
symptoms externally they are less troubled by their symptoms.
Psychological and organic beliefs about the causes of symptoms may be seen to
parallel internal and external attributions, and have been identified as having impact
on psychological functioning. Watts (1983) suggests that patients who "attribute
somatically based symptoms to internal, psychological causes may be unnecessarily
disturbed by them". For example, in obesity it is found that altered circadian rhythms
induced by hormones may be misattributed by patients to emotional arousal (Rodin,
1978). More commonly, however, predominantly psychological symptoms may be
believed to be due to an organic cause. Imboden et al (1961) found that some
patients who had recovered from influenza and who continued to complain of
symptoms three weeks later believed that they still bad an organic disease. Since
these patients could be predicted from the depression scale of the MMPI administered
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prior to the onset of the infection, it is likely that their symptoms were indicative of
depression and misattributed to the influenza. It follows that the way in which a
patient explains their illness to themselves will to some extent determine the way in
which they cope with that illness and respond to interventions. The model proposed
by Leventhal et a! (1980) describes how a patient's representation of their illness can
play a role in both preventing and dealing with Illness, by acting as part of a
regulatory system guiding coping efforts and setting goals by which coping efforts
are evaluated.
Clearly attributions concerning the causation of pain and recovery from it will
influence the way in which pain is experienced and communicated to others. As pain
persists, pain behaviours and emotions associated with the experience of pain may
reinforce the notion of illness and the sick role, thus inhibiting coping and reducing
the probability of effective treatment. An understanding of the chronic pain patient's
atiributional belief framework is therefore likely to aid accurate assessment and the
development of appropriate management strategies (Watts, 1983).
In an attempt to provide a method of assessing abnormal behaviour Pilowsky and
Spence (1983) developed an instrument, the Illness Behaviour Questionnaire, which
comprises 7 scales - general hypochondriasis, disease conviction, psychological
versus somatic perception of illness, affective inhibition, affective disturbance, denial
and irritability. Of particular interest is the third scale which assesses the tendency
to blame oneself and be accepting of the need for psychiatric help at one end of the
scale, and rejection of the possibility that psychological factors are important and
greater focus on somatic problems at the other end. Although at face value this
measure appears to satisfy the need for an assessment tool for psychological versus
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somatic beliefs, many of the items in the questionnaire as a whole have been found
not to meet adequate psychometric standards (Main and Waddell, 1987). In another
large scale study the third scale disappeared altogether on factor analysis
(Zonderman, Heft and Costa, 1985).
Three studies have described the development of measures designed to assess
beliefs about pain. The Pain Beliefs and Perceptions Inventory (Williams and Thom,
1989) has three dimensions - self-blame, perception of pain as mysterious and beliefs
about the duration of pain. They found a positive association between pain intensity
and the belief that pain is enduring. In addition, their results indicated that such
beliefs are also related to decreased compliance with health psychology and physical
therapy interventions. A strong belief in the mysterious nature of pain had simihir
impact on compliance with physical therapy, along with lack of improvement post
treatment with psychological distress and somatization. The belief that pain is
enduring and mysterious was shown to be linked with decreased likelihood of using
cognitive coping strategies, greater probability of catastrophization and less likelihood
that coping strategies would be rated as effective.
The second, the Beliefs about Pain Control Questionnaire(Skevington, 1990) is
derived from the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Questionnaire (MHLC,
Wallston and Wallston, 1978). It assesses the extent to which people believe that they
have personal control over their pain (Internal scale), or fate, or doctors and other
influential people control their pain (Chance and Powerful Others scales). As yet
there is little data on the relationship between these scales and indices of pain
experience.	
(JLk%Wk &to1)
Finally, the Survey of Pain Attitudesp9t7) provides a measure of attitudes in 5
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subscales; medical cure, pain control, solicitude, disability and medication. Although
it is relatively comprehensive and has adequate psychometric properties, this
questionnaire cannot readily assess the constructs of current interest Also, it does not
permit a variety of degrees of agreement with, or belief in a concept, given its
true/false response options. A recent study (Jensen and Karoly, 1991) has also
examined the relationship between patients' beliefs about the degree to which they
could control pain and psychological functioning, medical services use and activity
level The authors demonstrated the importance of control beliefs in well-being and
activity levels in chronic pain patients.
Although these measures and findings provide insight into certain aspects of belief
systems they do not encompass specific beliefs about the causes and consequences
of pain in terms of organic and psychological components, the importance of which
have been outlined.
Thus there is evidence to support the contention that attributional beliefs about
pain aetiology and consequences play a significant role, however there is as yet no
standardized instrument with which they can be assessed. The aim of this study was
to develop an instrument to assess such beliefs concerning the experience of pain.
The new questionnaire was then used to compare the beliefs of a heterogeneous
group of chronic pain patients and non-patient controls, and to investigate the
relationship between beliefs, the MHLC and other pain-related measures.
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Phase 1: Scale DeveloDment
METhOD
DESIGN
Twenty items were chosen for the questionnaire, reflecting common beliefs about
the experience of pain - its causes, consequences and factors influencing its severity.
Each item contained a statement concerning pain, and at the appropriate place in the
sentence a choice of six qualifying adverbs. The instructions read as follows:
'For each item please indicate your opinion by
underlining one of the following words in each
sentence: always, almost always, often,
sometimes, rarely, never. There are no right or
wrong answers: it is important that you respond
according to your actual beliefs, not according to
how you feel you should believe, or how you
think we want you to believe.'
A sample of 294 people, comprising 100 chronic pain patients and 194 non-pain
subjects completed the questionnaire.
SUBJECTS
(a) Chronic Pain Patients. Patients suffering pain of mixed aetiologies, for a
minimum of six months were recruited for the study. Thirty-eight (out of 45 who
were Invited to participate) completed the questionnaire, while waiting for routine
100
Pain Clinic appointments at Whipps Cross Hospital. In addition patients attending the
Pain Clinic at the Hanimersmith Hospital were mailed the questionnaire: 152 were
sent out and 62 of these were returned usable. Reasons for the non-return of
questionnaires could not be assessed. It is assumed that those patients who did
respond provided a representative sample of the chronic pain population. The mean
age of these subjects was 53.8 years (SD=14.05); 62% were female.
(b) Non-Patient Controls. The criteria for inclusion in this group was an absence of
pain complaint, and maximum scores of 2 out of 10 for current pain intensity and 3
out of 10 for average pain intensity over the past week respectively. Subjects were
recruited from two sources. Firstly, 140 students attending Extra Mural Studies
evening classes at the University of London were mailed the questionnaire. Forty-five
of the 65 returned were usable. Secondly, 116 undergraduate students of University
College London completed the questionnaire - 102 were acceptable. The mean age
of these controls was 26.34 years (SD=l0.76); 66.2% were female.
(c) Others. This group comprised 47 members of the general public approached
outside Euston Station who agreed to fill in the questionnaire. This London station
was selected at random as a place where a large number of people congregate and
have time to fill in a questionnaire. It was also thought that such a location would
provide a representative sample of the adult population. Their mean age was 34.3
years (SD=16.l6); 57% were female.
PROCEDURE
All subjects who were mailed the questionnaire were invited in a covering letter
to participate in a study concerning the experience of pain. They were assured of the
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confidentiality and anonymity of their responses, and were provided with a stamped,
addressed envelope for the return of the questionnaire. The remaining chronic pain
patients were approached by a member of the pain clinic nursing staff and invited to
participate in the project, under the same conditions. The undergraduate students
completed the questionnaire after attending psychology lectures. The subjects
approached outside Euston Station were given brief details of the nature of the study,
and invited to participate in a similar manner to all other subjects. Despite the
apparently complex format of the questionnaire, no subject experienced difficulty
in its completion.
RESULTS
Responses of all 294 subjects on the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire were subjected
to a Factor Analysis with oblique rotation using the Varimax procedure. Two factors
were obtained accounting for 68.15% of the variance. Items were included in a factor
if they loaded greater than 0.4 on either but not both factors. Table 4.1 presents the
items with their factor loadings. Where these are less than 0.4 they are replaced by
zero. The rotated factors did not correlate significantly (0.078). The squared multiple
correlations of the factors with their items were 0.80 and 0.73 for factors 1 and 2
respectively. This indicates good internal consistency of the factors.
Factor 1, accounting for 43.89% of the variance consists of 10 items, primarily
concerning the organic aspects and implications of pain. The four items of factor 2
accounted for 24.26% of the variance, and were psychological in nature. Five of the
items did not meet the loading criteria to be included in either factor (items 2,4,6,12
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and 14), and one item loaded on both factors, and was therefore dropped from the
solution (item 13). The two items loading least heavily on the first factor were also
then removed from the solution, since they were very similar in content to two other
items loading on this factor. This led to greater equality of number of items on each
of the resultant questionnaire scales. Thus the final solution comprised two factors,
the first with eight items, the second with four.
All items loaded positively onto their respective factors. A second factor analysis,
using identical procedures but on these 12 items confirmed the factor structure. Each
item loaded at least 0.4 on the same factor as in the original analysis and no item
loaded on both factors or on neither factor. This solution accounted for 82.37% of
the total variance.
Scale Reliability
Total factor scores were calculated for each individual, scoring the items from 1,
'never', through to 6, 'always'. Using Cronbach's coefficient alpha to assess the
internal reliability of the test showed good internal consistency for each scale; 0.73
and 0.70 for the organic and psychological scales respectively. Considering the
chronic pain patients alone, the coefficients were 0.71 and 0.73.
Scores on the scales (adjusted for the difference in number of items on each) were
subjected to a two-way split-plot analysis of variance with group (pain vs non-pain)
as the between groups variable and scale as the repeated measures variable. Subjects
from Euston Station were excluded from this analysis due to concerns about the
reliability of the information concerning their pain status. Results indicated main
effects of both group (F (1,236)=4.86, p<O.05) and scale (F (1,236)=54.36, p<0.0001)
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Table 4.1 Rotated factor loadings for the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire administered to 294 subjects
Factor Loadings
Item	 Factor 1 Factor2
1. Pain is the result of damage to the tissues of the body.
	
0.428	 0.000
2. DOCIOrS/GPS are the people best able to relieve pain.' 	 0.000	 0.000
3. Physical exercise makes pain worse. 	 0306	 0.000
4. Taking medication is the best way to relieve pain. t	0.000	 0.000
5. It is impossible to do much for oneself to relieve pain. 	 0350	 0.000
6. When in pain it is advisable to rest' 	 0.000	 0.000
7. Being anxious makes pain worse.	 0.000	 0380
8. Experiencing pain is a sign that something is wrong with 	 0.563	 0.000
the body.
9. When relaxed pain is easier to cope with. 	 0.000	 0.449
10. Being in pain prevents you from enjoying hobbies and 	 0313	 0.000
social activities.
11.The amount of pain is related to the amount of damage. 	 0.530	 0.000
12.A cause for pain can be found by doctors.'	 0.000	 0.000
13.Pain can be reduced by concentrating on other things.' 	 -0.418	 0.401
14.Women can tolerate more pain than men.'	 0.000	 0.000
15.Thinking about pain makes it worse. 	 0.000	 0.667
16.Pain can be dealt with by ignoring it'	 -0.401	 0.000
17.When injured one feels pain.' 	 0.425	 0.000
18. It is impossible to control pain on your own. 	 0.484	 0.000
19.Pain is a sign of illness.	 0.426	 0.000
20. Feeling depressed makes pain seem worse. 	 0.000	 0.6 16
Factor loadings of less than 0.40 have been replaced by zeros.
'These items were excluded from the final solution.
and a significant interaction (F (1,236)=54.03, pd).0001). Since there was a large
difference in age between the two groups this variable was entered into the above
analysis as a covariate. Its effect was to render the main effect of group insignificant,
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but did not alter the main effect of scale or the interaction term, both of which
remained significant at the p .czO.000l leveL The adjusted means did not differ horn
the oiiginal means by more than 0.08 in any instance. The means and standard
deviations are shown in Table 4.2, and unadjusted means are presented graphically
in Figure 4.1.
It can be seen that chronic pain patients are more likely than controls to endorse
items on the 'organic beliefs' scale, but less likely to show agreement with items on
the 'psychological beliefs' scale. This provides supportive evidence for the validity
of the scales.
Although chronic pain patients show mean scores of around the midpoint on both
scales, the greatest proportion of these individuals selecting the same response for
any one item was only 47%, not sufficient to cause concern over the discriminability
of the scales.
Table 4.2 Unadjusted and adjusted (using age as covariate) means (SD) for the
organic and psychological scales of the PBQ, in chronic pain patients and controls.
Chronic Pain	 Controls
Patients (n=93)	 (n=145)
Organic scale
Means
 (j)
Meanb
Psychological scale
Mean' (sd)
Meanb
4.012 (0.71)
3.947
4.013 (1.00)
3.968
3.420 (0.42)
3.438
4.284 (0.69)
4.310
'unadjusted b adjusted
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Mean Score
4.1
4.4
42
4
3.1
3.1
LI
32
Oiau	 P9ychoIoOIcii
Pain Beliefs Questionnaire Scale
*-P,. Patluts	 CoutroIs
Figure 4.1 Mean scores (adjusted for number of items per scale) for the organic
and psychological scales of the PBQ.
Phase 2: Criterion Related Validity
METHOD
DESIGN
The 12-item Pain Beliefs Questionnaire (PBOJ was administered to a separate
group of 40 pain patients, along with the MHLC and a measure of cuiTent pain
intensity.
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MEASURES
Patients completed the PBQ, as described in the develqment section of this
paper, the MHLC, and indicated the duration of their pain and their current pain
intensity on a 0- 100mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS).
SUBJECTS
Forty patients attending Rheumatology Out-Patient Clithcs at the Whittington
Hospital were recruited for this part of the study. Since pain chiunicity was a
variable of interest, no restriction was placed on the length f time pain had been
experienced. The mean age of the subjects was 51.0 years (sd=14.19); 75% were
female, 57.9% married, 18.4% single and 23.7% divorced, separated or widowed. The
mean duration of pain was 99.6 months (SD=105.08, range 1 -444 months). The
VAS yielded a mean current pain intensity of 48.38 (SD=31i0, range 0 - 100).
PROCEDURE
Patients waiting for routine out-patient appointments thn the Department of
Rheumatology at the Whittington Hospital were invited to take part in an
investigation into the experience of pain. After giving consent patients completed the
questionnaires in their own time, although an experimenter was always available to
answer any questions that arose. Completion of both questionnaires, and collection
of the other information took around 10 minutes.
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RESULTS
Pearson product-moment correlations were computed between the PBQ and all
other measures, and are presented in Table 4.3. Results provide support for the
construct validity of the PBQ. As anticipated, scores on both the Chance and
Powerful Others scales of the MHLC correlate significantly with scores on the PBQ
organic beliefs scale. Also, scores on the internal MHLC scale and the psychological
beliefs PBQ scale correlate significantly. Correlations between the two PBQ scales
and each of the other measures did not reach significance.
Table 4.3 Correlations between the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire scales and all other
measures.
PBQ Organic Scale	 PBQ Psychological
Scale
MHLC-Internal	 0.0013	 0.3869
MHLC-hance	 0.4316	 0.1310
MHLC-Powerful Others 	 0.4037'	 0.1420
Duration of pain (mths) 	 0.2338	 0.1635
Current pain intensity	 -0.3032	 -0.0510
MHLC: Multidimensional Health Locus of Control
•p:0.O5
p<0.O1
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DISCUSSION
Analysis of the results suggest that the PBQ is a reliable and valid measure of
beliefs about the cause and consequence of pain. It identifies two clear, discrete
classes of beliefs about pain. The first encompasses beliefs about the importance of
organic factors in the experience of pain, and the logical sequelae of this position.
The other concerns the personal, psychological factors that influence the experience
of pain. The choice of labels for the two scales requires some clarification, since the
intention is not to promote the concept of pain as readily divisible into organic and
psychogenic. However, after much deliberation these labels were adopted because
they appeared to reflect most accurately the way in which the lay population in our
sample, including chronic pain sufferers, viewed pain. The emphasis needs to be on
the beliefs held by these individuals, whether they are correct, or adaptive or not.
The PBQ appears to have adequate validity and reliability. However, it is possible
that, along with all self-report measures of this type, there are some biases in the
results. For example, chronic pain patients may place psychological investment in
reporting an organic cause for their condition, while de-emphasizing psychological
factors. However this is thought unlikely in this case, and that the responses reflect
the patients' true beliefs, since varying degrees of endorsement of the beliefs were
possible, and the statements did not overtly suggest an organic/psychological
dichotomy of aetiologies. Indeed, the psychological scale in particular assesses the
extent to which people believe psychological factors can influence pain, rather than
cause it per se.
In the group of chronic pain patients tested, beliefs concerning the organic
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component of pain were significantly associated with the belief that other people with
power (usually doctors), and chance or fate control health status, inferring a sense of
dissociation between the experience of pain and the individual themseif, In contrast,
belief that psychological factors may play a role was significantly associated with the
belief that the individual has control over their own health and well-being. Since
perceived personal control over pain (ie. internal locus of control) has been
associated with positive adaptation to chronic pain, it follows that those patients who
recognise that psychological factors can influence pain experience may show greater
use of coping strategies. It might also be anticipated that the PBQ scales are related
to activity levels, measures of mood and pain intensity. In this study pain beliefs
were not associated with the intensity of pain, although the correlation approached
significance, suggesting that such beliefs may have an enduring quality, more
strongly related to personality than current physical state. Thus it is likely that pain
beliefs are more closely associated with adjustment to pain than intensity per se, and
further studies are needed to address this issue.
Of particular interest is the finding that chronic pain patients and non-patient
controls differ in their beliefs about pain. Chronic pain patients place greater
emphasis than controls on the organic aspects of pain, whereas non pain-patients are
more likely to believe that psychological factors play a role in pain experience. The
explanation for this difference requires investigation. It is possible that changes in
beliefs occur as a consequence of the long-term experience of pain. Alternatively it
may be the case that holding certain beliefs about pain predisposes an individual to
becoming a long-term pain patient. In this study no conclusion regarding this issue
can be drawn since although no association was found between the duration of pain
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and the nature of the patients beliefs, relatively few patients in the sample had
experienced pain for less than six months. Hence the hypothesis that changes in
beliefs occur over time is not adequately tested here.
The results of this study have wide implications. On a clinical level, despite the
frequent misconceptions held by patients about pain, it would be unwise to attempt
to alter beliefs in organic aetiology to beliefs in a purely psychological one. This
position is obviously as incorrect as the premise that all pain is organic in origin. As
Watts (1983) points out, patients often have a "crude dichotomy of aetiologies,
believing that they must either have genuine symptoms with an organic aetiology, or
that they have psychological symptoms that are simply 'all in the mind". The results
of this study highlight the fact that the beliefs held by chronic pain patients differ
from those of non-patients. Furthermore, this difference is in a direction which may
be maladaptive, insofar as denial that psychological facto!s can influence pain may
prevent optimal adjustment and effective use of coping strategies. This points to the
need for the education of chronic pain patients, to explain, for example how stress
can interact with biological processes to produce heightened pain sensation.
The beliefs held by a patient suffering pain are also.likely to influence the way
in which they present their problem to health professionals, along with the way in
which they respond to both conventional physical, psychological and
multidisciplinary approaches to the management of pain. Leventhal, Meyer and
Nerenz (1980) present a model for the "common sense representation of illness
danger" in which they emphasize the role of beliefs in forming an organized system
or "theory" which helps the patient interpret and explain their illness. Three sources
of information are proposed to shape the belief system: bodily experience,
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information form the external social environment (health professionals, family, media
etc.) and information based on past experience of illness. They also suggest that
where the beliefs held by the patient conflict with those of the medical practitioners,
compliance is diminished.
In the next chapter the impact of surgical and cognitive behavioural interventions
for chronic pain conditions on organic and psychological pain beliefs will be
investigated.
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Cfuzp ter 5 Investigation of the effects of surgical aiu(
cognitive-be liavioural interventions for c/ironic
pithi on cognitive processes.
INTRODUCTION
Beliefs about pain - what it is, what causes it, what factors affect its severity, and
what it means for the individual, all combine to form a patient's conceptualization
of pain. In developing an understanding of pain and illness, patients may retain
beliefs, or adopt new ones, which in the eyes of health professionals appear incorrect
or maladaptive. Becker et al (1977) suggested that if beliefs about illness are
discordant with the treatment offered, compliance is greatly diminished. Following
this work, Williams and Thom (1988) examined the relationship between beliefs
about pain and subjective pain intensity, treatment compliance, psychological distress
and attributions concerning health care. The authors assessed beliefs using their
questionnaire, the Pain Beliefs and Perceptions Inventory, which has three scales;
"pain stability" - beliefs about the duration and continuous/ intermittent nature of
pain, "pain as a mystery", and "self blame". The dependent measures used were
subjective pain intensity ratings, therapists ratings (physiotherapists, occupational
therapists and psychologists) of patient compliance mid-treatment, the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale, the MMPI and the Multidimensional Health Locus of ControL
Results indicated that beliefs in long endurance of pain, and the belief that pain is
mysterious are both associated with lower compliance with physiotherapy. They also
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found a tendency for patients who held the belief that pain is enduring to show
poorer compliance with health psychology interventions. Beliefs in pain as
mysterious were associated with little post-treatment improvement on measures of
psychological distress and somatization, and beliefs in pain endurance were
associated with low internal locus of controL
Self-efficacy beliefs or expectancies form another subset of an individual's belief
system. These beliefs have been postulated by Bandura (1977, 1982) to be associated
with both the prediction and maintenance of behaviour. Dolce, Crocker and Doleys
(1986) suggest that self-efficacy ratings may provide useful predictors of the
maintenance of therapeutic gains in chronic pain patients. Following a four-week
multidisciplinary pain management programme patients were found to have
significantly higher ratings for the perceived efficacy of exercise, medication-free
coping and work in relation to their pain. High post-treatment efficacy beliefs were
related to higher follow-up exercise levels, less use of medication and better work
status.
In a similar study O'Leary, Schoor, Long and Holman (1988) tested the
hypothesis that enhancement of perceived self-efficacy to•manage rheumatoid arthritis
would mediate the magnitude of cognitive-behavioural treatment effects. Thirty
female rheumatoid arthritis patients completed the Arthritis Self-Efficacy Scale,
which assesses perceived ability to control symptoms of pain, depression and fatigue,
along with "Self-Efficacy to Manage Paine and "Self-Efficacy to Function" scales.
These scales, in addition to measures of depression, stress and loneliness were
obtained pre and post-treatment The results suggested that high post-treatment self-
efficacy was associated with low pain intensity. Post-treatment perceived efficacy for
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physical functioning was related to low post-treatment disability, and similarly,
higher post-treatment arthritis efficacy was associated with less depression and stress
post-treatment In this paper changes in perceived efficacy were correlated with
changes in outcome measures - a procedure thought to be inadvisable, for reasons
outlined in the results section of the current chapter. The only significant finding of
this type was that changes (increases) in efficacy beliefs for physical functioning
were correlated with changes (decreases) in disability.
Recently Kores et al (1990) used a modified self-efficacy scale with 5 categories -
walking distance, lifting ability, pain coping, working ability and social and
recreational engagement - to examine the relationship of perceived self-efficacy to
treatment outcome in a chronic pain population. They found that higher post-
treatment self-efficacy scores were related to increased sitting and standing tolerance
at follow-up, and that patients with higher self-efficacy scores after treatment had
lower pain behaviour levels at follow-up.
Thus it can be seen that beliefs play a role in both predicting outcome of
interventions for chronic pain, and also to some extent in understanding the processes
involved. However, it appears that self-efficacy beliefs have limited capacity in this
respect, given that significant findings are on the whole evident only for measures
of physical functioning.
Two groups of patients form the focus of the studies reported in this chapter
patients who have been offered either a surgical or a cognitive-behavioural
intervention for their chronic pain condition. Since the choice of treatment is made
on a clinical basis (rather than as the result of a double-blind randomized trial basis),
no attempt will be made to draw direct, statistical comparisons between the groups;
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the studies should be considered 'naturalistic', not experimental. It is anticipated that
these two treatment approaches will have contrasting outcomes - the surgery is
expected to result in complete pain relief, whereas the cognitive-behavioural approach
aims primarily to improve coping, not specifically to reduce pain. The two groups
therefore provide an excellent opportunity to examine the impact of different
interventions on cognitive processes.
The first aim of the studies reported here is to explore the relationship between
organic and psychological beliefs and recovery from surgical and cognitive-
behavioural interventions. Outcome measures employed include measures of pain,
anxiety, depression, cognitive coping strategies and psychological and physical
functioning.
The second aim of the studies reported here is to investigate the influence of
interventions for chronic pain on memory processes in chronic pain patients.
Research on selective memory in depression has provided mixed evidence regarding
memory biases in patients who have recovered from a clinical depression. Zuroff,
Colussy and Wielgus (1983) found that recovered clinically depressed patients
responded in a manner akin to that of currently depressed patients on a recall
memory test ie. they recalled relatively more negative words than normal controls.
However, it should be noted that the authors conducted separate analyses on the
numbers of positive and negative words recalled, rather than providing the necessary
evidence of an interaction between group and wordtype. Indeed, inspection of the
means shows that more positive than negative words were recalled by members of
all three groups. Therefore caution should be exercised in attaching importance to
these results. In a more recent study Bradley and Mathews (1988) investigated
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memory bias for negative versus positive adjectives in 11 recovered unipolar
depressives, 12 non-psychiatric controls and 9 current depressives. Words were
presented in either self or other person referent conditions. Results showed that
depressives have a recall bias for negative self-referent adjectives while the recovered
depressives and normal controls recalled more positive information in the self-
referent condition. Unexpectedly, the recovered depressed group recalled more
negative adjectives in the other-person referent condition. The authors interpreted
these results as suggesting that self-referent recall bias is a function of both current
mood state and more enduring cognitive structures, with consequent implications for
vulnerability to depressive disorders. Lending support to these results, although with
different types of cognitive processes, Dohr, Rush and Bernstein (1989) found that
remitted depressives and nonnal controls did not differ in their atiributional biases,
endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes, or interpretation of schema-relevant
ambiguous events, although both of these groups differed significantly from currently
depressed patients.
In the first of the two studies reported here, a group of patients undergo swgery
for a chronic pain condition, an operation which results in a high probability ot the
patient being pain-free within a few weeks post-surgery. This group may therefore
form a "recovered chronic pain group", analogous to the remitted/recovered
depressives. It is predicted that these patients wifi recall more pain-related than non
pain-related words prior to surgery (ie. a pain-related memory bias), but will exhibit
the opposite pattern of recall when pain-free, post surgery.
The other study in this chapter explores the influence of a multidisciplinary
cognitive-behavioural pain management programme on pain-related memory biases.
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Evidence provided by Watts, Trezise and Sharrock (1986) suggests that a behavioural
treatment for spider phobia (desensitization) leads to changes in recognition memory
for large spiders. Recognition memory was found to improve after desensitization,
but also improved in the no-treatment control group, although to a lesser extent. Thus
practise effects are likely to have played a significant role in these results, since the
same spiders were used on both occasions of testing. As a result of the treatment,
patients were also found to be less vigilant towards, and less preoccupied with
spiders, and showed less use of avoidance coping strategies. This suggests that
cognitive processes which axe condition-related (Ic. to depression or anxiety) may be
altered by psychological interventions.
However, it would be unwise to draw comparisons between this result and
possible changes in processing in chronic pain patients. Chronic pain patients appear
to show biases in processing which bear greater resemblance to those in depression
than in anxiety - memory rather than attention biases. Also, recall, as opposed to
recognition memory biases are the focus of interest, and findings clearly differ in
these domains. In the present study, the cognitive-behavioural programme aims
primarily to increase coping, rather than reduce pain intensity per se. Thus in contrast
to the spider phobics, whose treatment resulted in reduction in symptoms of their
phobia, the chronic pain patients are unlikely to experience substantial relief from
their physical pain symptoms. Therefore, if the memory bias is strictly a result of
pain sensations, no change in patterns of recall would be anticipated. If, on the other
hand, the bias is the result of being a "pain patient", with the related cognitions,
emotions, and sensations, it would be predicted that after treatment, the bias would
remain.
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STUDY 1 Effect of surica1 intervention on cognitive processes in chronic pain.
METHOD
DESIGN
A sample of chronic pain patients undergoing surgical intervention were
interviewed on three occasions - the day before their operation, and around 2 months
and 6 months post-operatively. At these timthe patients completed a recall memory
task, the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire (PBQ; Appendix A) and other mood and pain-
related measures.
MEASURES
The recall memory test on each occasion comprised 4 lists of words, each
containing 2 sensory and 2 affective adjectives from the McGill Pain Questionnaire
(Meizack, 1975), 2 neutral words and 2 gardening words. The gardening words were
included since they belong to a common semantic category, to provide a control for
the pain-related adjectives, which also belong to a semantic category. (As noted in
Chapter 3, words which are related in this way are remembered better that those
between which there is no connection). Items were matched as closely as possible for
frequency and length. They were presented aurally at a rate of one word per 2
seconds, (ie. IS! onset to onset =2 secs), in fixed random order, with three fillers at
the beginning and end of each list. Different lists were used at pre-trealment, 2
months, and 6 months post-treatment (thus there were a total of 12 matched lists).
The order of the blocks of 4 lists was systematically varied across subjects. The
sensory, affective, neutral and gardening words aze presented in Table 5.1. In
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addition to the PBQ, the following questionnaires were administered: the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI), the Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI), and the 28-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-28; Goldberg, 1978),
which has 4 scales - somatic symptoms, anxiety and insomnia, social dysfunction and
severe depression. Current and average weekly pain intensity ratings were obtained
using 0 - 100mm visual analogue scales (VAS).
Table 5.1 Sensory, affective, neutral and gardening words used in the recall task.
Sensory
Block I
pounding
tingling
tugging
itchy
pinching
splitting
throbbing
pricking
Block 2
stabbing
boring
searing
crushing
shooting
wrenching
cutting
aching
Affective
intense
fearful
cruel
vicious
terrifying
sickening
punishing
suffocating
tiring
horrible
annoying
distressing
troublesome
discomforting
blinding
excruciating
Neutral
educated
selective
promising
nimble
informal
protruding
resounding
reputable
stony
flexible
leaking
angular
prime
imprecise
spreading
transient
Gardening
growing
hovelling
seedling
leafy
budding
grassy
veeding
bedding
watering
sowing
pruning
planting
wilting
fertilizing
fencing
spraying
Block 3
scalding	 mild	 legal	 annual
pressing	 unbearable	 polished	 potting
tender	 gruelling	 amazing	 c1ipping
flashing	 miserable	 windswept	 digging
beating	 killing	 grand	 reaping
gnawing	 frightful	 youthful	 fkwering
hurting	 wretched	 knotty	 nwing
drilling	 exhausting	 swaying	 blooming
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SUBJECTS
Women undergoing hysterectomy and oophorectomy for pelvic venous
congestion at the Samaritan Hospital, London were invited to participate in a study
on the effects of surgery on psychological functioning. Twenty-four were recruited
for the study of these, 20 were interviewed at two months, and 12 at six months post
surgery. The primary reason for missing data was non-attendance at out-patient
follow-up appointments, largely because those patients who were pain-free had no
reason to attend. The measures were not mailed to patients since the memory test
was not amenable to seif-adminisiration.
The mean age of the patients was 35.958 (sd=6.16), their mean duration of pain
prior to surgery was 106.7 months (sd=78.30), and their mean cuffent and average
(weekly) pain intensity ratings pre-treatment were 55.88 (sd=30.54) and 72.29
(sd= 16.28) respectively.
PROCEDURE
Patients were first interviewed on the ward, on the day prior to surgery (in a zoom
allowing privacy). After obtaining infomied consetit to participation in the
investigation, subjects first completed the recall memory task, followed by all the
questionnaire and VAS measures. At 2 and 6 months post-operatively patients were
interviewed at routine out-patient appointments, before their consultation with the
doctor. Again, the recall test was administered, followed by all other irasures, in the
same order as previously.
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RESULTS
A. Memory
The mean number of words recalled in each category at the three times of testing
were calculated. This data was subjected to 2-way, repeated measures ANOVAs, with
"wordtype" and "time" as the within groups variables. Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted
probabilities are reported wherever appropriate. First, a comparison between the
number of neutral and gardening words recalled on the three occasions revealed no
significant main effects, nor a significant interaction. Therefore these two categories
were combined to produce a "non pain-related" word category. The number of
sensory and affective words recalled were also combined, forming a "pain-related"
category. It will be remembered that the results of an earlier experiment suggested
that a memory bias for affective adjectives may only be present if the chronic pain
patient is also depressed. Since it was not possible to anticipate the depression levels
in this group, both sensory and affective words were included in the lists. Insufficient
numbers of patients were tested to legitimately compare depressed with non-
depressed groups, and therefore the most sensible optioti appeared to be to combine
these two wordlype categories.
A comparison of recall of pain-related versus non pain-related words over the
three occasions of testing showed no significant main effects or interaction (means
and standard deviations are shown in Table 5.2). However, a trend towards a
decrease in the number of pain-related words recalled coupled with an increase in the
number of non pain-related words recalled appears to be emerging (Figure 5.1). An
ANOVA performed on the data from pre-treatment and 6 months post-treatment
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Mean Recall
4.5
4.25
4
3.75
3.5
3.25
alone revealed that although there were still no main effects, the interaction
approached significance, F(1,1 1)=3.61, p=O.0840.
Table 5.2 Mean (SD) number of pain-related and non pain-related words recalled
before surgery, 2 months post-surgery and 6 months post-surgery (n=1 1).
Pre-surgery	 2 mths post-	 .6 mths post-
surgery	 surgery
Pain-related	 4.364 (1.91)	 3.727 (1.95)	 3.545 (2.30)
Non pain-related	 3.636 (2.34)	 3.818 (3.28)	 4.000 (2.68) -
Pri-surgery 2 mths post 6 mths posi
Time or Testing
* pauu words	 so. pam words
Figure 5.1 Mean recall of pain-related and non pain related words before surgery,
2 months post-surgery and 6 months post-surgery. (ri=11)
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B. Pain Beliefs Questionnaire
Mean scores on the organic and psychological scales of the PBQ were obtained
and subjected to 2-way repeated measures ANOVAs with time of testing (pre-
surgery, 2 months and 6 months post-surgery) and scale as the within groups
variables. This revealed non-significant main effects (time of testing, F(2,22)=O.66,
p=O.5 178; scale, F(1,1 1)=O.21, p=O.6533), but a significant interaction, F(2,22)=9.18,
p=O.00l7. The nature of this interaction is clearly demonstrated graphically in Figure
5.2 (the means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5.3). Prior to treatment
patients show greater agreement with organic than psychological beliefs, whereas at
2 months post-treatment the reverse pattern is evident. This change is maintained at
6 months post-treatment. The graph suggests that the change in beliefs occurred
between pre-treatment testing and 2 months post-treatment, and this was confirmed
by a highly significant interaction between time of testing (pre-treatment vs 2 months
post-treatment) and scale, F(1,19)=25.30, p=0.0001, but not between time of testing
(2 months versus 6 months post-treatment) and scale, F(1,1 1)=0.05, p=O.8235.
Table 5.3 Mean scores (SD) on the organic and psychological scales of the Pain
Beliefs Questionnaire, at the three times of testing (n12).
Pre-surgeiy	 2 mths post-	 6 mths post-
surgery	 surgery
Organic Scale	 3.708 (0.54)	 3.323 (0.34)	 3.479 (0.48)
Psychological
Scale	 3.271 (0.73)	 3.729 (0.99)	 3.833 (0.67)
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Figure 5.2 Mean scores on the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire pre-surgery, 2 months
post-surgery and 6 months post surgery. (n=12)
C. Relationship between beliefs and outcome
Table 5.4 shows the mean scores and standard deviations on the BDI, Spielberger
STAI, GHQ scales and VAS pain intensity ratings at pre-treatment and first follow-
up, along with the associated 1-tailed probabilities (matched t-test). None of these
measures changed significantly between first and second follow-up, and 6 month
post-treatment data is therefore not presented. Patients showed significant reduction
in scores on the BDI, Spielberger State and Trait anxiety scales, the somatic
symptoms and anxiety & insomnia scales of the GHQ and in both current and
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average weekly pain intensity ratings.
Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated between scores on the
organic and psychological scales of the PBQ prior to surgery and all other measures
at 2 and 6 months post-surgery. These correlations are shown in Table 5.5.
It can be seen that strong organic beliefs prior to treatment correlate with high
current pain intensity at 6 months post-treatment. High endorsement of questions on
the psychological beliefs scale pre-titatment correlates with high trait anxiety, high
levels of somatic symptoms and high levels of social dysfunction at 2 months post-
treatment. These beliefs also correlate significantly with greater depression (BDI),
state and trait anxiety, somatic symptoms and severe depression (GHOJ at 6 months
post-treatment.
Table 5.4 Means (SDs) on the BDI, Spielberger, GHQ and pain intensity ratings.
Pre-surgery	 2 mths post-	 p (i-tail)
surgery
BDI
	
14.60 (3.39)	 6.20 (6.49)	 0.0003
Spielberger
State anxiety
Trait anxiety
GHQ-28
Somatic symptoms
Anxiety & insomnia
Social dysfunction
Severe depression
49.60 (11.71)
44.56 (7.05)
9.55 (4.45)
9.75 (4.48)
10.15 (3.62)
3.65 (4.79)
36.10 (11.52)
37.92 (7.95)
4.25 (4.22)
4.40 (4.54)
7.85 (4.21)
1.65 (4.49)
0.0000
0.0001
0.0014
0.0005
0.0535
0.0000
Pain intensity (VAS)
Current	 56.65 (32.25)	 7.65 (18.94)	 0.0000
Average	 73.25 (15.66)	 17.40 (25.62)	 0.0000
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Table 5.5 Pearson product-moment correlations between pre-surgely scores on the
Pain Beliefs Questionnaire scales and other measures at 2 months and 6 months post
surgery. NB. Degrees of freedom valy.
Organic Beliefs	 Psychological	 Beliefs
GHQ-28
Somatic symptoms
Anxiety & insomnia
Social dysfunction
Severe Depression
BDI
Spielberger
State
Trait
2 mths post-
surgy
0.2211
0.3323
-0.0477
0.2653
0.2484
-0.1292
0.2254
6 mths post-
surgery
-0.1990
-0.1577
0.0224
-02292
-0.1066
-0.1252
-0.1290
2mthspost-
surgery
0.3086
0.3065
0.4806*
0.4169*
0.2409
0.6798***
0.0677
6mthspost-
surgery
0.5615*
0.6395*
0.5840*
0.5786*
0.4688
0.2555
0.7623**
Pain Intensity (VAS)
Current	 0.1784	 0.7363**	 -0.1418	 -0.1677
Average	 -0.0878	 0.3436	 0.0073	 -0.0506
* p<0.05 ** p<O.Ol *** p0.005
D. Causal relationship between beliefs and other measures
It is clear from section B above that the beliefs about pain which are assessed by
the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire change between pre-surgery and 2 months post-
surgery assessments. The most obvious way of examining the relationship between
alterations in beliefs and improvements in the outcome measures would be to simply
correlate change in beliefs with change in other measures, ie. correlate difference
scores with difference scores. However, Plewis (1985) states that use of this method
is inadvisable for three primary reasons. Firstly, it may be unreasonable to assume
that a difference in scores on the same test on two or more occasions is valid, given
the possibility of repeated measurement bias. Secondly, for many variables,
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particularly questionnaire measures, the scale used is arbitrary and differs across tests,
making difference scores uninterpretable. Thirdly, social science variables are
generally subject to a significant degree of measure cor, resulting in difference
scores which are inherently unreliable.
An alternative approach, recommended by Plewis, allows the direction of causality
between two variables to be determined if a population is studied on two or more
occasions; if measures are obtained on a single occasion, only simple correlations can
be computed, with no possibility of determining direction of causality. It is this
method which will be adopted in both the present study and the following one. The
procedure is to compute stepwise hierarchical regression analyses. For example, for
two variables, A and B, measured on two occasions, A 1, A2 and B 1, B2, A causes B
if A1 predicts B2 after B 1 is taken into account, and B causes A if B 1 predicts A2 after
A1 is taken into account. As Mann and McManus (1991) note, it is quite feasible for
both directions of causality to co-exist, reflecting a "vicious circle" effect. In the
present studies investigating the causal relationship between beliefs and for example
depression, scores on an "outcome" measure eg. BDI pre-treatment are entered into
the analysis as the first step, with pre-treatment score.s on a beliefs scale as the
second step (independent variables). The dependent variable is the outcome measure
post-treatment. To conclude that beliefs, as measured by a particular scale, are
causally related to, for example depression, requires a significant improvement in
"fit" between the first and second steps of the analysis. In other words, the addition
of the second independent variable must account for a significantly greater proportion
of the variance than the first independent variable alone. If evidence for a causal
relationship is found, it can be inferred that if a change in one variable occurs, this
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will cause a change in the other variable.
Using this approach, with mean substitutions for missing data, it was found that
psychological beliefs are causally related to social dysfunction (GHQ); F(2,17)=8.49,
p<O.Ol, state anxiety; F(2,17)=4.91, p<O.O25, and trait anxiety; F(2,17)=7.20, p<O.Ol.
Causal relationships were also found in the opposite direction for these variables, eg.
social dysfunction, and state and trait anxiety are causally related to psychological
beliefs, F(217)=1O.45, p<O.O1; F(2,l7)=9.23, p<O.O1 and F(217)=9.16, p<O.Ol
respectively.
STUDY 2 Effect of a cognitive-behavioural intervention on cognitive processes
in chronic pain.
METHOD
DESIGN
A sample of chronic pain patients undergoing a cognitive-behavioural
management programme were interviewed on three occasions - prior to the
intervention, 8 weeks later at the end of the intervention, and 4 months post-
intervention (ie. 6 months after the baseline measures). At each of these times
patients completed a recall memory test, the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire and other
mood and pain-related measures.
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MEASURES
The recall lists and their presentation were identical to those employed in the
previous study. In addition to the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire, the BDI, Spielberger
and GHQ-28, which were again administered, the Sickness Impact profile, The Pain
Cognitions Questionnaire (PCQ), the Multidimensional Pain Inventory (Ml'!) and
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control (MHLC) were also employed. These
additional measures were included since the current study was carried out as part of
a larger study on the cognitive-behavioural management of chronic pain. The MPI
comprises 13 scales: pain severity, interference, life control, affective distress,
support, punishing responses, solicitous responses, distracting responses, household
chores, outdoor work, activities away from home, social activities and general
ictivity level (the sum of the previous 4 scales). The SIP has 7 scales providing
measures of the extent to which pain affects the following functioning: physical,
psychosocial, sleep and rest, recreational pastimes, eating, work and household
management. An overall disability measure can also be obtained from the sum of
these scales. Given the large number of measures used, and the length of time
required to obtain them, the SIP was dropped from .the battery for the end of
treatment testing, and is therefore used for validation of the Pain Beliefs
Questionnaire only.
SUBJECFS
Subjects were chronic pain patients attending an 8-week, out-patient cognitive-
behavioural pain management programme at the Whittington Hospital, London.
Twenty-five patients were recruited for the study of these, 24 were assessed at the
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end of the programme, and 17 at 4 months post-treatment.
The mean age of the subjects was 48.56 years (sd=1 1.97), their mean duration of
pain prior to the intervention was 121.83 months (sd=1C)3.92), and 72% were female.
Their mean current and average VAS pain intensity ratings pre-treatment were 53.96
(sd=20.06) and 64.17 (sd=20.96) respectively. The primary location of pain in this
sample was the back (56%).
PROCEDURE
Patients were first assessed one week prior to the start of the programme, as part
of a "preparation" day, dwing which they were provided with information concerning
the structure and content of the course, and individualized goals were obtained for
each patient. Subjects completed the memory task first, followed by the questionnaire
and VAS measures (a few of the questionnaires had been completed some weeks
previously as part of routine assessment for the programme - these were not repealed
at this time). On the last day of the programme, and again at a four-month follow-up
session, the recall test and other measures were administered.
RESULTS
A. Memory
Mean number of correctly recalled words per category were subjected to 2-way
repeated measures ANOVAs, with "wordtype" and "time" as the within groups
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variables. Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted probabilities are presented where appropriate
throughout. As before, the number o( neutral and gardening words recalled was
compared first . no significant main effects of time or wordtype were revealed, nor
a significant interaction, and therefore these two categories were again combined to
form a "non pain-related" category". Similarly, the recall of sensory and affective
adjectives did not differ, and these too were again combined formed the "pain-
related" category. A comparison of recall of pain-related and non-pain related words
over the three occasions of testing showed no main effect of time, F(2,32)<1, or
wordtype, F(1,16)<1, nor an interaction between the two, F(2,32)<1. Means and
standard deviations are shown in Table 5.6, and are presented graphically in Figure
5.3.
Table 5.6 Mean (SD) number of pain-related and non pain-related words
recalled prior to a cognitive-behavioural management programme, at the end of the
programme, and at 4 months post-treatment. (n=17)
Pre-treatment End of treaiment 4 months post-
treatment
Pain-related	 2.882 (1.45)	 2.941 (2.14)	 2.824 (2.24)
Non pain-related	 2.529 (1.59)	 2.529 (1.46)	 2.412 (1.77)
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Figure 5.3 Mean recall of pain-related words and non pain-related words
pre-treatment, at the end of treatment and 4 months post-treatment (n=17)
(cognitive-behavioural pain management)
B. Pain Beliefs Questionnaire
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on the PBQ, with time of testing
(pre-treatment, end of treatment and 4 months post-treatment) and scales (organic
versus psychological) as the within groups variables. Again, neither main effect was
significant: time of testing, F(2,28)=2.lO, p=O.l4l3; scale, F(1,14)<l. However, the
analysis revealed an interaction which is just significant, F(2,28)=3.34, p=O.O568. The
nature of this interaction is depicted graphically in Figure 5.4, with the corresponding
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Table 5.7 Mean scores (SD) on the organic and psychological scales of the
Pain Beliefs Questionnaire, at the three times of testing (n=15).
Pre-treatment End of treatment 4 months post-
treatment
Organic Scale
	 3.733 (0.62)	 3.583 (0.64)	 3.533 (0.71)
Psychological
Scale	 3.467 (0.89)	 3.950 (0.85)	 3.717 (0.91)
Pr.-	 End of	 4 mths
treatm.nJ, trsatmsnt	 post
Time of Testing
*— Orga. ic
	
e Psychological
Figure 5.4 Mean scores on the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire pre-treatment, at the
end of treatment and 4 months post treatment (cognitive-behavioural management
(n=15).
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means and standard deviations presented in Table 5.7. It can be seen from the graph
that the interaction occurs between the pre-treatment and end of treatment times of
testing, and this is confirmed statistically, F(1,22)=6.44, p=O.Ol88.
C. Relationship between beliefs and outcome
Table 5.8 shows the mean scores and standard deviations on all measures (except
memory and pain beliefs), pre-treatment and at the end of treatment, along with their
associated 1-tailed probabilities (matched t-test). Significant reductions were observed
in depression, trait anxiety, social dysfunction, interference of pain, affective distress,
and the extent of perceived support received from the spouse. Patients were found
to be engaging in greater levels of outdoor work, activities away from the home and
showed an increased general activity level. Significant increases in life control, active
positive coping cognitions and support and trust cognitions were found, with
significant decreases in hopelessness cognitions. Decreases in pain severity, state
anxiety, severe depression (GHOJ and average pain intensity were noted which
approached significance.
Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated between scores on the
organic and psychological scales of the PBQ prior to the intervention and all other
measures at the end of treatment and 4 months post-treatment. These correlations are
shown in Table 5.9.
Strong organic beliefs prior to treatment can be seen to correlate significantly with
high 'powerful others' locus of control at the end of treatment, along with high
'chance' locus of control, punishing responses from the spouse, greater current pain
intensity, and lower severe depression (GHOJ four months after the end of treatment
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Table 5.8 Means (SDs) on the BDI, Spielberger, GHQ-28, PCQ, MHLC, Ml'! and
pain intensity ratings, pre-treatment and at end of treatment.
Pre-treatment End of treatment 	 p (1-tail)
BDI
	
14.440 (6.89)	 11.120 (7.06)	 0.0386
Spielberger
State
Trait
GHQ-28
Somatic symptoms
Anxiety & insomnia
Social dysfunction
Severe depression
Pain Intensity (VAS)
Current
Average
PCQ
Active positive coping
Hopelessness
Helplessness
Support & trust
MHLC
Internal
Chance
Powerful Others
39.750 (8.84)
44.417 (9.32)
7.083 (3.68)
6.583 (3.48)
8.625 (1.93)
3.500 (4.06)
52.417 (21.65)
64.667 (20.70)
2.950 (0.60)
2.015 (0.50)
1.788 (0.56)
2.489 (0.73)
3.518 (0.91)
3.107 (0.66)
2.936 (1.01)
36.833 (9.85)
41.292 (8.94)
6.125 (2.64)
6.167 (3.36)
6.083 (2.21)
2.250 (3.18)
46.583 (20.09)
57.583 (21.45)
3.163 (0.58)
1.727 (0.46)
1.583 (0.42)
2.8 15 (0.44)
3.770 (0.90)
2.935 (0.77)
2.630 (0.76)
0.0858
0.0341
NS
NS
0.0000
0.0547
NS
0.0605
0.0342
0.0017
NS
0.0304
NS
NS
NS
MPI
Pain severity	 4.379 (0.77)	 3.972 (1.16)	 0.0539
Interference	 4.337 (1.15)	 3.801 (1.22)	 0.01 14
Life control	 3.473 (1.13)	 4.073 (1.06)	 0.0141
Affective distress	 3.662 (1.16)	 2.750 (1.01)	 0.0128
Support	 4.517 (1.26)	 4.042 (1.35)	 0.0282
Punishing responses	 1.626 (1.34)	 1.218 (1.20)	 NS
Solicitous responses	 3.720 (1.39)	 3.449 (1.40)	 NS
Distracting responses 	 2.443 (1.31)	 2.337 (1.45)	 NS
Household chores	 3.629 (1.86)	 3.844 (1.90)	 NS
Outdoor work	 1.450 (1.51)	 2.180 (1.81)	 0.0496
Activities away from home 	 2.333 (1.06)	 2.875 (0.96)	 0.0010
Social activities	 2.659 (1.17)	 2.740 (1.16)	 NS
General activity level 	 2.5 13 (0.94)	 2.909 (0.93)	 0.0047
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-0.0870
-0.1589
0.3761
0. 143 1
03892
0.2632
0.4902*
0.0909
-03212
0.0913
-0.0525
0.5016**
-0.2574
0.7272****
0.3804
-0.1389
-01180
-0.0627
-0.1355
0.0695
-0.1322
0.0672
-0.1040
-0.0461
0.1889
-01098
-0.0881
-0.1920
0.2630
0.5249***
Table 5.9 Pearson product-moment correlations between pre-treatment scores on the Pain
Beliefs Questionnaire scales, and other measures at the end of treatment and 4 months post-
treatment. NB. Degrees of freedom vary.
Organic Beliefs 	 Psychological Beliefs
End of	 4 mths post-	 End of	 4 mths post-
treatment	 treatment	 treatment	 treatment
BDI	 -03058	 0.1270	 -0.2983	 0.0288
Spielberger
State
Trait
GHQ-28
Somatic symptoms
Anxiety & insomnia
Social dysfunction
Severe depression
Pain intensity (VAS)
Current
Avemge
PCQ
Active positive coping
Hopelessness
Helplessness
Support & trust
nC
Internal
Chsn
Powerful others
	
-0.1362	 0.0269
	
-0.1652	 0.2192
	
.0.2297	 -0.0469
	
-0.0500	 0.0547
	
-0.0849	 -0.1165
	
-0.2450	 -0.0675
	
-0.1208	 -01941
	
-0.1503	 0.0544
	
0.7322****	 0.6846*
	
-0.1666	 -0.0905
	
0.0002	 0.0640
	
0.4744**	 0.5086**
	
0.4146*
	
04239*
	
-0.1146	 -0.1639
	
-0.0984	 0.2594
MPI
Pain severity	 -0.0480	 03932	 -0.1951	 -0.0364
Interference	 -0.0071	 0.3039	 -0.1537	 -0.603
Life control	 -01146	 .0.6020***	 0.4805**	 03578
Affective distress	 0.0004	 03687	 -03304	 -03747
Support	 OA)079	 0.0846	 .0.3704*	 -0.2579
Punishing responses 	 0.2839	 0.4347*	 0.2627	 0.4502*
Solicitous responses	 -0.0503	 0.0859	 -0.1319	 -0.0669
Distracting responses	 -03221	 -0.0985	 0.1642	 02188
Household chores	 -0.0123	 -0.1421	 0.6006*	 0.6621*
Outdoor work	 -0.1608	 -0.1739	 0.0949	 03368
Activities away from home	 -0.2562	 -03696	 0.5896***	 0371
Social activities	 .0.1845	 -03975	 01679	 0.6267
General activity level 	 -02046	 -03221	 03896*	 0.71 lO
* p<0.05 ** p.<O.O25 *** p<o.o1 **** p<o.0o1
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High endorsement of items on the psychological beliefs scale pre-treatinent were
found to correlate significantly with high active positive coping and support and trust
cognitions, strong internal locus of control, high life control, low support from the
spouse, and high levels of engagement in household chores, activities away from the
home and general activity at the end of treatment These beliefs before the
intervention were also found to be related to the following 4 months after the end of
treatment high levels of active positive coping and support and trust cognitions,
internal locus of control, high degree of 'punishing responses' from the spouse, and
high household chores, activities away from the home, social activities and general
activity levels.
D. Causal relationships between beliefs and other measures
The same procedure as that employed in the preceding study was used to
examine causal relationships between organic and psychological beliefs and other
measures. Mean substitutions were again made for all analyses. Where significant
relationships are evident in both directions of causality, the results of the "beliefs"
"other measure" direction is presented first Each analysis has 2 and 21 degrees of
freedom. Significant, bi-directional, causal relationships were identified between
organic beliefs and internal locus of control F=7.76, p<O.Ol and F=4.30, p<O,O5;
chance locus of control F=6..22, p<O.Ol and F=5.00, p<O.O5; powerful others locus
of control F=lO.11, p<O.001 and F=5.33, p<O.05; and hopelessness cognitions
F=9.27, p<O.Ol and F=6.18. p<O.O1. Bi-directional causal relationships were found
between psychological beliefs and the following depression F=6.71, p<O.O1 and
F-8.07, p<O.Ol; active positive coping cognitions F=20.11, p<O.0001 and F=29.57,
138
p<O.0001; support and trust cognitions F=6.32, p<O.Ol and F=14.22, p<O.001; life
control F=6.04, p<O.O1 and F=15.13, p<O.001; household chores F=93.Ol, p=O.000
and F=14.14, p<O.001; activities away from home F=16.42, p<O.001 and F=26.49,
p<O.0001; and general activity level F=18.54, p<O.0001 and F=17.5O, p<O.000l.
These relationships are summarized in Figure 5.5.
DISCUSSION
There are four main areas to be discussed as a result of these two studies:
1) the impact of interventions for chronic pain on patients' beliefs,
2) the impact of interventions on memory processes,
3) the utility of beliefs in predicting outcome of interventions,
4) the role of beliefs in understanding the processes of change which occurred as a
result of intervention.
Comment will also be made on the additional evidence for the validity of the Pain
Beliefs Questionnaire.
The results of the studies suggest that both physical (Ic. surgical), and
psychologicalj(ie. cognitive-behavioural management) can have 'pFofound effect on
the beliefs about pain held by patients. As a consequence of both forms of treatment,
endorsement of the organic type beliefs decreased, while agreement with
psychological beliefs increased. This interaction was less pronounced in the
cognitive-behavioural group. The reason for this may have been in part due to the
extensive preparation for the programme received by the patients, which included
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Figure 5.5 Causal relationships between organic and psychological beliefs and
other measures. Unfilled arrows represent bi-directional relationships; filled arrow
represents causality in one direction only - that indicated.
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information about the content and emphasis (ie. psychological) of the course, which
may have influenced beliefs prior to the baseline assessment of beliefs. Also, patients
were selected for the programme partly on the basis of their ability to accept that
psychological factors play a role in pain. Thus the 'room for movement' in terms of
altering beliefs may have been substantially reduced. Having said this, significant
changes in beliefs were observed, probably as a direct result of the intervention.
However, it was not possible to determine whether beliefs may change
spontaneously, as a control group (no intervention) was not employed, but this is
thought unlikely. Major components of the programme were education (including the
Gate Control Theory), skills training (cognitive coping strategies such as attention
diversion), and graded physical exercises, all of which are likely to influence beliefs
about pain.
The change in beliefs exhibited by the surgical intervention group is perhaps more
puzzling. This group received no education about pain, nor any form of treatment
other than the surgery itself, yet a dramatic change in both organic and psychological
beliefs was observed. The most plausible explanation for this finding is that these
patients have an investment in strongly endorsing organic-type beliefs prior to
surgery. These beliefs would be entirely compatible with the intervention being
offered and undertaken - beliefs at the opposite end of the spectrum would be
expected to result in cognitive dissonance, described by Festinger (1957) as the
awareness of implicit contradiction anywhere within ones beliefs, preferences or
thoughts about behaviour. The theory also proposes that cognitive dissonance of this
sort will prompt the individual to change cognitions in order to restore a kind of
balance. This type of process may be occurring in these patients at this time. After
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surgery, however, when in the majority of cases pain is largely or entirely eliminated,
the psychological 'need' for these women to strongly hold organic type beliefs is
reduced, and the influence of psychological factors in pain can be acknowledged.
Furthermore, those women who did continue to feel pain weeks after the operation
when normal healing has occurred, may then feel that organic beliefs must be
inaccurate, and therefore place greater emphasis on psychological type beliefs.
The second issue to be discussed concerns the influence of different interventions
on memory processes in chronic pain. In the surgical intervention group, on the recall
memory task, it was found that prior to surgery subjects recalled more pain-related
than non pain-related words, but at six months post-surgery, relatively more non
pain-related words were remembered. That the interaction did not quite reach
significance, may have been due to the small sample for whom data was available
for both these times of testing, however the pattern of results emerging is very clear.
The result may also be an indication that changes in schematic processing occur very
slowly over time, and that the memory bias in chronic pain is a function of pain per
Se, rather than a result of some kind of 'pain personality' or vulnerability factor.
These results may also be seen to parallel those of Bradley and Mathews (1988) who
found evidence that recovered depressives behave in a manner similar to that of
normal controls on memory tests comparing recall of positive and negative self-
referent adjectives. Thus selective memory in chronic pain may be more related to
state than trait factors.
In contrast, there was no change in the number of pain-related and non pain-
related words recalled as a consequence of the cognitive-behavioural pain
management programme. At each time of testing subjects recalled more pain-related
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than non pain-related words, although the difference (main effect of wordtype) was
not significant. This implies that there was no memory bias in these patients. This
may have been largely due to the fact that there were only 2 sensory and 2 affective
pain-related words in each list (through necessity - there are a finite number of
suitable words on the McGill Pain Questionnaire), fewer than in previous experiments
demonstrating selective memory effects. Alternatively, it is possible that the
assessment procedures and preparation for the programme each patient received prior
to the intervention may have had a "top-down" influence on schematic processes,
altering these processes before the first memory test.
This study provides additional evidence to suggest that selective memory
processes in chronic pain are a function of pain itself rather than being a 'pain
patient'. However, unlike Watts, Trezise and Sharrock (1986), study 2 failed to
provide evidence that psychological intervention influences biased processing. Further
experiments are required to clarify this issue, to provide information regarding what
type of memory (ie. recall/recognition), in which patient groups, after what type of
intervention, such changes in processing are demonstrable.
The results of the present two studies do, however, provide evidence to suggest
that selective memory in chronic pain is not found simply because words belonging
to a common semantic category ie. pain-related words, are easier to remember than
unrelated words - the neutral category in most experiments. In both of the studies
reported here there was no difference in the recall of neutral and gardening words.
The organic and psychological scales of the PBQ were found to be predictive of
various measures of outcome of both the surgical and cognitive-behavioural
treatments for chronic pain. Considerable consistency was found in the measures
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related to beliefs at the two and six month times of testing, particularly in the
cognitive-behavioural treatment group. However, some of the associations were not
in the direction anticipated. Notably, in the surgical intervention group the finding
that strong psychological beliefs were associated with high levels of depression,
anxiety, somatic symptoms or social dysfunction was not expected. (Interestingly
these patterns were not found in the cognitive-behavioural treatment group). In
women who have experienced chronic pelvic pain it may be the case that simply
knowing that psychological factors can influence pain is insufficient to prevent
disruption of emotional functioning, given that they may be unable to make use of
this information in dealing with their pain. Not all of the patients were pain-free at
the follow-up assessments, and therefore the relationships between psychological
beliefs and outcome may be a reflection of this subgroup of women. If this is the
case, it is less surprising that these beliefs are associated with poor functioning, since
the women are not provided with alternative approaches to managing their pain, in
the way that patients attending the cognitive-behavioural pain management
programme are. Clearly, this requires further investigation, but if supporting evidence
is obtained there are important implications for the long-term post-surgical
management of pelvic pain patients.
The results of the subjects in the pain management programme suggest that in
general, patients who hold strong organic beliefs prior to commencing the programme
benefit less from the treatment than those who hold strong psychological beliefs.
Strong organic beliefs were related to chance and powerful others locus of controL
These patients also perceive that they have little control over their life and their pain,
and have little ability to deal with problems or stressful situations. On the other band,
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recognition that psychological factors can play a role in pain is related to internal
locus of control, the belief that the individual has personal control over their health,
which in turn is typically associated with positive outcome (eg. Rock et al, 1987;
Toomey et a!, 1991). These beliefs were also associated with greater use of active
positive cognitive coping strategies such as reassuring yourself about your ability to
cope with the pain and thinldng of ways to distract yourself from the pain, and
support and trust cognitions, for example believing the doctor can help, after the
intervention. Fmally, these beliefs were related to greater participation in a variety
of activities.
The role that changes in beliefs play in causing the improvements in measures
of emotional and physical functioning found as a result of both types of intervention,
was assessed using a statistical technique called 'cross-lagged panel correlations'. In
the surgical intervention group reciprocal causal relationships were found between
psychological beliefs and depression, state anxiety and trait anxiety. This result
carries the inference that increases in endorsement of psychological beliefs found in
this group was responsible, at least in part, in causing increases in depression and
anxiety. As discussed earlier, this group was not homogeneous in terms of pain
intensity levels at the follow-up assessments, with important implications for
psychological functioning.
Similarly, the results of the group of patients who attended the pain management
programme suggest that as beliefs become less organic, patients perceive that they
have greater personal control over their health, while at the same time believing less
that fate and significant other people such as health professionals control their health.
Decreases in organic beliefs were also implicated as playing a causal role in
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decreasing the extent to which patients report having negative, 'hopelessness'
thoughts when experiencing pain. Increases in psychological beliefs were found to
influence depression, as well as increasing the use of cognitive positive coping
strategies and support and trust cognitions. In addition evidence was found to suggest
that these beliefs were causally involved in increasing activity levels.
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Cfiapter 6 Turtfier investigition of schematic processing
INTRODUCTION
In the attempt to investigate schematic processing in chronic pain, emphasis has
been placed on recall and recognition memory task performance. This has revealed
processing biases for pain-related information in patients suffering a chronic pain
condition. The aim of the current chapter is to explore further the nature of schematic
processing using an alternative paradigm to the recall and recognition tests previously
employed.
For this purpose a word-stem completion task is used, where subjects are asked
to complete a number of three-letter word stems such as 'sen....' with the first
English word which comes to mind. All stems can potentially be completed with
pain-related endings. On this task subjects are not required to process information
which has previously been presented to them, as in a memory test. Instead, they are
simply producing responses to ambiguous stimuli.
In addition to the chronic pain patients and controls, in this experiment a third
group of subjects, health professionals will be tested to assess the significance of
contextual effects in schematic processing. Previous studies where information-
processing biases have been demonstrated in relation to mood (typically depression
and anxiety states), and more recently pain, have not examined processing styles in
people who have had considerable contact with these disorders through their
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occupation but not through personal experience. Such studies have typically
emphasized the implications of their results for the development and maintenance of
the disorder under investigation (eg. Teasdale, 1983; MacLeod eta!, 1986). However,
if biased processing is found to the same extent in these health professionals as in
the patients, such inferences are clearly unwarranted.
METHOD
DESIGN
The experiment was presented to subjects as an investigation into language. This
was to avoid the unquantifiable confounding (as a result of activation of the pain
schema) of results which would occur if subjects were aware that it concerned pain.
A total of 102 subjects in three groups (chronic pain patients, health professionals,
and controls) completed two tasks which comprised 12 word endings (for example
...ell, ...ed), and 12 three-letter word stems (for example sha.., fea...). Subjects were
asked to write down the first two words of any length which came to mind, for each
of the 12 endings and stems. The first task was included solely to lend credence to
the assertion that the experiment concerned language. The word endings were chosen
as being the most common in the English language. The responses on this task were
not included in any statistical analysis. In the second task all the stems had at least
one possible pain-related completion, and a minimum of three (and usually many
more) possible non-pain-related completions of equivalent or greater frequency
(Carroll, Davies and Richman 1971). Given these strict criteria for choosing words
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to include in the experiment, relatively few of those available were suitable, resulting
in the list of only 12 words. Four words were chosen from each of the sensory and
affective categories of the McGill Pain questionnaire and the remaining four stems
could be completed with words associated with the experience of illness (eg. disease).
These words are presented in Table 6.1. The design was therefore a 3 (group:chronic
pain, health professionals, controls) x 3 (wordtype: sensory, affective, illness-related).
The first factor was between subjects, the second within subjects.
Table 6.1 Pain-related words presented as three letter word stems.
Sensory words	 Affective words	 Illness-related
words
tender	 horrible	 a,nbulance
hurting	 miserable	 disease
burning	 fearful	 healthy
sharp	 cruel	 accident
SUBJECTS
The chronic pain group consisted of 38 patients attending routine out-patient
appointments in the Rheumatology department and the Whittington Hospital. Their
mean age was 46.8 years (SD=17.2) and 71% were female. Their mean duration of
pain was 114.1 months (SD=112) and mean current pain intensity on a 0- 100 mm
visual analogue scale was 41.6 (SD=27.3). The health professionals group comprised
28 nurses and physiotherapists (approximately 1:1 ratio) working at the Whittington
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Hospital London. Their mean age was 31.3 years (SD=7.7) and all were female. The
mean duration since qualification as a nurse/physiotherapist was 132.4 months
(SD=84.l) and none were currently in pain or suffered a long-term painful condition.
Finally, the control group were volunteer members of the general public, whose mean
age was 29.6 years (SD=14.1) and 50% of whom were female. None were in pain
at the time of testing or suffered a long-term painful condition.
PROCEDURE
Subjects were invited to take part in an experiment on language. Having obtained
verbal consent, they first completed the two language tasks, and were then asked to
provide demographic details, a measure of current pain intensity, and to indicate how
long they had suffered pain/been qualified as a nurse or physiotherapist, as
appropriate. All subjects were then fully debriefed.
RESULTS
The total number of pain-related words produced on the word completion task
was calculated for each subject Variants of the original words on the McGill Pain
Questionnaire were included, eg. discomfort/discomforting. If subjects produced two
variants of a word both were counted, but only if the variant did not involve the
addition of 'ing', eg. horrible, horrendous. In all cases data was normally distributed
and plots of means against standard deviations indicated that no transformations were
necessary. These results were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with group
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as the between groups factor. Since the ratio of men to women clearly differed
significantly between the groups, sex was entered into the analysis as a covariate. A
highly significant difference in the number of pain-related words produced by the
three groups was identified, F (2,99) = 6.84, p<O.002. (The covariate had no effect
on the difference between the groups, and was therefore not used in further analyses.)
In the main analysis the number of word completions in each of the three
wordtype categories was subjected to a two-way split plot ANOVA with group as
between groups factor and wordtype as the repeated measure factor. Here, the main
effect of wordtype was significant; F (2198) = 5.77, p<0.OL This is accounted for
by a smaller number of illness-related completions compared to sensory or affective
completions. The interaction between group and wordtype approached significance,
F (4,198) = 2.24, p<O.O7. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 depict these results graphically, and in
particular clarify the nature of the interaction. The means and standard deviations of
pain-related completions for each wordtype and group can be found in table 6.2. A
simple effects analysis of group for each wordtype highlighted the significant
difference between chronic pain patients compared to health professionals and
controls in the number of sensory words produced, F(2,99)=3.89, p<0.025. No
difference between groups was found for affective completions, F(2,99) = 0.26,
p>0.75, but a difference approaching significance emerged between controls
compared to pain patients and health professionals, F(2,99) = 2.87, p<0.06, for
illness-related completions.
151
Table 6.2 Mean (SD) number of pain-related word completions by each group for
each wordtype.
Pain Patients	 Health	 Controls
Professionals
Sensory	 2.139 (1.10)	 1.464 (0.96)	 1.605 (1.05)
Affective	 1.889 (1.10)	 1L714 (0.85)	 1.816 (0.93)
illness-related	 1.500 (1.25)	 1.607 (0.99)	 1.026 (0.94)
- Meeri number of words
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Figure 6.1 Mean number of pain-related word stem completions by
chronic pain patients, health prdssiona1s and controls.
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Figure 6.2 Mean number of sensory, affective and illness-related word stem
completions by chronic pain patients, health professionals and controls.
DISCUSSION
On a word completion task chronic pain sufferers produced significantly more
pain-related word completions than did non-patient controls. A group of health
professionals, exposed to pain through their occupational responsibilities, produced
a mean number of pain-related words intermediate to the chronic pain and control
groups, despite a mean number of years since qualifying which was greater than the
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pain patients' pain duration. These results can best be accommodated within a
"schema" model of mental representations, using the definition of schema presented
in Chapter 1. The findings suggest that the pain schema of chronic pain patients
differ from those of non-patients controls; their schematic representation of pain may
be more highly organised. Although the health professiona1 also produced more
pain-related stem completions relative to controls, it was not statistically significant.
The intennediate position of this group in the one-way analysis of variance is thought
to imply that personal experience of pain is the crucial factor in developing altered
patterns of information-processing in chronic pain, rather than vicarious experience
of pain and exposure to distress experienced via patient contaat or education/training.
In other words, these results could be accounted for by the existence of a 'self-
schema', which in chronic pain patients incorporates highly elaborated pain
representations. Pincus (submitted) provides evidence for a such a self-schema in
chronic pain patients, with the finding that these patients show a self-referent (but not
other person-referent) recall bias for sensoiy compared to neutral words.
This study also provides evidence to suggest that the way in which schema are
elaborated is specific to the nature of exposure to pain informartion. The simple effect
analysis of group on sensory word completions indicated that the chronic pain
patients produced significantly more sensory completions than either the health
professionals or controls. In contrast, both the health professionals and chronic pain
patients produced more illness-related completions than the controls, although this
difference just failed to meet the 5% significance criterion. This is consistent with
much of the research in information processing in emotional disorders, which
suggests that biased processing is typically, (but not exclusively) associated with
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categories of words which bold personal relevance for the subjects, eg. Zeitlin and
McNally, 1991; Mathews and MacLeod, 1985. In the present study the groups did
not differ in the number of affective word completions produced. This is explicable,
taking into account the finding reported in Chapter 2, that biased processing of
affectively valenced pain-related information occurs only in depressed chronic pain
patients. Neither the pain patients in this study, nor the health professionals and
controls, could be assumed to be a homogenous group in terms of levels of
depression. This requires clarification in future research.
Whilst these results have been discussed in terms of their implications for the
organization of pain schema, it is also possible to explain them in terms of
differences in baseline levels of activation of the schema. In chronic pain patients the
baseline level of activation may exceed that of non-pain patients, resulting in their
'biased' performance on this task. Baseline schema activation levels have been
investigated in other emotional disorders using implicit memory tasks which are an
extension of the paradigm described here. Implicit tasks contrast with explicit tasks
such as recall and recognition, which require the individual to consciously attempt
to retrieve information which has previously been presented. Implicit memory does
not require subjects to retrieve information from specific episodes (for example a
previously presented word list) and is evidenced in priming tests such as word
identification (where wonis axe presented in degraded fonn), word fragment
completion (eg. em_ - - kej, and word stem completion (eg. spe......). In a typical
paradigm subjects are presented with a list of words, followed by a distraction
procedure such as counting backwards in is, then the implicit task, for which they
are asked to complete the items with the first word which comes to mind. A
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dissociation between implicit and explicit memory function has been shown to occur
in patients who have brain damage resulting in amnesia for new information. In these
patients, performance on explicit memory tests shows very poor retention, whereas
implicit test performance is unimpaired (Warrington and Weikrantz, 1970).
Comparable dissociations have been demonstrated in normal subjects, eg. Jacoby,
1983, 1988. Such results have been used to support the assumption that implicit
memory test performance reflects unconscious or unaware retention of information.
Also, it appears that these findings cannot be attributed to the subjects realizing that
is was possible for the task to be completed by explicitly retrieving information from
an earlier part of the experiment (Bowers and Schacter, 1990).
The distinction between implicit and explicit memory has inspired research which
has resulted in the demonstration of implicit memory biases in anxieay states, where
evidence for explicit selective memory effects for threat material has generally
proved elusive. Three studies have provided evidence consistent with the idea that
anxious subjects show an implicit memory bias. Mathews, Mogg, May and Eysenck
(1989) found an implicit memory bias in generalised anxiety disorder patients using
a word stem completion task. Subjects were presented with words aad instructed to
imagine a situation involving themselves and the word (elaborative encoding).
Following 6 minute, unrelated filler tasks, subjects completed cued recall (explicit
memory task) and word stem completion tasks in random order. Half of the stems
could be completed with threat words previously presented (primed completions),
while the remainder could be completed with other threat words not previously
presented (unprimed completions). Results indicated that for primed (but not
unprimed) completions, control subjects showed a pattern of pmceuing favouring
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non-threatening information, compared to the anxious patients who produced equal
numbers of threat and non-threat completions.
In a similar study Zeitlin and McNally (1991) explored implicit memory in post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) patients, for combat, social threat, positive and
neutral words. In this study more substantial evidence was provided for an implicit
bias - the PTSD patients produced more combat primed and unprimed completions
than any other category, while controls produced equivalent levels of completions
from all categories. A response bias explanation for this finding was ruled out since
significantly more primed than unprimed combat completions were found in the
PTSD group alone.
The only other study which has examined this issue used a word-fragment
completion task, and compared self-referenced encoding with a 'read-only' condition.
In high trait anxious subjects, an implicit memory bias was demonstrated for threat-
related stimuli under the self-reference encoding condition only. This finding may,
of course, have been due to the depth of processing involved, rather than the self-
referencing per se, (Richards and French, 1991).
There are at least three theoretical approaches to account for implicit memory
phenomena (discussed by Schacter, 1987), however, the most applicable here is the
activation approach. The basic model used by Graf and Mandler (1984) to account
for dissociations between implicit and explicit menxny performance is presented in
Chapter 1, along with the Williams a al (1988) extension of the model to account
for the dissociation of the effects of anxiety and depression on memory and attention.
In summary, according to Graf and Mandler (1984) activation of a schema makes its
contents more accessible, whereas elaboration renders the contents both more
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accessible and more retrievable. However, unlike Graf and Mandler (1984), WilliamS
et a! (1988) suggest that integration and elaboration axe separate, distinct processes,
and therefore items can be more easily retrieved without necessarily being more
accessible. They propose that anxiety acts on integration resulting in attention biases,
whereas depression influences elaboration, and hence retrieval processes.
To date, no studies have examined implicit memory in relation to depressive
disorders. From the above theoretical perspectives, differing predictions would be
made from the initial premise that depression acts on elaborative processes. The Graf
and Mandler version of the model would lead to the prediction that since integration
must precede elaboration, an implicit memory bias will occur in depression, whereas
the Williams et a! (1988) model does not. In support of the first position there is
some evidence to suggest that depressed mood is related to Stroop interference (ie,
an attention bias), which would be expected if negative words are primed Gotlib and
McCann, 1984; Williams and Nulty, 1986; Williams and Broadbent, 1986. However,
another study has failed to find evidence for attentive biases in depression (MacLeod,
Mathews and Tata, 1986).
Taking into account these conflicting models and empirical findings, the question
of whether an implicit memory bias occurs in chronic pain is equivocal, and it
remains an issue which requires full investigation. Never-the-less, within the implicit
memory framework it is possible to say that the chronic pain patients in the present
experiment produced more unprimed pain-related word completions than controls,
and the most plausible explanation is that the internal representations of pain in these
patients is in a constant state of activation as a result of the personal experience of
long-term pain. However, there is another possible explanation for the results
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obtained which might imply that they are artifacts of the experimental design, which
needs to be excluded before we can be confident of this interpretation. The
heightened number of pain word completions in the chronic pain group could
potentially be due to a frequency effect, ie. chronic pain patients are exposed to pain
words more often, and hence they are more common in their language, and the
results merely reflect this effect. This is thought improbable since if completion
simply reflects frequency, it would be predicted that nurses and physiotherapists, who
are constantly exposed to pain vocabulary, would show the same bias as the chronic
pain patients. This was not the case. However, it is an important issue, and forms the
focus of the next chapter, where a lexical decision task is used to examine frequency
of pain words in chronic pain patients and controls.
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Cfzapter 7 'rests offrequenc/ effect ani associative networ&
ea(anations for infornuuion-processiig fliases
in c/Ironic pain.
INTRODUCTION
In previous chapters considerable emphasis has been placed on the effects of
mood on memory. Numerous studies have demonstrated selective processing of mood
congruent information, primarily threat-related information in anxiety states and
negative material in depression. Similarly, a recall bias has been found for pain-
related words in chronic pain sufferers, along with differences in pain-related word
stem completion. From both clinical and theoretical perspectives a great deal of
importance has been attached to this type of finding. However, all of these findings
can potentially be accounted for by a simple frequency effect although studies
invariably match words for frequency across word categories, it may be erroneous
to assume that the frequency of particular words is the same fr more than one
population. For example, it is conceivable that a word such as "throbbing" may be
high frequency ie. common, for the chronic pain patient population, but of lower
frequency for the general, non-pain population. If this is the case the classical finding
that high frequency words aie easier to remember (in a free recall paradigm) than
low frequency words would acconnt for the superior recall of paia-related words in
chronic pain sufferers.
It appears that only one study in the literature has attempted to tackle this
160
problem. Clark and Teasdale (1985) aimed to investigate the possibility that women
use personality trait words and concepts more frequently than men, and that this
resulted in their finding of differential recall of pleasant and unpleasant words in
induced happy and unhappy moods in women but not men. Subjects were asked (post
experimentally) to rate a list of trait words, including those from the recall test, for
how much they would notice and think about them when talking about peoples'
behaviour, on a scale from never (1) through moderately frequently (4) to extremely
frequently (7). In women, a significant positive correlation was found between word
usage ratings and preferential recall. Clark and Teasdale fail to discuss the
implications of this fmding: clearly, however, selective memory effects may be more
strongly associated with word frequency/usage than biases in information processing.
Other studies have implications for this issue, although they did not directly set
out to investigate the problem. For example, Watts, McKenna, Sharrock and Trezise
(1986) found that an exposure treatment for spider phobia (desensitization) reduced
interference on the S troop task, despite increased exposure to the threat stimuli. Other
work on perceptual processing biases which has also suggested that abnormalities
disappear after treatment includes that of Foa and McNally, (1986) and Gotlib and
Cane (1987).
There is no empirical evidence on this issue in chronic pain. However, before it
is possible to draw safe conclusions from previous experiments, it seems necessaxy
to investigate the possibility of a frequency effect. Obtaining usage ratings from
subjects provides one method of assessing frequency, but gives only a subjective
measure and is therefore not ideal. Lexical decision research provides an alternative
approach.
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In a lexical decision task subjects are typically asked to decide as quickly and
accurately as possible whether on each trial a single letter string forms an English
word, for example "yellow" or a non-word, for example "yillo'V". Non-words are
usually formed by replacing one or more of the vowels in a real word, as in the
previous example, making the non-words pronounceable. Basic research using this
paradigm has revealed that word frequency is a consistent predictor of response time,
with high frequency words being responded to more quickly (eg. Landauer and
Freedman, 1968; Rubenstein et al, 1970). Also, when the same word is presented
twice, as in 'repetition priming', subjects respond significantly faster to the second
presentation, even when there is a considerable lag of 15 other words between the
first and second presentations. Interestingly, and of importance to the current
problem, is the robust finding that frequency and repetition interact, such that the size
of the repetition effect (ie. the decrease in response time) is larger for low frequency
(uncommon) words than for high frequency words, (eg. Norris 1984; Scarborough,
Cortese and Scarborough, 1977). This observation allows the following prediction to
be made with regard to chronic pain: if pain-related words are relatively high
frequency for pain patients but relatively low frequency for controls, a greater
repetition effect for these words would be expected for control subjects. If the words
are of equivalent frequency for both groups, the extent of repetition priming would
be equal across groups. These possibilities are represented graphically in Figures 7.1
and 7.2.
Thus the first and primary aim of this study is to address the issue of potential
frequency effects in information processing biases in chronic pain. It is predicted that
there will be no difference in the extent of repetition priming in a lexical decision
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task on pain-related words, between chronic pain patients and controls.
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One of the most replicated findings in lexical decision research in the 1970s was
that the lexical decision time for a word is more rapid if it follows a word with
which it is associated (eg. Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971; Meyer a a!, 1975). The
classic example is that the response latency for "doctor" is faster if it is preceded by
the word "nurse" than if it is preceded by the word "butter". This type of finding has
generally been interpreted within an associative network/spreading activation model,
such that when a representation of a concept is presented, for example the word
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"doctor", its corresponding node is activated, along with links in the network with
other related nodes, thereby increasing their activation levels. If the representation of
a related concept is then presented, lexical decision time is reduced since this node
is already activated to some extent.
Explanations for inforrnation-pmcessing biases in mood states (and of course
chronic pain) in terms of this model have proposed emotion nodes, along with the
nodes for descriptors of the emotional/physical states. Using a variant of the lexical
decision paradigm, Clark, Teasdale, Broadbent and Martin (1983) tested the
prediction that emotional states (elation and depression in this instance) will prime
or activate nodes related to that emotion, such that relative to neutral words, lexical
decision times for positive words would be faster when subjects were in an induced
happy mood than induced depressed mood. The converse would be true for negative
words. In the paradigm used, subjects were presented with a priming word to which
they did not have to respond, followed by the target word. Contrary to expectations,
there was no interaction between mood and word valence. The authors suggest three
possible explanations. Firstly, the strength of association between the mood state and
words may have been insufficient to produce facilitation in the lexical decision task.
However, differential recall of these words was found in induced moods by Teasciale
and Russell, (1983). Secondly, they suggest that semantic information and
information from personal experience of an emotion may be stored separately, but
this would not be predicted from the original modeL Finally, mood congruity effects
may occur only when the subject has to generate the emotionally-valenced response
as in recall (and word completion). In similar studies, Martin and Clark (1985) and
MacLeod et a! (1987) failed to find differences in lexical decision times in relation
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to depressed mood.
Although associative network models have more recently been claimed inadequate
to account for the different effects of anxiety and depression on information-
processing (Williams er al, 1988), it would be unreasonable to assume that
associative networks for emotions do not exist it may be that they simply do not
differ in patient groups and controls. The alternative is that the variant of the lexical
decision paradigm used in previous research was not appropriate, and it is this
possibility which will be explored here in chronic pain patients. The primary
questions are therefore 1) is there an associative network for pain?, and 2) if so, can
chronic pain patients and non-patient controls be distinguished on the basis of the
degree of activation of nodes and their links? The second part of the experiment
reported in this chapter uses association priming in the following manner subjects
(chronic pain patients and non-patient controls) are presented with pain-related words
consecutively, and the response latency for both is recorded. These pairs are
interspersed with neutral words and non-words. It is predicted that the extent of
priming of the first pain-related word will be greater for die chronic pain patients
than the controls, in other words the difference in response latency between first and
second of the pairs of pain words will be greater for chronic pain patients than
controls (see Figure 7.3.)
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Figure 7.3 Predicted pattern of results for association priming
of pairs of pain-related words.
METHOD
DESIGN AND STIMULI
The experiment is divided into two sections, part A: repetition priming and part
B: association priming. Groups of chronic pain patients and controls completed both
sections. The design of each will be considered separately, however certain aspects
are common to both. Although only pain-related words are strictly required for the
hypotheses to be tested, neutral fillers are included in an attempt to prevent subjects
from guessing the purpose of the experiment. However, fewer neutral than pain-
related words are used to keep the duration of the experiment to a minimum. All
pain-related adjectives were from the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975),
and include those used in previous studies of this thesis. Neutral adjectives were
approximately matched for length and frequency with the pain-related words so that
they did not stick out like a sore thumb. The non-words were compiled by changing
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one or two vowels (depending on the length of the word) in a further set of neutral
words. Fifty per cent of the non-words appeared in both sections of the experiment.
Neutral and non-words were not statistically analysed.
Half of the subjects completed part A first, the remainder started with part B.
Words were presented in the centre of the screen, on a Toshiba T3100SX, gas plasma
display portable computer. Each trial consisted of a "s" fixation point presented for
1 second, followed by a blank screen for 1 second, then the word.
Part A. Repetition priming
Thirty pain-related adjectives (18 sensory and 12 affective), 15 neutral words each
presented twice, and 45 nonsense words were presented to subjects in fixed random
order. The following constraints were placed on the randomization: no more than 4
words (pain-related, neutral or a mixture) presented consecutively, and the lag
between first and second presentation of words varied between 2 and 4 words. This
was to ensure that subjects could not learn (consciously or unconsciously) what type
of word to expect next.
Part B. Association priming
Fifteen pairs of pain-related adjectives (9 sensory and 6 affective), 15 neutral
words and 45 non-words were presented to subjects in fixed random order under the
following constraints (for the same reasons as previously): a minimum of 1 neutral
or non-word and maximum of 7 between each pain-related pair, and no more than
4 words or non-words consecutively. The order of presentation of words within the
pain-related pairs was reversed for half of the subjects.
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The BDI was completed by all subjects to obtain a measure of level of depression.
SUBJECTS
The chronic pain patient group comprised 20 patients attending routine out-patient
appointments at the Whittington Hospital Rheumatology clinic. All patients had
experienced pain for a minimum of 6 months. Their mean age was 47.20 years
(sd=9.24) and 90% were female. Their mean duration of pain was 91.350 months
(sd=93.28), mean current and average VAS pain intensity ratings were 41.200
(sd=23.66) and 54.474 (sd=22.61) respectively, and their mean BDI score was 12.00
(sd=7.56). In this sample, 12 patients had rheumatoid arthritis, 4 had systemic lupus
erythmotosis, 1 ankylosing spondylitis, 1 Sjogans disease, I tendonitis and 1
unclassified arthritis.
Twenty volunteer members of the general public formed the control group,
recruited primarily through advertisements. Their mean age was 44.95 (sd=13.71) and
again 90% were female. Their mean score on the BDI was 7.25 (sd=6.03), and none
of these subjects had experienced a long-term painful condition.
The two groups differed significantly in their scorei on the BDI (t(38)=
2.637, p<0.05).
PROCEDURE
Subjects were invited to participate in a study investigating how quickly people
can decide whether a word is wrealH (in English) or not. Subjects were instructed to
press the right hand button of a hand-held set if they thought the word was real, and
the left hand button if it was not, using right and left hands respectively. Subjects
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were warned that some words would be repeated once. (Instructions using the terms
"letter-string" and "non-word" were avoided to prevent confusion). Subjects were
asked to respond as quickly but as accurately as possible. They first completed a
block of 10 practice trials, 5 of which were words, and 5 non-words, compiled from
high frequency nouns. This was followed by the 2 experimental blocks, as described
in the design. Subjects were allowed to rest for as long as they wished between these
two blocks. The BDI was then administered. The procedure lasted approximately 30
minutes.
RESULTS
A. Repetition priming
Mean response latencies in milliseconds for the pain-related words (Table 7.1)
were subjected to a 3-way split plot ANCOVA (after undergoing a square root
transformation), with group (chronic pain patients, controls) and order (repetition
priming first, association priming first) as the between groups variables, presentation
(first versus second) as the repeated measure variable, and BDI score as the
covariate. Covariates do not affect the repeated measure variable or interactions with
this variable; their only influence in this and all other analyses in this study was to
render previously significant differences between the groups insignificant (chronic
pain patients consistently respond more slowly than controls in all conditions). This
analysis therefore revealed no significant main effects of group or order, but a highly
significant main effect of repetition, such that the response latency for the second
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presentation of a pain word was faster than the first presentation of that word,
F(1,36)=55.50, p=O.000. The interaction between repetition and order was also
significant, indicating that there was a greater repetition effect in subjects who
completed this section of the experiment first than in those who completed the
association priming section first. These results, using adjusted means, are shown
graphically in Figure 7.4 (a, b).
Table 7.1 Unadjusted and adjusted (with BDI as covariate) mean response latencies
in milliseconds (after square root transfoimation) for repeated pain-related wonis.
	
Cbronic Pain Patients (n=20)	 Controls (n=20)
Order	 V	 2'	 1	 2
1st presentation
Meaif (Sd)	 37368 (6.65)	 33.635 (5.78)	 32.001 (3.373)	 31.511 (5.22)
Meanb
	36.265	 33.777	 32.734	 31.768
2nd presentation
Mean (Sd)	 33371 (4.79)	 32.085 (5.98)
	
30.014 (2.70)	 30.195 (5.15)
Meanb
	32.467	 32.288	 30.747	 30.453
Unadjusted mean b Adjusted mean	 Repetition priming first. 'Association priming first
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Figure 7.4 Mean response latencies (square rooted, in milliseconds) for first and
second presentation of pain-related words in chronic pain patients and controls.
B. Association priming
Mean response latencies in milliseconds (after square root transformation; Table
7.2), for pain-related words were subjected to a 4-way ANCOVA, with group
(chronic pain patients, controls), order (repetition priming first, association priming
first), and order of pain-related words within the pair as the between groups
variables, position in pair (first or second) as the repeated measure variable, and BDI
score as the covariate. There were no significant main effects or interactions
involving either 'order' variable; these were therefore dropped from further analysis.
The results showed neither main effects of group or position of words in the pair, nor
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an interaction between the two (Figure 7.5). Since the sensory words may have been
more strongly associated with pain than the affective, these were considered
separately. For the sensory adjectives there was no main effect of group, and the
interaction between group and position in pair failed to reach significance. However,
the analysis revealed a significant main effect of position, with faster response
latencies for the second word in the pair compared to the first, across both groups;
F(l,38)=&84, p=O.005. Considering the affective adjectives, there was again no
evidence for any main effects or interactions.
Table 7.2 Unadjusted and adjusted (with BDI as covariate) mean response latencies
in milliseconds (after square root transformation) for association priming of pain-
related words.
Chronic Pain Patients	 Controls
(n=20)	 (n=20)
1st of pair of pain words
Mean' (sd)
	
34.643 (5.45)	 32.185 (4.42)
Meanb	 34.274	 32.554
2nd of pair of pain words
Mean' (sd)
	 33.934 (5.37)	 32.875 (5.11)
Meanb	 33.565	 32.244
'Unadjusted mean b Adjusted mean
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Figure 7.5 Mean (square rooted) response latencies in milliseconds, for the first
and second of pairs of pain-related adjectives, in chronic pain patients and
controls.
DISCUSSION
The results of the first part of this experiment provide evidence which suggests
that differences in infonnation processing between chronic pain patients and non-
patient controls cannot be explained solely in terms of a word frequency effect. The
interaction between repetition (first or second presentation) of pain-related adjectives
and group did not reach significance - control subjects did not respond faster to the
second presentation relative to the first presentation of the pain-related words,
compared to the chronic pain patients. However, in accord with research on general
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repetition priming effects, all subjects showed significantly shorter response latencies
to the second presentation of words. Together, these fmdings carry the implication
that pain-related words are not of higher frequency for chronic pain patients than
controls; they are no more common, or used more frequently in either population.
This finding is apparently in contrast to that of Clark and Teasdale (1985), who
found that women use personality trait words more frequently than men, and that this
could account for the superior recall of these words in congruent mood states in
women alone. However, in this study a subjective measure of word frequency was
obtained, and the population sampled was 'normal' students, in whom depression and
elation was induced. Therefore direct comparisons between the current study and that
of Clark and Teasdale (1985) cannot be drawn, and future research is needed to
replicate this result, also using alternative paradigms. If the result can be taken at
face value, previous findings that chronic pain patients selectively recall pain-related
information, and produce more pain-related stem completions than controls, are
indicative of biased information processing in these patients.
One surprising aspect of this part of the experiment was that the repetition effect
was found to interact with the order in which subjects completed the repetition and
association priming sections of the experiment The reason why the repetition effect
was greater when this part of the experiment was completed first is unclear; however
there were no other significant effects involving this variable, and no mention of such
an occunence in the relevant literature, suggesting it is of little importance.
The results of the association priming part of the experiment are more difficult
to explain. The predicted interaction between group and position of the word within
the pain-related pair failed to emerge. In previous studies on mood congruity in
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lexical decision tasks, emphasis was placed on decision times for mood congruent
words relative to neutral words, in induced happy and unhappy moods. Here the
explanation that nodes representing the mcxd itself, and nodes representing the words
associated with that mood may not be strongly connected, is plausible (if not readily
predicted from Bowers (1981) network model). However, in the present experiment
response times were compared for Zwo pain-rela red words and therefore this
possibility is not viable. All subjects would be expected to possess an associative
network for pain, as all must have experienced pain at some time in their lives. The
associative network of chronic pain patients should, however, be more structured,
with a greater number of links, and higher levels of activation. Yet there was no
evidence for association priming for pain-related information in either group, under
the analysis of all the available pain-related words.
There are two possible approaches in accounting for this finding. Firstly, the
methodology used may have been inappropriate. Lupker (1984) points out that the
automatic activation of a concept and spread of activation decays rapidly, perhaps
within 40 milliseconds (Fischler and Goodman, 1978), unless the subject continues
to attend to the stimulus. Clearly, it would be impossible to obtain inter-stimuli
intervals (onset to onset) of this order in chronic pain patients and matched controls,
who typically show response latencies alone of greater than 1000 ms, without
considering the presentation of the fixation point or interval between the fixation
point and presentation of the stimulus.. In addition, association priming has
consistently been demonstrated for other classes of words, where inter-stimulus
intervals exceed 4Oms, and the subjects have not been forced to continue to attend
to stimuli (eg. Meyer and Schaveneveldt, 1971; Meyer et a!, 1975).
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Further methodological issues include the possibility than the pain-related words
chosen were not closely associated enough with each other to promote priming. In
an effort to obtain as many stimuli as possible, all the words on the McGill Pain
Questionnaire were used. Some of these words, such as 'hot' and 'jumping' may not
have been linked to pain by the subjects. This requires investigation using association
norms, such as those provided by Postman and Keppel (1970). Other types of pain-
related words such as 'disabled' and 'hospital' may be more powerful primers of pain
concepts, particularly compared to the affective adjectives used in this experiment,
since the pain patients did not generally exhibit a particularly high level of
depression. This study provides some evidence to this effect - association priming by
the sensory, but not the affective adjectives was found in both groups.
The alternative explanation for this fmding is that the theoretical assumptions
being tested are at fault, resulting in the failure to coiroborate the network model, at
least for a pain network encompassing both physical and emotional pain descriptors.
This is perhaps a less compelling argument, given that some evidence was found for
association priming, with the sensory pain descriptors. The problem remains, though,
that there was no evidence for a superior network, even for the sensory pain-related
words in the chronic pain patients. Thus an account of previous findings of
processing biases in relation to pain in terms of associative network theory may be
premature.
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Cfiapter 8 DLccussion aiul Conclusions
In this thesis eight studies have been described which investigate cognitive
processes in pain and depression. The aim of this chapter is to draw together the
findings from all these studies and to consider their theoretical and clinical
implications.
The model which originally guided these experiments was that of Leventhal and
Everhart (1979), who proposed 3 levels of processing in pain; expressive-motor,
schematic and conceptual,along with the parallel processing of sensory and
distress/emotional components of pain. The model proposes that the emotional
component of pain is processed largely pre-consciously, and is produced rapidly and
"virtually simultaneously with the pain experience", with pain entering "focal
awareness" (or consciousness) as a unified sensory and emotional experience. Thus
unless specific anaesthesia instructions are given to the patient while under hypnosis,
or other attention diversion strategies are employed, whenever pain is experienced,
the emotional component is also necessarily experienced. The extent to which the
sensory and distress components can be considered independent pre-consciously is
unclear.
The results of the studies reported in this thesis can be divided into those with
relevance to the schematic level of processing, and those which can be considered
conceptual. Findings will therefore be discussed under these two broad headings,
although a complete segregation is not possible given the interactive nature of the
processes.
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Schematic Processing
The first study of this thesis explored one aspect of the schematic level of
processing: memory function, with the primary aim of assessing the impact of both
chronic pain and depression on information-processing. The results of this study, like
those of Pearce et a! (1990), provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that chronic
pain patients selectively remember pain-related information in preference to neutral,
non pain-related material. In addition, in this study chronic pain patients who showed
minimal depressive symptomatology selectively recalled the sensory, but not the
affective adjectives of the McGill Pain Questionnaire. One possible conclusion is that
these affective pain descriptors do not tap the distress/emotional component of pain
as conceived by Leventhal and Everhart. Their model would lead to the prediction
that all patients, whether depressed or not, will show a memory bias for both sensory
and affective adjectives. Thus the affective adjectives may provide an index of the
affective state of the individual, and be more strongly associated with general mood
state, rather than reflect the emotional component of pain itself, or pain intensity on
an affective dimension. Indeed, Reading et al (1982) argue as invalid the assumption
that these affective adjectives can be ordered along a single intensity dimension.
The results of this experiment can be conceptualized within two main theoretical
frameworks for the mechanisms of mood and memory - associative network and
schema theory, described in Chapter 1. Although Leventhal and Everhart (1979) use
the terms schemata and schematic processing they do not suggest how exactly they
might operate. However, in a general theory of emotions, the "perceptual-motor
theory of emotion", Leventhal (1984) clearly states that he "does not believe that it
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[the schematic memory siructure] can be represented as a set of nodes in an
associative network". Instead he suggests that they can be thought of as a set of
components which fall in a common cortical field or column - a vertical section
through the layers of the cortex that allows a combination of sensory and motor
events to be represented in each layer. Thus in this conception of schemata, they are
discrete, automatically activated units, with excitation flowing downward through the
column from the topmost layer. He argues against a network of nodes with links
which axe of the same type for the sensory, expressive and other components, as well
as for the verbal labels for pain experience. Support for this position stems from the
fact that it is possible to talk about past experiences of pain, thus activating verbal
labels, without re-experiencing the subjective feeling of pain. However, it remains
unclear how this can occur under the unified schema model, since activation of an
entire pain schema through reading or talking about pain should result in all other
aspects of pain also becoming activated. Presumably this activation is assumed to fail
to reach sufficient levels for the subjective experience of pain to enter conscious
awareness.
Leventhal therefore points to the distinction between associative network and
schema models, and rejects the idea of associative networks for emotions. However,
such network explanations are most common for the effects of mood on memory.
Ellis and Ashbmok (1991) clarify the distinction, while also attesting to the fact that
they are also conceptually very similar. The models differ primarily in that
associative network models generally assume spreading activation whereas schema
models typically do not. However the two models are not necessarily contradictory,
and Ellis and Ashbrook (1991) suggest a "fully-developed model of how mood states
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influence cognition will see an integration of these two approaches". Both models are
able to account for the effects of chronic pain and depression on memory, but only
if the affective words in the cunent experiment are assumed to tap a general
emotional state and not the affective/distress component of pain, ie. separate
nodes/networks or schemas for physical pain and negative affect. If, on the other
hand, the affective adjectives describe an integral part of the pain experience, then
neither model is acceptable. Also, there is a danger of all these "explanations"
becoming tautological. It is however, possible to answer the original question, and
conclude that pain has an effect on information-processing distinct from that of
negative mood, and that the memory bias demonstrated by Pearce et al (1990) cannot
be attributed solely to the chronic pain patients' elevated levels of depression.
The use of Signal Detection Theory in this first experiment was an attempt to
separate differences in true memory from response bias between the groups.
Unfortunately it proved largely unfruitful, with no clear results evident This is
perhaps an indication that the method is inappropriate for this purpose in these
groups - receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were not obtained (for
practical reasons outlined in Chapter 2), which would have permitted validation of
the method.
The results of the recall tests in the acute pain sufferers were not conclusive,
given the relatively small numbers of subjects in the groups. If future research
confirms that there is no memory bias associated with either acute clinical or induced
pain, it would suggest that selective memory is a consequence of the long-tenn
experience of pain. Theoretically, this may be the result of the gradual strengthening
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of schema, or build up and activation of links in an associative network. On the other
hand the meaning of the pain may have prevented the development of recall biases.
If patients believed that their pain would be transitory, and manageable, resulting in
minimal permanent impact on their lives, a top-down influence from conceptual
processes would be exerted on schematic processes, a notion proposed by Leventhal
and Everhart's (1979) model of pain processing. An interaction between these factors
(duration and meaning of the situation) is perhaps most probable.
Alternatively, if the trend towards selective recall of sensory words which was
becoming apparent in the acute pain patients, becomes statistically significant with
larger sample sizes, it would indicate that the meaning of the situation for the
individual is of greater importance than the duration of pain. Although acute, the pain
may be considered of serious immediate and long-term threat to the individuaL For
example, if patients believe that the pain they are currently experiencing heralds the
start of a long-term illness, with implications for employment, family and social
activities etc., this is likely to influence schematic processing. Indeed, the patients
who participated in this study may have formed an unusual group in this respect,
since the surgical operation they received carried major implications for future
fertility, and therefore their conceptual processing may not have been representative
of all patients experiencing an acute pain condition. Although all experience of acute
clinical pain is likely to carry some degree of threat, certain conditions, such as
appendicitis, in which the threat is minimized may provide a more useful group of
patients to investigate. Clearly all of these issues require further investigation and
clarification.
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One of the more surprising findings in this thesis was evidence for cognitive
avoidance of negative information in clinically depressed patients. In a free recall
paradigm, a group of clinically depressed patients remembered fewer affective pain
descriptors and negative adjectives describing the feelings associated with depression
compared to neutral and sensory words. No evidence for cognitive avoidance in
disorders other than anxiety states has been found, and not generally as the result of
the use of recall paradigms. Conclusions and theoretical interpretation must therefore
be considered tentative. As associative network and schema theories stand, neither
are able to account for this finding, since both assume heightened activation of
mood-congruent nodes/schema, which would only lead to the over-recall of affective
information. However, the Williams et ci (1988) integrated model, which relies on
the concept of resource allocation, provides a plausible alternative. Under this model
is it possible for processing resources to be allocated either towards, or away from
material. Allocation away from negative material might have occurred in this group
as a result of the combination of encoding procedure used (non self-referential) and
the nature of the stimuli. Words were specifically chosen to reflect the feelings
associated with depression, rather than personality-trait words used in previous
research.
The suggestion that selective memory effects ate a consequence of the long-term
personal experience of pain received further support from the results of the
experiment comparing pain-related word-stem completion amongst chronic pain
patients, health professionals and non-patient controls. Qronic pain patients produced
the most, and controls the least, pain-related word stem completions. In addition, the
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type of words produced generally coincided with the nature/extent ofpain experience.
Differences in activation levels of schemas or associative networks could be
considered responsible for the findings. However, the difference between the
reSponses of the chronic pain patients and health professionals provides snong
evidence that simply talking, hearing or reading about pain is not sufficient to cause
biased processing, suggesting that a modification of the models is necessarily - the
idea of a self-schema incoiporating information obtained from experiencing pain
personally, may be sufficient. The associative network model is less readily adapted
in this manner.
The results of the two studies reported in Chapter 5, which explored the impact
of surgical and cognitive-behavioural interventions for chronic pain, should be
considered preliminary given the small sample sizes at follow-up. Patients who were
largely pain-free after surgery showed an increase in the number of non pain-related
words remembered, coupled with a decrease in the recall of pain-related adjectives.
In conwast, cognitive-behavioural management appeared to have no effect on the type
of information remembered. Together these studies suggest that memory biases in
chronic pain are "pain-driven". In other words, only when pain is removed does
selective recall of pain-related information disappear: cognitive-behavioural
intervention apparently has no impact on biased processing, since the experience of
pain sensations remains. However the process of remediation appears to be gradual,
perhaps suggesting that schema or associative networks are slow to dde-activate", or
that the links in a network do not break down instantaneously. Studies exploring
Cognitive biases in anxiety and depression have frequently alluded o the possibility
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that the mechanisms underlying such biases may represent enduring "vulnerability"
factors for those conditions. While evidence has been mixed in relation to anxiety
disorders (Eysenk et a!, 1991; Mathews et a!, 1990), studies comparing clinically
depressed, recovered depressives and normal controls have typically provided
evidence that the depressed patients in remission respond in a manner which is ckser
to that of controls than currently depressed patients, for example Bradley and
Mathews, 1988; Dohr and Rush, 1989. This suggests that selective memory is state-
related, and therefore cannot be considered an index of vulnerability.
It is therefore possible to tentatively conclude that pain-related memory biases in
pain are more strongly related to state than trait factors, although, taking into
consideration the results of the acute pain group and induced pain experiments
(Pearce eta!, 1990), long-term experience of pain appears necessary. Also, the results
perhaps suggest that schematic processing exerts a more powerful influence than
conceptual processing, or over-rides changes in conceptual processing; the changes
in functioning which occurred as a result of the pain management programme (for
example reductions in depression, anxiety, hopelessness thoughts and social
dysfunction, and increases in activities and positive pain-related thoughts, all of
which involve some degree of conceptual processing) apparently failed to influence
memory function. The chronic pain patients consistently remembered more pain-
related adjectives, however, the difference was not significant at any stage. It is
important to note, however, that the return to a "normal" pattern of recall would
involve the superior recall of neutral information: there was no evidence for such a
process occurring. This could be interpreted as indicative of the greater influence of
conceptual processing, as a result of the psychological assessment and preparation
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prior to the start of the intervention.
Thus the relative dominance of schematic and conceptual processing in pain
remains an issue for conjecture. Although Leventhal (1979, 1984) states that
conceptual processing can alter schematic processing, and that conceptual processing
may not accurately reflect schematic "knowledge", he does not suggest which level
of processing may exert greater influence at any particular time. Future research
could attempt to solve this issue.
Further support for the inadequacy of associative network models in accounting
for selective memory effects was provided by the second part of the experiment
reported in Chapter 7. Some evidence compatible with an associative network
conceptualization of sensory pain descriptors was found; all subjects responded faster
to the second of a pair of sensory adjectives. However, significantly, no differences
in the levels of activation or organization of the network between chronic pain
patients and controls could be inferred, since the amount of priming provided by the
first of the pair was no greater for chronic pain patients than controls.
Two final conclusions can be drawn from the investigation of schematic
processing in pain patients in this thesis. Firstly, no evidence was found to support
the hypothesis that selective memory effects in chronic pain are 'found as a result of
the use of pain-related stimuli which form members of a semantic category: chronic
pain patients did not recall more gardening words than neutral words. Secondly, the
results of the first part of the experiment in Chapter 7 suggest that pain-related
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memory biases cannot be attributed to differences in the frequency with which
chronic pain patients and non-patient controls encounter sensory or affective pain
descriptors. This finding supports the indirect evidence from studies which have
bitS
demonstrated redkdespite repeated exposure to the mood-congruent stimuli.
In considering all of these findings it becomes apparent that the models previously
adapted to account for the effects of mood on memory, ie. associative networks and
schemas require some modification before they can account for the effects of pain
on unconscious processes. Williams et al (1988) provide a model which is able to
accomplish this to a large extent, by distinguishing between the processes of priming
and elaboration and proposing that biases can occur in one but not the other.
The experimental findings of this thesis, in conjunction with research on attentive
processes in chronic pain, suggest that this model has potential for understanding
cognitive processes in chronic pain. It appears that the effects of pain on memory
processes are analogous to those of depression, with chronic pain influencing the
allocation of processing resources to the elaboration of pain-related information.
Components of each of these models, in particular activation and resource
allocation, along with the concepts of feedback and cognitive loops (Ingram 1984),
may provide a theoretical account of greater utility in guiding future research in this
area. Such research could aim to define more clearly the exact conditions under
which biased processing in pain is evidenced, establishing whether findings are
generalizable from word stimuli, and developing specific remedial strategies based
on this knowledge.
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Several authors have proposed that information-processing biases play a role in
the development and maintenance of mood disorders (eg. Teasdale, 1983; MacLeod
et al, 1986), with mechanisms including cumulative activation and feedback thought
to be responsible (Ingram, 1984). In anxiety states it has been suggested that the
clinical manifestation of elevated levels of activation of cognitive structures results
in intrusive thoughts and re-experiencing of symptoms such as flashbacks, which arc
characteristic of these emotional disorders. The analogous implication for chronic
pain is that such activation plays a role in the continued experience of pain after
healing has occurred or where no organic pathology is found, typical of chronic pain
syndromes. Clearly, such a causal relationship requires empirical verification.
Conceptual Processing
With the aim of providing a measure of some aspects of conceptual processing,
a questionnaire was devised which, on factor analysis, was shown to comprise two
scales, labelled "organic" and "psychological" (Chapter 4). Groups of chronic pain
patients and non-patient controls were found to differ ignificantly in the extent to
which they endorsed these two classes of beliefs. The chronic pain patients placed
greater emphasis on organic beliefs, and less on psychological beliefs compared to
controls. The extent to which these differences are a function of chronicity of pain
is unclear, and it is possible that rather than changing over time, the contrast in
beliefs may be apparent before the patients become chronic pain sufferers. In other
words, beliefs may be one factor which distinguishes those individuals at risk for
developing a chronic pain condition. Blumer and Heilbronn (1982) proposed a model
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of chronic pain in which pain is a somatic expression of repressed emotion conflict,
and assumed that psychosocial disturbance was a significant factor in the onset of
pain. Clearly this is an extreme point of view, and has since been strongly refuted.
For example Gamsa (19) found that emotional disturbance was 	 likely to be
a precipitator than a consequence of chronic pain. More recently, Gamsa and Vikis-
Freibergers (1991) have argued that psychological factors are both risk factors in, and
consequences of chronic pain. They demonstrated an association between chronic
pain and less emotional repression and excessive work habits ("ergomania"). These
results are in direct conflict with Blumer and Heilbronn's concept of a "pain prone"
personality. However, these were retrospective, correlational studies, and therefore
it is not possible to conclude causality in either direction.
The studies presented in Chapter 5, through employing a prospective research
design, were able to demonstrate causal links between beliefs and a number of pain-
related measures. In a group of patients with chronic pain of a variety of aetiologies
(who may therefore be considered generally representative of chronic pain sufferers)
causal relationships were found between psychologióal beliefs and depression,
positive pain-related cognitions and several indices of activity. In each case increases
in endorsement in psychological beliefs were associated with improvements in
psychological and physical functioning. Organic beliefs were found to be causally
related to hopelessness cognitions and health locus of control beliefs. Decreases in
emphasis on this class of beliefs was associated with reduction in the frequency of
hopelessness cognitions, heightened internal locus of control and lowed reliance on
chance factors and powerful others in controlling health. The majority of these
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relationships were in both directions, suggesting that a vicious circle may be
operating, with a large number of disparate factors playing important roles in both
precipitating and perpetuating chronic pain. Thus it is likely that conceptual processes
are able provide an index of vulnerability, where schematic processes (as measured
by memory function) were not.
Clinically, the importance of these findings lies in the need to be able to predict
which individuals are at risk of developing chronic pain, after, for example a back
injury or illness, on the basis of non-medical variables such as beliefs, attitudes,
coping styles and emotional state. Appropriate interventions could then be targeted.
In conclusion, the distinction between schematic and conceptual processing has
provided a useful starting point for the examination of cognitive processes in chronic
pain. Where it suffers is in its failure to propose the exact mechanisms underlying
these levels of processing, and in the nature and extent of their interaction. Future
research might be directed at exploring these interactions.
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Appendix A
PAIN BELIEFS QUESTIONNAIRE
9or each item p(ease indicate your opinion by undei1ninq one cf the foffowing rmm(s in eacJ
sentence:
atzmys / almost a(u*Jy.s / ofteii / sometimes / iureAj / never
are no iigIt or rmvng asLcu: it is important that you respon( a conEi to your actual
beliefs, not according to flow you feet you sflouW believe or flow you think n rmznt you so believe.
Pfease makc sure that you answer .LL the questions.
1) Pain is (always/almost always/often/somelimes/rarely/never) the result of damage to the
tissues of the body.
2) Physical exercise (alwaysMznost always/often/sometimes/rarely/eve r) makes pain worse.
3) Ii is (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarelylnever) impossible to do much for oneself
to relieve pain.
4) Being anxious (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarely/never) makes pain seem worse.
5) Experiencing pain is (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarely/never) a sign that
Something is wrong with the body.
6) Being in pain (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarely/never) prevents you from
enjoying hobbies and social activities.
7) When relaxed pain is (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarely/never) easier to cope
with.
8) The amount of pain is (always/almost always/oftcWsometimes/rarely/ never) related to the
amount of damage.
9) Thinking about pain (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarely/never) makes it worse.
10) It is (always/almost always/oftenfsometimes/rarely/never) impossible to control pain on your own.
11) Pain is (always/almost always/often/sometimes/rarelyMevez) a sign of illness.
12) Feeling depressed (always/almost always/often/so,netimesftarely/ncvCr) makes pain seem
worse.
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